



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES




3 3433 07030138 1



BTLS

Page



Dup. to *BTZS*
Be Kept *1.2.3*
5

OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING

OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING



OUR
110 DAYS' FIGHTING

BY
ARTHUR W. PAGE




With Many Maps in Text
(And Two Large Maps at the Back)

GARDEN CITY NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

1920

LB



COPYRIGHT, 1919, 1920, BY
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF
TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES,
INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN

WORLD
LIBRARY
PUBLISHED

TO
MY FATHER

WHO SACRIFICED HIS LIFE TO THE END
THAT AMERICA SHOULD DO ITS PART
IN THE DEFENSE OF CIVILIZATION



FOREWORD

THE American people realize in a general way what wonderful work was done by the American Expeditionary Forces in the great war. They scarcely realize, however, to any extent, that this work was done in the face of difficulties all but insurmountable, or that General Pershing and those under him accomplished miracles in overcoming adverse conditions that sprang from many causes, most of them going back to our lack of preparation for war, some of them inseparable from war, and, therefore, unavoidable.

The country may well be proud of the fact, in spite of our general lack of preparation for war, that in the great Meuse-Argonne battle—which proved the decisive battle of 1918, and which lasted from September 26th to November 11th—the quality of our leadership and plans were such that our partially trained troops were able to drive back the picked troops of the German Army from Verdun to Sedan.

In the course of these operations, three strongly prepared defensive lines, in a terrain which in itself afforded great natural obstacles, were captured from the enemy, in spite of the effort of the enemy to hold these lines at all cost to prevent the ruin of his armies on the Western Front.

They can further be proud of the fact that our leadership, plans, and the devotion of our men were such that this great victory was won with a total loss on our side of approximately 9,000 less than that inflicted on the enemy.

What the American Expeditionary Forces accomplished in France forms a grand picture that compels the admiration of the patriotic American. The small-souled critic may pick up a magnifying glass and apply it to the picture in an endeavour to bring out prominently small flaws that, in the distorted view of the glass, may appear great, but when seen in correct perspective and relation to the remainder of the picture, do not affect in any way its grandeur.

Those of us who were called upon to hold more or less responsible positions in the American Expeditionary Forces in France, and who are, therefore, acquainted with the facts, feel that Mr. Page in his book, "Our 110 Days' Fighting," has rendered a distinct public service in giving a splendid vista of the organization of the American Armies in France, and of the period of fighting that began with Cantigny and ended with Sedan.

Apart from the official reports, which are to come out later, nothing can appear that will have greater immediate interest than Mr. Page's book. It forms a brief, readable, and concise account of the part the American troops played in Europe. In this necessarily brief record we get only a glimpse of the principal difficulties that confronted General

Pershing and his staff in France. It would take hundreds of volumes to recite them all, little and great, and in the detail necessary to a clear understanding of their importance to all our operations.

The soldiers, whose devotion to duty has set a new standard in our army, and their leaders from General Pershing down, including the staffs who directed operations in the American Expeditionary Forces; who spent days and nights of heart-breaking anxiety and labour in struggling with untoward conditions; whose motto was, "GET RESULTS," under any and all circumstances, and who finally presented to their country a victorious army—are satisfied to rest their case with the Nation, feeling sure of a just verdict.

J. W. McANDREW,
Major General U. S. Army.
Chief of Staff, A. E. F.,
May 6, 1918, to May 26, 1919.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD BY MAJOR GENERAL McANDREW

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. Our Training and Our Plan of Campaign	3
II. A Little Battle That Proved a Great Point and Made 100,000 Men . . .	20
III. Our Sixty Days Under the French . .	31
IV. The Triumph and Humour of St. Mihiel	62
V. The Campaign of the Argonne-Meuse .	83
VI. With the Allies	142
Statistics of the First Army	267

LIST OF MAPS

	PAGE
The American Army's Supply System . . .	7
Seicheprey and the Fixed Trench System . .	12
Artillery Plan for the Cantigny Attack . .	22
The Plan of the First American Attack . .	23
Cantigny and the Trenches of the War of Move- ment	27
Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood . . .	35
Ludendorff's First Effort to Widen the Marne Salient	39
Ludendorff's Second Effort to Widen the Marne Salient	41
Where the Tide of War Changed	48
America's Part in Clearing the Marne Salient	55
The Topography of the St. Mihiel Salient .	63
The Official Plan of the St. Mihiel Attack .	67
The Lane of the 42nd's Advance at St. Mihiel	69
The Allied Advance	77
The Woods of the Argonne-Meuse Battlefield	92
The Roads of the Argonne-Meuse	95
The Official Plan of the Argonne-Meuse Attack	98

	PAGE
Looking from the American Positions, September 26th	106
Relief Map of Montfaucon Area	107
The German Defence Lines	115
The Verdun Hills and the Woivre Plain	134
The Last Battle	136
Where We Cut the German Communications	137
Two Detail Maps of the Argonne-Meuse. <i>Supplement</i>	

OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING

Our 110 Days' Fighting

CHAPTER I

OUR TRAINING AND OUR PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

THE first independent offensive action by the American Army in Europe, the taking of Cantigny, took place only five and a half months before the war ended.

The first American division to take over an active sector of line did so only in April, six months before the war ended.

And the American First Army, formed on the 20th of July, had its first action at St. Mihiel, September 12th, just two months before the war came to an end.

The active fighting of any large bodies of American troops was confined to two main periods—from Château-Thierry to the Vesle, some sixty days, in which eight of our divisions took part; and the Argonne-Meuse battle, forty-seven days, in which twenty-two divisions took part. There were two or three days' fighting at St. Mihiel in between these two times. There were also several other notable ones, as those of the 27th and 30th divisions with British, but none involving more than two divisions.

In other words, our army just barely got in at the finish, and to do that it had to fight before either its training or equipment was ready. But if it had not gone in, ready or unready, and had not paid the price when it did, the war would not have ended on November 11th. The war ended then because the Germans were beaten—defeated in the military sense. Let there be no mistake about that. And the American Army in its hundred-odd days of fighting provided one of the vital elements of this defeat.

If the Marines of the 2nd Division at Belleau Wood, and the 3rd Division machine gunners at Château-Thierry, provided a dramatic entrance of our army into the main struggle, the moral decisions that placed them there were no less dramatic. If the six green divisions that went over the top in the Argonne-Meuse battle on September 26th performed heroic deeds, the moral courage to set them at such a task was no less remarkable, and far back of that, the moral courage to train them for open warfare was worth a great victory in itself. Most battles are lost or won before the first shot is fired. With this in mind it is worth studying the American Army's action in France, for it is full of brave, human endeavour, of moral and physical courage at many times and places that are still little known.

The short period in which our forces were actually engaged has tended to obscure somewhat the fact that when the war ended General Pershing commanded the largest force in American history, which had fought and won one of the great battles of all

times—the Argonne-Meuse battle, which lasted forty-seven days and used more American troops than there ever were in an American army before. This extraordinary result came suddenly. The work, however, that produced it was slow.


When General Pershing first landed in France, he determined to create a purely American force of quality and size large enough to bring victory to the Allied armies, for even before the German offensive of the spring of 1918 it was clear that the maximum British and French forces were not sufficient to defeat the Germans, then reinforced by their troops from Russia. General Pershing's intention was to train divisions until there were enough for an army corps, and occupy a separate American sector with that. As more divisions were trained and as the number of corps increased he planned to form an American army, and as the troops further increased more armies, until there were American groups such as existed in the armies of the French, British, and Germans. This was to be strictly an American organization, just as the British Army was entirely British, and the French all French. It would, of course, be under the supreme Commander-in-Chief, as all others were; even before he reached France, General Pershing was a believer in a unified command.

The divisions which were to make up this American force were to be trained principally for open warfare, a war of movement, with less attention paid to trench warfare, although they were to spend a certain time

in quiet sectors of the front-line trenches as part of their training.

It is worth while for every American who takes pride in what the army accomplished to contemplate carefully this conception of training—two thirds for open warfare, one third for trench warfare. This conception was decided upon in the summer of 1917, when there had been no war of movement on the Western Front for nearly three years. As prosaic as it looks on paper, this decision was more important than most battles, for it made our part in the final battle possible. It had this significance: Continued trench fighting almost inevitably meant a stalemate. A war of movement meant a decision one way or the other. The American Army was built for offensive, for victory. It is probably fair to say that the bulk of military opinion on the Allied side did not agree with General Pershing, and his decision was, therefore, a very bold one. But seldom has sound thinking and courage been better rewarded. A good many thousand American soldiers are alive now who would have died had his decision been the reverse. He expected to vindicate his belief in open warfare in the spring of 1919. It was vindicated, most opportunely, six months earlier.

The position on the front, ultimately to be taken by the group of American armies being planned, was practically fixed by the only possible remaining line of supply. The British had all the northern ports, and their lines covered everything from the battle area to the sea, as far south as Havre. The French



THE AMERICAN ARMY'S SUPPLY SYSTEM

This map shows in general the area occupied by British and French supply systems into which we could not go without confusion, and the lines of the supply we organized for our army. This only available line of supply chiefly dictated our position on the front.

supply lines took in all the Paris area and a broad belt running eastward from the capital. A supply system south of the French belt, from the sea to the battle line, between Verdun and Belfort, was about all that was left. Therefore Chaumont became headquarters, and the neighbourhood of Neufchateau and Saint-Dizier became our main advanced base.

The first place selected by the American staff for attack was the St. Mihiel salient, and the staff was working on this project many months before there was any American force ready even for a minor engagement, not to mention the taking of this position. To make a purely American army, trained for open warfare, with the first attack to be made at St. Mihiel—such were the plans.

By March, 1917, there were four American divisions which had finished their training and were theoretically ready for battle. Still, they had never been seriously engaged and no one knew how they would compare with first-class veteran troops in the ordeal of battle.

The first division which arrived after General Pershing in the spring of 1917 went into the trenches for training for the first time in October of that year. Three other divisions had followed it, the 2nd made up of two regiments of regulars (mostly recruits), the 9th and 23rd, and two regiments of Marines; the 26th Division, made up of the New England National Guard; and the 42nd, the Rainbow Division, made up of guard units from many states. But none of these divisions had yet been tested under fire. They

had had trench practice in quiet sectors, some patrol work, and had been subjected to a few German raids. Until March, 1918, no American unit had ever made a raid itself. The first one planned was to take place at one o'clock on the morning of March 4th. It was to be carried out by a detachment of 150 men from the 1st Division then in line on the southern side of the St. Mihiel sector. There was a good deal of suppressed excitement over this first offensive action, even if it was a small one. The whole division would have volunteered for the duty. The Commander-in-Chief himself was present. Nearly everyone stayed up, so as not to miss anything.

The plan was for the engineers to crawl out over No Man's Land, and put Bangalore torpedoes under the German wire, so arranged that they could be set off from a safe distance. At the appointed time the wire was to be blown up, the box barrage was to surround entirely the point to be attacked, and the raiders were to rush across, capture as many of the enemy as possible, and come back before the Germans could retaliate. The infantry, artillery, and engineer watches had been exactly synchronized, so that everything should work in harmony. To the second, on the appointed time, a wonderfully precise and accurate barrage surrounded the point of attack. The hundred and fifty raiders hurried out of their trenches. But the German wire remained intact. The attacking party was ordered back again. And then, about this time, the missing engineers turned

up. They had not been out preparing to blow up the German wire. They had been lost!

The miscarriage of this plan killed no one on this occasion, as such miscarriages often do. To train an army, especially a very new one, so that everything will happen correctly, and on time, is a task which is very difficult, and hard even to conceive in its true proportions. And if any one is disposed to laugh at the engineers for getting lost, let him take a map and go forth in the trenches in that sector in broad daylight, with no enemy to bother him, and see how rapidly he can get to any given point. Trenches are very crooked, puzzling, and slow and slippery lanes of travel.


The largest action in which American troops appeared before Cantigny was the so-called "battle of Seicheprey." It, too, occurred on the southern side of the St. Mihiel salient, and it, too, was unfortunate, if judged by immediate results.

This "battle" of Seicheprey was in reality a large raid. The Germans intended to cross the two American trenches between their lines and the village, clean it up, and then withdraw to the Sibille trench immediately north of the town. If they were not too heavily attacked, they meant to hold this position. And, in a general way, they carried out this mission successfully.

In the early morning of April 20th there were no Americans in the foremost trench. The second, the Sibille trench, was occupied by three companies of the 102nd Infantry, each minus one platoon.

They had orders to hold this trench if attacked. They also had been instructed by the French to have no outposts more than ten meters in front of the trench. Behind these trenches in the village was one platoon and the battalion headquarters.

About four o'clock in the morning of the 20th the German artillery became active. Later it quieted down, and then again, at about a quarter past five, it fell heavily on the village of Seicheprey and on parts of the Sibille trench in front. The American major in command, in the village, asked for a return artillery fire, which was given; but he got no word of any kind from his troops in the trenches, until about six o'clock a few of them retreated into the town with the Germans close behind them. With these men and the platoon that made up the town's garrison the major retreated to the southern edge of the village. The Germans cleaned up most of the town, destroyed the dugouts, kitchen, and first-aid station, captured the battalion headquarters and all its papers, and on an appointed signal withdrew to the cemetery that they held as a kind of advanced post in front of the Sibille trench, which they now organized for defence. It was discovered later that the Germans had come in three parties from the northeast, north, and northwest of Seicheprey, all arriving at the town at about the same time, and all having overcome the resistance of the Americans in the trenches. Most of our 400 or 500 losses in killed, missing, wounded, and prisoners occurred in the fighting in the Sibille trench. But the Ger-



SEICHEPREY AND THE FIXED TRENCH SYSTEM

The heavier black lines show the Franco-American trenches. The lighter black lines the German trenches. The lines of xxxx indicate wire. The Germans who attacked Seicheprey came from the direction of Richecourt, from Lahayville, and through the Bois de Remières.

mans did not escape easily, for we buried forty-one of their men, and they left other indications of having met a very stiff resistance. Our men probably had little real chance to make a successful defence, because of having no patrols to warn them and not being able to see on account of a heavy fog. The Germans, following their barrage very closely, were on them before they were aware.

The Germans held the Sibille trench all day, with the small American force lying in front of them in the village, while back on the next hill preparations for a counter attack were in progress. But the day passed with no reaction on our part, except artillery fire, and a little before the counter attack was ordered an American patrol discovered that the Germans had abandoned the Sibille trench and returned to their own lines.

Seicheprey was a very successful performance for the Germans, who endeavoured to use it to dampen our morale, sending out reports by their wireless and printing in their paper, the *Gazette des Ardennes*, a list of the prisoners, with the comment that, as General Pershing was very new at the game, he might like to know what had become of his men. But while such misadventures were annoying, they were part of the process of education. And this process was not an orderly procession of perfect achievements. No one can appreciate the real accomplishments of the army who does not realize how unskilled it was to begin with, and how dangerous it was to be unskilled in the presence of a keen and

practised enemy. Even our successes in the training period were sometimes rather high priced. A part of the 5th Division in August, 1918, under French orders attacked and captured the town of Frapelle in the Vosges near St. Die. The account of this in one of the New York papers was as follows:

The brilliant work of the American troops on Saturday in low ground bordering the little River Fave, east of St. Die, in the Vosges, has scarcely, perhaps, received the attention it deserves. It may be taken for granted that the affair must have been pretty serious for the enemy, otherwise Ludendorff would not have allowed himself in an official report to state that the Germans advanced posts had "yielded to an enemy local thrust."

What Ludendorff omitted to add was that very few of the defenders of these advanced posts succeeded in falling back, as nearly the whole lot were killed or made prisoner. The American attack, according to accounts which reached here to-day, was carried out with extraordinary dash. Charging with the bayonet on the village of Frapelle from two sides, the Americans carried the machine gun nests with a single rush, cleaning out the trenches and shelters with grenades as they went. The German garrison was practically wiped out.

There is nothing so far to indicate whether Saturday's affair may be regarded as the precursor of other operations on that part of the front, which has been for many months regarded by both sides as exceptionally quiet. Frapelle, however, is the first stage on the very important road from St. Die to Strassburg, via the Col de Saales. It lies in a river bottom, between five and six miles from the Col de Saales, from the crest of which the run down into Alsace is rapid and easy.

This was all true. But it was also true that the garrison consisted of four men, one an idiot, and that,

while it cost us nothing to take the town, the German artillery caused us a good many casualties before we withdrew from the village again.

Seicheprey and Frapelle and various other raids and minor activities taught us much. After Seicheprey battalion headquarters were not again put where the Germans were likely to get the papers. The men at Frapelle learned the cost of holding bad positions. Our artillery became surer of itself. We were not so likely to carry on a night battle between two parts of our own trenches if they happened to be very crooked. We were getting on in our training. And in recounting these instances, it is not intended to imply that we were not getting on very well. We were. But merely to give the bright side of the picture, which was all that came to the papers at the time, does not give a fair estimate of the situation. Without the less victorious side the record takes on an air of precision and assurance which the actual progress of events often lacked.

Suddenly, in March, our army was forced to give up its orderly plan of training and growth. In a sense, General Pershing was a sufferer from his own principal theory. The German General Staff also believed that the only way to win the war was to get out of the trenches and start a war of movement. The Germans had evolved a theory for accomplishing this end, and General Von Hutier practised it on the Russians near Riga. From this it became known as the Riga attack, or the Von Hutier method. Instead of concentrating troops on a front some days

before an attack, which usually resulted in detection by the enemy, they brought them up from many directions and had them arrive practically at the time of offence. The numbers and effect of surprise due to this system enabled them to break through the trench lines. They provided their infantry with light artillery, which it could take along in the advance, and which gave the troops power to keep up their progress even after they had left behind their field guns and heavy artillery, whose range had hitherto set the limit for any continuing attack.

Using this system, the Germans broke through the British Fifth Army, and in five days had gone twenty-five miles to within artillery range of Amiens and the main lateral railway behind the British lines. In the face of this crisis, General Pershing immediately gave up (for the time) the plans on which he had been working so hard for a separate American force.

The Secretary of War was in France. At a conference in Paris, General Pershing and Mr. Baker decided that we should turn over our forces to General Foch. The President approved by cable. On the 28th of March, General Pershing attended a meeting of the Allied commanders. As he came into the room he walked straight up to General Foch and said in French:

"I have come to tell you that the American people would consider it a great honour for our troops to be engaged in the present battle; I ask you for this in their name and my own.

"Infantry, artillery, aviation, all that we have, is yours; use it as you wish. More will come, in numbers equal to requirements.

"I have come especially to tell you that the American people will be proud to take part in the greatest and finest battle of history."

At that time there were four trained American divisions in France—a few more than 100,000 combatant troops, enough to make the first corps the first step in General Pershing's original hopes. General Foch accepted the offer. The 1st Division was sent to the line opposite Montdidier—a still active sector. The 26th went in the line at St. Mihiel. We had entered the war on the firing line. The four divisions which were to have constituted the first American corps to take over the first American sector were scattered across France. The American plan had been surrendered in the face of the Allied crisis.

In the meanwhile, affairs had proceeded from bad to worse. On the 9th of April, the Germans broke through the Portuguese at Armentières, and pushed their advantage until another great wedge was driven into the British line and the channel ports were threatened. The difficulties of transportation, caused by the Amiens line being under fire, made it very hard to get French reinforcements as far north as the fighting at Kemmel Hill in time to be of assistance. On April 12th Sir Douglas Haig had issued his famous communique in which he said:

Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment.

With the help of French reinforcements the front held. The Belgian army repulsed a German drive north of Ypres—an important contribution to the whole situation of which little has been said. By the middle of May, the lines were again stabilized. When the storm had broken on the Allied lines in March, the High Commissioners of Great Britain and France had gone to the American Government in Washington and asked that we send every available man to France, no matter how much training he had or how much he lacked.

The British cut down communications with their colonies and again cut down the imports into England, combed their merchant marine for ships, and gave us the tonnage to bring our men in a hurry. Ten of our divisions were to go into their area to be ready to help stem another German attack there. The others were to go into various French armies to build up their reserves. In actuality, there had not been much to Foch's famous strategic reserve army, and what there had been was exhausted. Nor, as history will show, did the Generalissimo have the power with which the public was wont to credit him. He was faced with a somewhat desperate situation. On May 1st the Germans could count on 1,600,000 rifles on the Western Front against the 1,343,000 rifles

of the Allies. If America was coming at all, it was time to start. In April and May the men began to pour into France. American divisions were arriving back of the British lines, some via England and some via the French ports, and other American divisions were coming into a training area behind the French armies. In the ten months prior to April we had sent 283,511 men to France. In April, 117,212 troops of all kinds embarked. In May, the numbers rose to 244,345. The papers were full of the great troop movements, but, although we had been at war for more than a year, and our 1st Division had been in France for most of that year, American troops had engaged in no real fighting. Yet American help was the main feature of any programme of bettering the Allied fortunes. By the middle of May there was no fear that great numbers would not arrive, but how would they fight? They were brave enough, admittedly, but 28,000 brave men might be a mob and not a division of fighting troops. The officers were of good character and intelligence, but these qualities do not necessarily imply military knowledge and leadership. The divisions manœuvred well in training, but what would they do in battle? That was a vital question to America, to the Allies, and to Germany, in May, 1918.

The German press belittled the possibility of our fighting well. Our press and the Allied press took success for granted. Neither side was quite sure. The stage was set for the trial.

CHAPTER II

CANTIGNY A LITTLE BATTLE THAT PROVED A GREAT
POINT AND MADE 100,000 MEN

THE trial was at Cantigny. It was, naturally, planned some time in advance, but in the march of events a thing happened the day before the Cantigny attack which more than ever made the demonstration of American fighting ability necessary. Our attack was to begin on the morning of May 28th. On the morning of May 27th, a great mass of German troops suddenly pushed across the Ailette, up over the strong position of the Chemin des Dames, and before the day was over the French lines were completely broken, and the Germans had crossed the Vesle on their way south to the Marne. The communiques that reached Paris on the night of the 28th told of the rapid and continuous German progress. But there came also that night another piece of news. The American Army had at last actively entered the war. The 1st Division shed a bright little ray of light on the otherwise dismal picture. And this ray of light was of great significance, for if the Americans could successfully meet the Germans, the Allies were assured an effective force big enough to win the war—the Americans were then arriving at the rate of 250,000 a month. If the Americans could

not successfully meet the Germans, then, well, the situation was very bad indeed.


To the Allied High Command Cantigny had an importance much beyond its intrinsic value as an action. In General Pershing's report to the Secretary of War the following occurs:

On April 26th, a month before, the 1st Division had gone into line in the Montdidier salient on the Picardy battle front. Tactics had been suddenly revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident of the results of their training, were eager for the test.

The first time one of our divisions went into line as a unit it met just the conditions for which it had been trained, and from that time to the end of the war the American troops were engaged in open warfare.

The town of Cantigny was the centre of a little salient projecting into the Allied line west of Montdidier. It was a very active part of the line, and the German artillery continually took a toll of forty or fifty casualties a day. The men were particularly eager, therefore, to get revenge. The task set the 28th Infantry, a part of the 1st Division, was to take the village of Cantigny and to straighten the line. The attack was to be made on a front of two kilometers (1.2 miles). The line having been here for some time, the industrious Germans had made for themselves some trenches and a good system of strong points, although there were no trench systems like those on the old fronts. The village itself was

Ammer 2, F.O. 18
43, 5HQA EF



The lines marked H-5 to H, etc., show the position of the barrage from five minutes before the H hour, the moment of attack, until 42 minutes after the H hour. This movement of the barrage was calculated to synchronize with the speed of the attack.

PLAN OF OPERATION AGAINST CANTIGNY

Legend
Zones of action - Objectives

Objective
 Line on which Bn. C will establish itself after clearing up the head of the hollow (18.25) (if the 9th A.C. does not attack on our left.)
 Line of change of role of advance of Bn. A.
 Limit between Bns.
 Limit between Companies.

Scale of Miles

Cantigny

Bn. C

C1

C2

C3

C4

Bn. B

Bn. A

C5

The first positions of the companies of the three battalions of the 28th Regiment (1st Division) are shown by squares marked A¹, A², A³, A⁴ for the companies of one battalion and so forth. Their advance is shown by dotted lines. The advance was actually made exactly "according to plan."

particularly well defended by machine guns. Back of it, in various woods, were the German reserves and artillery. The American infantry, which was to take the town, was to be supported by three French tank battalions containing ten tanks. There were also a French platoon of flame throwers and 150 men of the 1st Engineers.

A day or two before the 1st Division prepared two trenches in front of its position, which would appear on any airplane photograph as a strong defensive system. One of these trenches was a fake. The other was to act as a jumping-off place for our attack.

After an hour's artillery preparation, the infantry started at 6:45 A.M. The barrage started at five minutes to the zero hour of 6:45, and from the zero hour moved forward 100 meters every two minutes for the first 300 meters (327.9 yards). Then it held its fire for four minutes to give the infantry time to get up, if it had fallen behind, and then it rolled forward again; then another stop occurred, and so on, until it finally covered its allotted task. The barrage covered two kilometers in forty-two minutes. The infantry reached its destination right behind it—forty minutes after the zero hour, so the report of the battle stated. This meant that they passed all obstacles, overcame the German defences, captured or killed the defenders, and proceeded 2,000 meters (2,186 yards) at about the rate a person would stroll over the ground now with nothing to bother him. But as the troops went forward on May 28th, the

French tanks lumbered alongside, the bursting shells of the barrage fell in front of them, beyond which the heavy artillery concentration burst on the woods, where otherwise assistance might come to the help of the town's defenders.

The commander of the French tanks, in reporting his own operations, gives a picture of the soldiers of the 28th in action which is good evidence that all doubts of the skill and courage of the American Army to meet successfully the Germans could be safely discarded.

One paragraph of his report read:

Aside from the evidence of spirit and courage which aroused admiration on the part of all members of Tank Battalion No. 5 the American infantry showed a remarkable knowledge of how to use tank assistance, following them closely without allowing themselves to be held up by them, and sticking close to their barrage.

The tanks destroyed, or helped to destroy, fifteen or twenty machine guns in the village, and north and east of it. With their help and the barrage, the town was taken without a great deal of loss, and, at the end of forty minutes, the troops had reached their objectives and were even pressing on. Two hundred and fifty prisoners also had been picked up.

Five minutes later came the first German reaction. A small counter attack was launched against Fontaine Wood, south of where the 28th had advanced. It failed. Following this came intermittent heavy artillery fire on this part of the line. Toward noon,

enemy planes came over, and, very shortly after, Cantigny and the lines that our men had established in front of it were violently shelled. At about this time the French corps artillery, which was to do the counter battery work on the German guns, was taken out and sent south to the Marne battle. This left the German artillery with a free hand.

At ten minutes past five a heavy counter attack came against the western edge of Framecourt Woods. This was broken up by American artillery. At 6:45 another attack in waves came from due east toward Cantigny. Rifle and machine gun fire broke up the first wave, and the artillery attended to the rest. All the next day the Germans kept up their attempts to regain the town, but, as they lost many men and got nothing, at the end of the second night they ceased.

The American casualties were 350 men and twenty-five officers of the 28th Regiment, and twenty-five men of the 1st Engineers. Including the loss from artillery and the counter attacks on the second day, the losses were probably 600. The French tank battalion lost two officers and one man. The German casualties in the actual taking of the position were estimated at 350 men besides the 250 prisoners. In their counter attack they suffered many more.

1. The American soldiers had shown bravery and energy—that had been pretty well taken for granted.

2. They showed trained intelligence in using the help of the tanks in following the barrage, and in establishing defensive positions after their attack



CANTIGNY AND THE TRENCHES OF THE WAR OF MOVEMENT

The American (regular line with points) and the German (irregular line) trenches after our taking of Cantigny, a great contrast to the four-year-old systems around Seicheprey. These two maps are copies of the G. 2 maps made from airplane photographs and all other sources of information and kept up to date by frequent new editions.

had succeeded—this was the real test of their training. They were not only brave men but *brave and intelligent soldiers*. This information was worth much to the Allied command.

Our soldiers were, however, not skilled veterans. They showed this in an unnecessary and somewhat costly contempt for danger. After taking Cantigny, some of them walked round in the streets, as if they were invisible and invulnerable, although they were neither. This caused General Bullard, then in command of the division, to say in his telegraphic report: "The losses sustained, caused in part by lack of experience, will be a lesson which only personal experience could have given."

General Debeny, commanding the French First Army, reported that the operation was well prepared and vigorously executed, "which will serve to give the Americans, and others, a realization of the offensive valour of our Allies."

A realization of the offensive valour of the American troops amounted to adding four large divisions to the Allied forces. The 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd had finished their training and were ready for battle, and, as the 1st Division had just shown, when ready for battle on paper they were also prepared in fact. The 32nd, 3rd, and 5th were also on hand, but not so far advanced. Behind the British front, training under British tutelage, were ten newly arrived divisions, the 35th, 82nd, 33rd, 27th, 4th, 28th, 80th, 30th, 77th, and 78th. In the supply area was the 41st, already being broken up for replacements.

When General Pershing arrived, followed by the 1st Division, in 1917, the French staff knew that the American Army, even after it reached Europe, would have to be trained. The French public, however, did not realize this so well. Month after month had elapsed, and, although the American help was much talked of—for it was the Allies' trump card—the American soldier did not appear in the fighting. Then came the terrible blows against the British. Still the Americans were not in the line. Then, on May 27th, the Germans succeeded in the unbelievable project of taking the Chemin des Dames, and seemingly doing it with ease. If the Americans were going to appear at all, it was time. Whatever had been the plans, whether their training was completed or not, the current of events called for them in the fighting. Everyone in France, England, and America wanted to look at the trump card that had been talked of so long.

Cantigny showed it just a little, and it looked very good. American stock rose immediately. It was a small fight of great importance. As General Pershing said, in his report of November 20th, "Although local, this brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions." As the report of the fight reached French officers, it was easy to see the great importance they attached to it.

Within a week afterward two American divisions were defending the road to Paris and the crossing of the Marne. Perhaps necessity would have

driven the French to call on them if Cantigny had not occurred. But without Cantigny, they could not have called on them with the same confidence. It is fair to say that Cantigny added 100,000 men, or about the equivalent of eight French divisions, at one of the most critical moments of the war.

CHAPTER III

OUR SIXTY DAYS UNDER THE FRENCH

THE actual fighting of the American Army in France can be divided into two main periods:

The first period included chiefly the battle of Cantigny, the fighting in the Château-Thierry area and on the Marne, and the Marne-Vesle campaign—some sixty days' fighting under French command. During this period we had nine divisions engaged. This does not include the operations of the 27th and 30th divisions which performed all their very remarkable service with the British Army. This first period is the period of French command.

The second period, under American command, includes the battle of St. Mihiel beginning on September 12th, and the forty-seven days of the Argonne-Meuse battle, from September 26th to November 11th—about fifty days' fighting in which all of our combat troops were engaged. The 2nd, 36th, 27th, 30th, 37th, and 91st served either all or part of this period with either the French, British, or Belgians. But the second period is essentially the period of American command.

To get a fair picture of what happened during the first period one must turn his mind back to the conditions at the end of May, 1918. The Germans

had just broken the French line on the Chemin des Dames, as they had previously broken the British lines at St. Quentin. They were rapidly advancing toward the Marne. In all men's minds were two questions: Can this advance be stopped now? And if it is, is there any way to stop the Germans from succeeding in a third drive as they have already in two? There was no army of manœuvre and not enough for either French or British reserves. Such was the situation on May 29th. There were, however, considerable reserves of Americans in various stages of training, and two days previously one regiment of the American 1st Division had demonstrated its skill and ability in taking the town of Cantigny.

On the morning of May 29th, the Chief-of-Staff, Major-General McAndrew, had a visit from General Ragueneau, then chief of the French mission to our headquarters at Chaumont. He told General McAndrew of the desperate condition of the French forces north of the Marne, and the possibility of German cavalry getting through and raiding south of the river. General Pershing was at Cantigny and in his absence General McAndrew promised that the 3rd Division would be ready to move by 6 o'clock that evening.

In consequence General Dickman, then commanding the 3rd Division, received a sudden change in orders. He was on a tour, inspecting a quiet sector of the line to which he was to take his division for its first trench training. He was overtaken by orders


to hurry back to his command and put them in motion with all speed for Château-Thierry. The 2nd Division had a similar experience. French officers are among the least excitable people in the world, and having been in the war a long time they did not allow it to disturb their comforts any more than was absolutely necessary. Consequently the arrival of a French officer at five in the morning (May 30th) at the headquarters of the American 2nd Division was a sure proof that something unusual was afoot. The 2nd Division was then under orders to move up to the Beauvais district for further training. The orders which this early-morning caller from French Headquarters gave to General Bundy were to put his whole division on trucks and move with all speed to Meaux. This meant that the training period was over and that the 2nd was going into battle! These orders to the 3rd and 2nd divisions marked a vital decision in the conduct of the war. From five o'clock in the morning of May 30th to the end of the war American troops were always headed toward the fighting front. The little battle of Cantigny had proved that the Americans could be used without further test, and the German successes made it clear that they would have to be used without further delay. So the 3rd and 2nd received their historic orders and started for the battle.

The first American unit to meet the German offensive was the 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the 3rd Division. It was a motorized unit and rolled off to Condé-en-Brie to join the French, and then

on to Château-Thierry. The men rode up practically to the battle line and immediately went into action. After being more than twenty-four hours on the road, two companies reached Château-Thierry on the afternoon of May 31st. They helped the French Colonials, who were there to stop a fierce effort of the Germans to cross the river, and from that time until the Germans retreated, more than a month later, there were machine gunners of the 3rd Division holding the crossing at Château-Thierry.

The rest of the division came up little by little. Its transportation had been disarranged in the confusion caused by the German advance, and part of the troops had to march the thirty-five miles from Provins to the Marne. As they came in they were scattered amongst the French troops on the south side of the river. The conduct of this division is particularly interesting because it had not had its trench training, had never been under any kind of fire, and had not even been together as a unit since it left America until some days after it went into action, when its artillery came up. Its first troops went into action on May 31st. It was relieved on the Ourcq on July 29th.

The 2nd Division came into the battle area in somewhat the same hurried way but it had time to get together before it was actually engaged. Motor transport to Meaux and an all-night march brought its leading troops, early on the 1st of June, into a support position covering the Paris road at Le Thiolet. By that night the whole division was in



CHATEAU-THIERRY AND BELLEAU WOOD

The taking of Belleau Wood and Vaux and the defence of the river at Château-Thierry gave the American troops a new standing in the eyes of both the Allies and the enemy. The Germans, however, held Hill 204 and Château-Thierry until the attack south of Soissons forced their retirement from the Marne.

position behind the French troops on a twelve-mile front.

The confidence born of the appearance of this help stiffened the resistance of the French troops holding this part of the line and they maintained themselves with the help of small American reinforcements until the night of the 3rd of June. During this night the 2nd Division relieved them, and on the morning of the 4th the 2nd Division was face to face with the Germans on a twelve-mile front. The Germans opposite them held a position including Belleau Wood and Bouresches village, which gave them protection and cover either for defence or concentration for another attack. The Americans set to work to push them out of the woods. .

The tactical and strategic reasons for advancing our line there at that time were of little consequence in comparison with the moral reason. Cantigny had, after all, been but a small experiment. A bigger demonstration was needed to establish the proper confidence in our army and in the minds of our Allies, and to explode the myth which the German commanders circulated among their troops that even if Americans got to France they would not be trained enough to fight. The Germans sent two picked divisions for the particular purpose of inflicting a defeat on our troops that would seriously discount the effect of all American military aid. As American military aid was the greatest hope of the Allies and the greatest fear of the Germans, its test was a matter of supreme significance to each side.

The battle of Belleau Wood, which followed, has probably been described more than almost any other American engagement. It was a splendid test of American against German in open warfare with machine guns, rifles, and artillery, and with all the advantage of position with the enemy. The German defence consisted of hidden machine guns so placed as to cover all approaches, and with other machine guns covering these, so that taking one nest would not break their line. Theoretically, it was impassable. Practically, it was impassable also for any troops that at all hesitated in their attacks.

Our men produced a heavy and accurate rifle fire—a special part of their training—against these nests, and when they rushed them they shed all impediments, and went in at a terrible speed and regardless of loss. The combination was just good enough. It was the vigour of our attack there that prompted the German intelligence officer's comment, captured later by the French, which said:

The American 2nd Division may be considered a very good division, perhaps even an assault division. The various attacks of the two regiments upon Belleau Wood were executed with dash and intrepidity. The moral effect of our fire was not able seriously to check the advance of the infantry. The nerves of the Americans are not yet worn out.

This is an extraordinary tribute to a division in its first battle. This German practically says that to stop the Americans they had to be hit. The last line of his comment is also a grim comment on the


slowing down which long service causes in the best troops, and the great value of the freshness of our forces.

From the 4th of June until the end of the month, the Marine brigade, with minor reliefs, worked its way through the woods. At the end it held Belleau (now *Marine*) Wood and the other brigade (regulars) of the division, which had been doing its part also, topped off the proceedings on July 1st by brilliantly taking the village of Vaux with 500 prisoners.

This action also marked the first appearance of the American Air Service in an active sector. The 1st Observation and 1st Pursuit Groups had been transferred to this area on June 28th and the Pursuit Groups' task on July 1st was to keep enemy airplanes from crossing the lines between daylight and eight P.M., which was successfully accomplished.

The fighting of the 2nd Division and the scattered units of the 3rd Division on the south bank of the Marne confirmed the Cantigny verdict that there was no discount on our troops. On the Allied side the question ceased to be how much more training they needed, but how fast they could be moved into the line. With the Germans the question was: What could be accomplished before large numbers of Americans got into action?

The necessity for a quick decision more than ever pressed upon the German High Command, and with amazing rapidity and persistence they continued their attacks. When they finally decided that the road to Paris via Château-Thierry was barred, they planned




LUDENDORFF'S FIRST EFFORT TO WIDEN THE MARNE SALIENT

If he could connect the Noyon and Marne salients he would make both safer for his troops against counter attack and also bring his front much nearer Paris. The arrows show the plan of attack, but it gained little and was stopped before it achieved its purpose.

a great offensive to widen their Marne salient on the western side. This offensive is best explained by the accompanying map. Its ultimate object was to join the Montdidier and Marne salients thereby not only threatening Paris, but the communications between the British and French armies as well. On the 9th of June the attack began. It made some progress, and heavy fighting continued for several weeks. But strategically it was a failure. When it was over the Marne salient was still dangerously narrow between Soissons and Rheims, and the Germans had derived no advantage from their operations.

Having failed on this side of the salient, they determined upon a similar operation on the other side. This, as planned, would cut the lines at Chalons and Epernay and threaten the French communications. The main second attack was to be against General Gouraud's army in the Champagne. But the central idea behind both these attacks was the destruction of the French army. By various means, General Gouraud discovered not only that this second attack was to be launched against him, but exactly the day, hour, and minute on which it would start, and he made his plans accordingly.

The Germans counted upon massing both men and artillery in secret, and launching their infantry attack where they would have a great preponderance of both. These advantages, coupled with the effect of surprise, were to give them a third such victory as those of March 21st and May 27th. But Gouraud, knowing their plans, prepared his men and his



LUDENDORFF'S SECOND EFFORT TO WIDEN THE MARNE SALIENT

This attack would, if successful, make the Marne salient safe for his troops, isolate and capture Rheims, cut the rail-roads at Epervain and Châlons and also isolate Verdun. As always, the attack's main object was the destruction of the army opposite. It turned out to be the last German offensive. It was a complete failure, and the Germans never again regained the initiative.

artillery likewise, and as he knew what they were going to do and they did not know what he was going to do, the effect of surprise was all against the Germans. The German artillery barrage was ruined by the French, and the Germans, massed for the attack, were subject to bombardment. The attacking waves, poorly protected by their own artillery, were terribly lacerated by the French. Besides the ordinary kinds of shelling they were even subjected to the point-blank fire from batteries of 75's especially arranged to meet their attack. These guns were with the French infantry, which had been withdrawn from the front lines so that the Germans would have to pass a wide and withering zone of fire before reaching any one to fight. When they did reach the French lines they were met first with all the kinds of small arms fire and then with the bayonet. July 15, 1918, was probably the worst single day the Germans ever had. This last desperate attack in the Champagne was a terrible catastrophe for them. It took their last "offensive" reserve. They never attacked again.

The 42nd, the Rainbow Division, had the honour of holding a small part of Gouraud's front line on that momentous day. Two battalions of the 165th Infantry (the old "Fighting" 69th, New York) were in the line near Somme-Py, and the rest of the division was disposed in the rear to handle any Germans that might break through. There was no break through, but the two battalions in the line handled themselves in a way to receive the praise and con-

gratulations of General Gouraud. In France this is taken to mean that the reward was fully merited.

While this was going on, the Germans started their corollary attack across the Marne intending to push south and east. South of Dormans the attack caught some companies of the 28th Division—the Pennsylvania Guard. They were not enough to hold, and had their nerves been worn out, or perhaps, if their experience had been longer, they would have retired to the main force. As it was, they stopped the advance until most of them were killed or wounded. A few only trickled back.

A little farther west, the German attack ran into the same spirit, backed by somewhat larger numbers. The 3rd Division held the south bank of the Marne from Château-Thierry, where their machine guns had come on May 31st, to Mézy, five miles (eight kilometers) eastward. East of Mézy the Germans were across the river, so that the right flank of the 3rd Division, the 38th Regiment, was already under fire when the battle commenced. The German artillery turned a stream of shells on Mézy to drive the 38th into its dugouts, and then, under cover of a smoke screen, the German troops started to cross the river in boats. It is a little stream, and if the German fire had kept the Americans underground, the passage would have been quickly achieved. The 38th realized this as well as the Germans, and taking the barrage as it came, they remained in the open, and with rifle fire and machine guns fired through the smoke screen at the German boats. Our artillery

also, although this was its first action, got the range of the Germans waiting to cross and those crossing. In a few minutes broken boats and dead Germans were floating down the river. One boat got across, but there was a sergeant hiding in the bushes waiting for it. As it touched the shore he told the Germans with the particular vigour and implications of army language that they were the people he had been waiting for and simultaneously threw a hand grenade in the boat. There was no landing there. But east of the village, where a point of land jutted out, the German cross fire kept the defenders from preventing a landing. However, after they had crossed the river the Germans were little better off. They were met by the same machine gun and rifle fire—and General Pershing had made a specialty of marksmanship in the A.E.F. As they pressed on, they came into contact with bombs and bayonets. In the defence one platoon of the 38th Infantry was annihilated. A second was nearly so, but the third came in and continued the fight. As the fourth finally came into action, the Germans surrendered. With veritable devils in front of them, and the river behind, 400 men of the 6th Grenadiers gave themselves up to about half their number. And while all this was going on the 38th had been subjected to fire from every possible direction, for they were surrounded on three sides.

This is why General Pershing called this action “one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals.” By this time the 2nd, 3rd, and parts of

the 42nd and 28th divisions had met the enemy and verified the verdict of the 1st at Cantigny.

General Pershing was one of those who, immediately after the Germans reached the Marne, counselled attacking them at the base of their salient. Strategically, it was the normal thing to do if there was an available force to do it. On June 22nd, when Marshal Foch and Premier Clemenceau visited American Headquarters, General Pershing urged it again, saying that the American Army could furnish several first-class divisions, and several others which, if then not fully trained, would certainly fight. And the less advanced American divisions could relieve first-class French divisions and permit them to be used for attack.

But the German preparations kept the initiative in their hands a little longer. On the 15th of July the French were still fighting where and when the Germans chose; three days later the exact reverse was the case.

The terrible defeat Gouraud inflicted on the Germans in the Champagne ended the German offensive. The plan to hit back by an attack on the base of the Marne salient had been made some time previous. The psychological moment was to strike when the German Army was in the confusion and discouragement of its great defeat, and before it could reorganize itself and initiate anything more. But the decision to put the Allied attack into effect necessarily rested on the availability of men to do the attacking. The French were terribly used up, as

well as the Germans. The available American troops were also in need of rest. There was a great danger that temporary stalemate might give the Germans time to recover. Instead, Foch had the moral courage to call on his tired forces, French and American, to renew the struggle; and Americans can take pride in the fact that Pershing urged it, insisting that the Americans, tired and depleted as they were, could and should be used. There is a line in the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" that carries the spirit of the Franco-American attack of July 18th, for certainly on that day *"there sounded forth the trumpet that never called retreat."* The year 1918 had seen no Allied advance of any size before July 18th. From that time to the end of the war there were nothing but Allied advances.


The orders to start for this historic battle caught the 1st Division on the road to its rest area. They caught the 2nd Division resting after its month's fighting at Vaux and Belleau Wood. Both were ordered to make all speed, for once the decision had been made, no time was to be lost, lest the psychological moment should slip away.

Accordingly, the 1st Division received orders to join the French XX Corps, Tenth Army—General Mangin—southwest of Soissons. The infantry, engineers, and even the field artillery of the 1st Division were taken by truck to their area, and by the night of the 17th, by hard marching and long hours, the 1st was in position for attack the next morning, although the artillery had to spend all night getting up ammunition.

The 2nd Division likewise had a difficult time. The plan of its attack was made on the night of the 16th. By superhuman efforts the infantry of the division was gotten to the line in time to make the attack although part of the 23rd Infantry and the 5th Marines had to double-time to get there. The machine guns, however, did not get into the fight until about 10 o'clock, some five hours after the battle opened.

The object of the attack was to push forward due east and capture the heights south of Soissons, and cut the road from Soissons to Château-Thierry which was one of the vital supply lines to the Germans in the Marne salient. From north to south the attack was to be delivered by the French 153rd Infantry Division, the 1st American, the 1st Moroccan, and the 2nd American.

At 4:35 on the 18th the battle opened. There was no previous artillery preparation to warn the enemy. The infantry started with the first roll of the barrage. Except for the fact that the men were very tired from hard travel, and that the French tanks moving into action had cut all the ground telephone wires to division headquarters, the 1st went into the fight in shape. The 2nd, likewise tired, was without its machine guns. But even if the attack occurred before some of our units were ready, the situation was even worse for the Germans. It caught them by surprise. One German officer was caught still in his pajamas. Their artillery was accordingly weak at first. By six o'clock prisoners were coming in, and all reports from the front were good.



WHERE THE TIDE OF WAR CHANGED

The battle line before the attack on July 18th. The 1st Division pushed across the Misy Ravine, passed Ploisy and Berzy le Sec and cut the Soissons-Château-Thierry road. The 2nd Division passed Vierz and reached a position to dominate the road.

The whole line moved the one and a quarter miles (two kilometers) past the first objective in good order. Before reaching the second objective the French on the left of the 1st Division were held up and the left flank of the 1st, slowing down to keep in touch, finally stopped about its second objective in front of the Missy Ravine which was stoutly held by German machine guns. The right of the division reached the third objective in liaison with the neighbouring Moroccans. On the other side of the Moroccans the 2nd Division had also reached its third objective.

At four the next morning the attack was resumed. The 2nd Division, which had reached the outskirts of Vierzy the night before, cleared this place and by the night of the 19th, when it was relieved, had reached a position that commanded the Soissons-Château-Thierry road. The losses had been very heavy and the gains very important.

The 23rd Regiment began the battle with 3,400 men and ninety-nine officers. It came out with 1,429 men and thirty-seven officers. It had gone five miles (eight kilometers) in the first day, and captured 2,100 men and seventy-five officers.

The 1st Division, meanwhile, pressed on. Ahead of it a tank attack almost reached Ploisy, but this was about the end of the tanks' assistance for they were pretty well destroyed. In the afternoon, at 5:30, the left wing again attacked and this time did reach Ploisy, evening up both flanks and presenting a straight front.

This day cost the division about 3,000 casualties,

making a total of 4,500 for the two days' fighting. The prisoners amounted to about 2,000 on the first day and 1,000 on the second, when the resistance stiffened.

The French command then honoured the division by assigning it part of the 153rd's objective—the village of Berzy-le-Sec—for the next day. Hard fighting all that day, however, did not capture the village, although south of it an advance was made. But another toll of a thousand casualties came. After this third day the 153rd on the left of the 1st was reinforced, the Moroccan Division on the right was relieved. The previous night the 2nd had been relieved. Of the original attacking force only the 1st Division remained as it entered the fight.

In company, then, with fresh troops on either side, the 1st attacked again at four o'clock on the morning of the fourth day, July 21st. The casualties were again heavy, especially on account of the fire from the north, but Berzy and the heights beyond were reached and the whole division front was in line. While this fighting was going on, General Summerall was notified that the relief promised for that night would not reach the line. The relief was the Scottish 15th Division which had been previously loaned to Foch by Haig. So the 1st was scheduled to have another day of it. The meagre resources with which Foch was attacking is significantly shown in the length of time the 1st Division kept up its attack and the distance from which its relief came.

When the division finally came out of the line

it had lost more than 7,200 men, mostly in the infantry. The full complement of infantry in a division is 16,644. Five days' constant and successful attack after a long march; an advance of more than six and a quarter miles (ten kilometers); losses of nearly 50 per cent. of the infantry engaged; keeping pace with the famous Moroccan division and staying longer in the fight—all this had demonstrated that the 1st Division could stand in any company.

Moreover, the last days had been the hardest. The element of surprise had disappeared and the Germans were stiffening their line, for it meant a catastrophe for them if this attack continued to gain. As it was, the success of the whole operation necessitated the beginning of a German retreat that ended in the armistice.

The records of some of the units of the 1st Division give a good indication of the severity of the fighting. The 16th and 18th Infantry each lost all officers above the rank of captain except the commanding officers, while the 26th lost them all and came out commanded by a captain of less than two years' experience. About 60 per cent. of all infantry officers were hit.

This battle south of Soissons is a fair sample of open warfare as compared with the previous trench fighting. The front had not been stabilized long enough at that point for much if any trench construction. But this does not mean that troops remained in the open as in the Civil War. Modern artillery necessitates the use of dugouts, caves, cellars, or

burrowing of some kind. In the Civil War it would not have been normal to catch 600 men in a cave, as the Americans did near Soissons. In this war catching men underground was not unusual. These particular Germans had been kept in the cave by artillery fire and their escape had been prevented by the rapid approach of the infantry. Nevertheless, they refused to surrender and kept up a fire out of the cave's mouth. The Americans called for the help of a tank, which waddled up and turned its one-pounder into the cave's mouth. But the German garrison still resisted, and the German artillery, spotting the tank, drove it away. About this time someone discovered a vent from the cave and had the happy idea of dropping a gas bomb down it. As there were none on hand, messengers were sent to the Moroccans to borrow some. The first bomb produced the desired result. After it had been dropped into the cave, the Germans surrendered and to the great surprise of the little cleaning-up party of Americans, instead of a squad or two, there were 600 of them who came marching out.

At another place an American sergeant led an attack against a dugout. It was beaten off and he was wounded and captured. The Germans dressed his wounds. While this was going on, he convinced them that the Americans would treat them well and that they had better surrender. They let him go to arrange the matter, and he found a lieutenant who paused to receive the surrender before he went on with the fight. The wounded sergeant brought the

Germans back to division headquarters. To surrender this way to small numbers does not sound very heroic, but it is a part of modern war, and men in a cave or dugout have practically no other alternative, because one machine gun or a couple of men with hand grenades can absolutely command an exit.

The tanks also add two new features to modern warfare—one physical and the other moral. Physically they break up machine gun nests, which were the main German system of defence. And morally, they are of almost as much value. Officers who have been with them in action are almost unanimous in saying that they increased the morale of the infantry tremendously. "The men will go anywhere with the tanks." Even an attack that has about played out can be reinvigorated by the presence of a tank or two.


The cutting of the Soissons-Château-Thierry road by this operation was the most decisive part of the general attack which Foch had started on both sides of the Marne salient—an attack in which French, Americans, British, and Italians took part. It made it necessary for the Germans to get out of the Marne salient. More war of movement was imperative, this time a backward movement. That similarly meant movement for the French and Americans. All three were weary and used up. Around the base of the salient, in line to follow and push the Germans in retreat, was the 26th Division, the New England Guard, which had taken over the Belleau Wood sector. And troops of the 3rd, 28th,

and 4th divisions in smaller units brigaded with the French were in the line chiefly along the south side of the salient.

The 26th pushed forward its left a little on the 18th to keep in touch with the fighting farther north. On the 20th, the attack in which the 1st and 2nd divisions were engaged south of Soissons having progressed far enough, the whole line from there to Château-Thierry advanced.

The Germans now steadied the sides of the salient and retreated north out of it. They had recrossed the Marne on the 18th, with elements of the 3rd, 4th, and 28th among the troops in pursuit. The 4th Infantry of the 3rd Division were the first troops over the river. The enemy fought only a rear-guard action on the 21st, but on the next two days they tried hard to hold the ridges around Epieds. They needed this time to get their material out behind them. Once the Allied attack started, everyone with a map looked eagerly at the pocket in which the Germans were trapped, and scanned the headlines for the news that would foretell their cutting off and capture. To look at the map such a result looked possible. But the map did not show the lack of reserves. Even with the terrain in our favour, men were needed, and they were still scarce. The relief for the 26th Division, on July 25th, for example, was obtained by pulling the 42nd Division out of its position with Gouraud and sending it all the way around to the other side of the Marne salient.

As they neared the line of the Ourcq River, the



AMERICA'S PART IN CLEARING THE MARNE SALIENT

In the 60-odd days' fighting under French command shown on this map the American troops got their first experience of active warfare in units larger than a regiment. In this 60 days' fighting the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, and 42nd took part. The 77th Division's service on the Vesle, after August 6th, is not shown.

Germans were being pushed faster than they could withdraw their supplies and decided to make a firm stand to gain time. The front having now become narrower, the American 3rd Division had been relieved, some French divisions had fallen out of line, and two American divisions, the 42nd and 28th (by July 27th this division was all together), were side by side.

A report of the 1st Army Corps, covering the operation of the 42nd division, gives this picture of the situation: "To halt our too-rapid advance, fresh (German) divisions were thrown into line, and it was along the Ourcq that the most stubborn fighting along our corps' front, during the entire operation, occurred. On the yellow wheat fields that gradually slope eastward from Meurcy Farm; on the heights of Hill No. 184, which dominated Fère-en-Tardenois, remained innumerable evidences of the stubbornness of the fighting. The bodies of our men often lay in rows not twenty yards from the German fox holes; the opposing lines were often within a stone's throw of each other, and the bodies of the German and American dead in the same machine gun nests were a further testimony of the mutual stubbornness of the conflicts." On the right of the 42nd, under a French corps, the 32nd, which was for the first time in combat, was having similar hard fighting in front of Cierges.

When the Germans gave up the Ourcq line, they retreated to the Vesle. On August 3rd the 4th Division, which in small units had been doing good

fighting with the French, making its first appearance as a division, relieved the 42nd. With little opposition it reached the Vesle the next day. Two days later it crossed the river and reached Bazoches. On the 12th, after this campaign had really come to a standstill, still another new division came into line, the 77th relieving the 4th. The 4th, 26th, 42nd, and 32nd had all seen hard fighting during the forty days from June 20th to August 1st.

The Americans had broken the German line at the Ourcq. Yet the enemy had conducted a skilful and successful retreat, losing comparatively few men and guns. The Allies—French, American, British, and Italians—had not been able to force their retreat into disorder.

But a great change had come over the war and it was due in large part to General Pershing and his army. For he had produced the men to change the scale against the Germans. The odds were now with the Allies.

On May 27th there had been only one American division, the 1st, that had ever even held an active sector of line. By the middle of August there were nine divisions with battle experiences:

1st Division, *Cantigny—Soissons*

2nd Division, *Belleau Wood—Faux—Soissons*

3rd Division, *Château-Thierry—Mezy—Crossing of Marne*

4th Division, *Crossing of Vesle*

26th Division, *Belleau Wood—Hill 204*

28th Division, *Dormans—Passing of Ourcq*

32nd Division, *Passing of the Ourcq*

42nd Division, *Champagne—Passing of the Ourcq*

77th Division, *Bazoches Sector*

These divisions had met the Germans in attack, in defence, in bitterly contested actions, and in rear-guard fighting. They had met Prussian Guard and Landwehr divisions, all kinds of Germans in all conditions of warfare, and all were keen to meet the German again. They had finished "second best" in none of the encounters. Their confidence in themselves was high. Their Commander-in-Chief believed in them even more than before. Their Allies accepted them completely. And last, but not least, the Germans had acquired a genuine respect for them. About a month after the Vesle was crossed, the German Intelligence wrote from this Marne campaign experience that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd were first-class attacking divisions and that the 42nd and 26th were good fighting divisions. This report did not cover the other divisions engaged in the Marne, but this is enough to show that enemy opinion of us—the safest judgment to follow—was rising rapidly.

The time had now come to go back to General Pershing's fundamental purpose and create a great American army to fight under its own leaders, subject only to the Allied High Command. With the end of the Marne-Vesle campaign ended also the period of French command. In that campaign the American I Corps, under General Hunter Liggett, had functioned as a part of the French Sixth Army. But most of the time it directed only one American division. This was the first time that we had had a corps organization in tactical command of troops

either in practice or in action since the Civil War. With the exception of this corps all higher staffs were French.

The creation and moulding of corps and army staffs that are as highly trained as they should be is properly a twenty-year task. There was, therefore, much more doubt about our ability to make working staff organizations in two years than of our ability to create fighting divisions in that time. Nevertheless, doubt or no doubt, it was necessary to do it both because it would have been ridiculous for a nation like the United States to put two or three million men in the field under foreign generals, and also because our men wanted to fight under American leadership and would fight better that way. An apprenticeship they gladly and thankfully served, but we could not naturally accept permanent tutelage. The fact that we did succeed in organizing effective staffs is due chiefly to the teaching of the Fort Leavenworth schools from 1901 on and the permeation of that teaching through the army.

By the end of July, then, the time had come to organize the American First Army. There was no pressing emergency calling our troops to the front for a little while. The Germans had not recovered from their reverses at Soissons, the Champagne, and the Marne, and the British had launched an offensive against the Amiens salient on the north, seconded by a French attack on the south. The British and French then were giving the enemy no rest. The task for us was to organize our army and get into action

again as soon as possible. We practically withdrew from active fighting for thirty days.

On the 27th of July the American First Army was organized. General Pershing became Commander of the First Army acting under himself as Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. Orders would go from General Headquarters at Chaumont signed "by command of General J. J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, James W. McAndrew, Chief-of-Staff," to General J. J. Pershing, Commanding the First Army, who, it is recorded, was duly obedient to his superior.

Our General Staff then began to direct the active operations of our troops, which, except in the training areas, had been done by the French. The First Army staff and the corps staffs began to function. A typical case will show what the organizing of higher commands meant in responsibility to American officers.

Joseph T. Dickman was a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1915, that is, second in command of a regiment which then consisted of 800 men. He went to France as a Major-General in command of a division of 27,000 men, and in quick succession rose to be a corps commander with responsibility for some 81,000 men, and then to the command of an army which means any number from 180,000 to 250,000. From the peace-time care of 800 men to the war-time direction of 250,000 is a big increase in responsibility in three years.

During August we collected our scattered divisions from the French and brought down to our own area

all but two (the 27th and 30th) of the ten divisions which the March crises had necessitated sending into the British area, where they had been trained under British instruction. Around Chaumont and Toul the country was filled with American troops.

General Pershing went back immediately to his original plan—to attack the St. Mihiel salient. The French High Command approved the project, but with the stipulation that when the salient was flattened out the operation should be concluded.

CHAPTER IV

THE TRIUMPH AND HUMOUR OF ST. MIHIEL

WHEN the Germans took the St. Mihiel salient in 1914 they established their line with an eye for advantageous positions which must evoke admiration from any one who sees them. In the point of the salient they held all the high ground and the French lines opposite were all below them. The Germans could see practically every time a French soldier moved, and their artillery could fire from direct observation. Almost the only low ground the Germans themselves had at the point of the salient was the town of St. Mihiel, and they kept part of the civil population in St. Mihiel so that the French would not disturb the troops there by shelling. The side of the salient running north from St. Mihiel crosses a range of hills where it joins the main battle line. On these hills the Germans were in a strong position, but as the French were also on the hills the German advantage here was not so marked. The German line on the side of the salient east from St. Mihiel ran along a completely commanding line of hills terminating in the isolated peak of Mont Sec. From there they crossed an open valley and then ran into the hills again near Pont-a-Mousson. The French positions in the valley would not have been so

bad if it had not been for Mont Sec. Ask any American who was there, and he will tell you that you could not wink your eye without the German observers on that cursed mountain seeing you. Every American who ever served on that part of the line has a clear picture of Mont Sec in his mind.

A report of the Intelligence Section (G-2) of the 1st Corps gives a vivid picture of the St. Mihiel salient:

The strength of the enemy positions had for four years seemed impregnable, and had withstood in 1914 and 1915 the bloody attacks of the French at Les Éparges, Apremont, and the Bois le Prêtre. Such names in the early part of the war had vied in notoriety with Mons, Ypres, Louvain, Tahur, Vauquois, and Verdun. They were symbolic of the days of trench warfare, in which opposing trenches were often no farther apart than ten meters; and in which mining and underground warfare played a principal part. They typified campaigns in which 100,000 lives were sacrificed to push back a trench line a few hundred meters.

But by the fall of 1918 conditions at St. Mihiel had changed. It was a quiet sector. The salient was held by nine German divisions, perhaps 90,000 men. Six out of the nine divisions were second or third-class troops, made up of reserve, Landwehr, or Austro-Hungarian regiments. Nevertheless, under the new system of elastic defence the line was supposed to be so strong that these troops could hold it against attack, certainly until reinforcements should reach them from Metz. Gouraud's defence in the Champagne on July 15th had been a good dem-

onstration of what a well-organized, elastic defence could do, and Gouraud had no such advantages of position as the Germans had at St. Mihiel. Machine guns, trenches, and lines of wire—the whole system several meters deep, supported by artillery, was considered as strong as the trenches filled with infantry used to be, and much more sparing of men.

From August 21st to September 12th American preparations for attack were ordered to be made in all secrecy. The troops were moved in at night and hidden in the woods. Traffic on the roads was ordered limited to the normal amount. The artillery and the air service were forbidden to show any unusual activity. The heavy artillery that was brought up was not even allowed to fire any registration shots.

However, it seems certain that the front-line troops of the Germans and their lower staffs expected an attack, but that the higher staffs, particularly the army staff, did not believe an attack was impending until too late to serve a useful purpose. That they did not know the date set for the attack is shown by the fact that on September 11th, less than twenty-four hours before our attack was launched, the army command issued the order for the evacuation of the salient, an operation which would require at best several days. Considering the dominating observation points in the hands of the enemy it was practically impossible for our own army to make preparations unnoticed. The Germans were, however, a good deal puzzled by the whole business. An officer on the staff of the German General told an American officer after the

armistice that our preparations had been so easily detected that the German Staff had decided that they were a feint until almost the time of the battle. They then ordered the troops to hold the lines if attacked, but they seemed to have made little preparation for this, and as they began removing their heavy artillery they undoubtedly weakened the morale of their troops. They seemed to have expected a smaller and lighter attack that they could hold off while they evacuated the salient, which they then planned to do. In the meanwhile, they were busily engaged finishing a main defence line in the rear.

The American plan of battle was to send the main attack north into the only part of the German line not on dominating hills. This was the valley of the Rupt de Mad. However, this valley is not wide enough for the planned attack, so that the troops on the right and left of the main attack would have to cover harder country. But it was not necessary for them to go so far as the divisions in the centre.

The map will make plain the fact that, if the first and second days' fighting in the Rupt de Mad valley went as planned, the Germans would have to give up the whole salient, although this attack covered less than half of the salient itself. A smaller offensive on the other side of the salient was to be made to narrow even further the German outlet from St. Mihiel, and the two forces were to join at the town of Vigneulles.

The main attack was to be made by the IV Corps.



THE OFFICIAL PLAN OF THE ST. MIHIEL ATTACK

Showing line of attack of each division. The main attack was to be made up the Rupt de Mad valley. The Grand Tranchee de Calonne, down which the men of the 26th marched, is the road running from where it says 26th Div. on the map to Hattonville. Compare this plan with what occurred as shown on large battle map.

The I Corps, on its right, was to advance enough to keep in touch and maintain enough activity to keep the Germans opposite them busy. On the other side of the IV Corps, the French Colonial II Corps was to do likewise. This corps was acting as part of our First Army, just as our I Corps had served as part of the French Sixth Army between Château-Thierry and the Vesle.

This French corps held a long sector around both sides of the salient, but its main duty was to follow the Germans when their retreat began. On each end of the sector, however, they were to join somewhat in the advance. The American V Corps was to make an offensive in the hilly country opposite its lines. If everything went as planned the Germans between the V and IV Corps, attacked on both sides, would have to retreat, and those in the nose of the salient would be caught.

Unless it was General Allenby's capture of the Turkish Army in Palestine, no large operation in the war worked out in practice so exactly "according to plan." It rained hard on the night of the 11th of September. It had been raining hard for a day or two. Slimy mud was everywhere. At one in the morning the Germans were awakened by a terrible crash of artillery. For four hours the shells dropped on their trenches and dugouts, on their roads and battery positions, and, for that matter, everywhere else. Particular attention was paid to Mont Sec. It was deluged with smoke shells so that its observers could not see what was going on. Then at five

**THE LANE OF THE 42ND'S
ADVANCE AT ST. MIHIEL**

Showing at the bottom of the map the American trench system from which our attack started, the German lines of wire xxxxx, the German trench systems and wire systems and railroads continuing back for miles, making up a system of defence in depth.

o'clock came the barrage and the infantry attack on the southern sector. Much of the German wire was old and a good deal of it was very low. Some the Americans cut, some they just walked over. According to the habit which both sides had acquired, the forward trenches were occupied only by patrols. There was practically no resistance there. At the next line of trenches,



where resistance should have developed, the artillery had done so well that, in most places, there was not much there, either. Many Germans came out of their dugouts merely in time to surrender.

For example, on the front of the 42nd Division, which was a typical one, the first German trench system consisted of two trenches with various connections, on the average about 200 yards apart with wire in front of both. About half a mile behind the second trench was a third also protected by wire, and a mile back of that a fourth and more wire. To the unpractised eye it looked as if there were lines of wire wandering aimlessly all over these different positions. It was very heavy in the front of our main attack, and had given our staffs many anxious moments. Between the third and fourth trenches were most of the German light batteries. Holding these defences was the German 10th Division, recently brought down from Flanders. Contained in it was the 6th Grenadier Regiment, which had tried to cross the river at Mezy against the 3rd Division in July. This German 10th Division was one of the best in the salient and yet the general commanding the 42nd reported after the battle:

The operation was unusual in its nature because of the small amount of resistance encountered, and it is not felt that its experience should be made the basis of general deductions for use in other operations.

The 42nd was in the van of our attack against one of the few good German divisions in the salient, and

its losses in the whole operation were 702. Comparing this with 4,500, two days' losses for the 1st Division at Soissons, shows very plainly that the St. Mihiel defence was not made of very stern stuff.

However, even with the dash of our main attack and the paralysis of the German defence, it is doubtful if we should have made the big haul of prisoners if it had not been for one of the most extraordinary movements in the whole war, which occurred at the point of our secondary attack on the other side of the salient. The French 15th Division and our 26th, the New England Guard Division, were to attack there. In front of the French in their first day's objective were three hills, Les Éparges, famous in 1915, being the first. As they advanced, their left flank was exposed, which made progress somewhat difficult. However, they pushed steadily forward in their cautious, skilful manner, not going very fast but making their gains with little loss.

To their right the 26th Division also was retarded by machine gun fire in the woods and hills south of St. Remy. When nightfall came they were still deployed in the woods about halfway to their first day's objective with the German machine guns in front of them. Now, according to the usual practice, fighting stops at dark except for artillery. But someone in or over the 102nd Regiment of infantry had a different idea. Some time after dark that regiment was collected from its lines in the woods, assembled in column on the high road named La Grand Tranchée de Calonne, leading straight into the German

lines. This solid formation marched boldly down the main highway six miles through the German lines to Vigneulles, arriving there at 3:25 in the morning and absolutely closing the retreat of any Germans in the nose of the salient. Although there were still some Germans in the woods as the 102nd passed through, the march of the adventurous regiment was unopposed.

To a methodical and scientific minded fighting man like the German this proceeding must have seemed as outrageous a breach of the rules of war as any of his atrocities have appeared to us. Some time later in the morning the leading troops of the 1st Division came into Vigneulles from the south, also somewhat ahead of their schedule, but having achieved their advance in a more normal manner, and greatly to their surprise found the town full of Americans. But even despite the phenomenal speed of our troops in reaching Vigneulles the Germans had moved so promptly that much of their artillery escaped.

St. Mihiel introduced four new divisions to active warfare. The 82nd Division, draft men from Georgia under Major-General George P. Duncan, was on the extreme right of the line. It had no advance to make but carried out what is called a holding attack, designed to keep the enemy opposite from sending help elsewhere. Next to the 82nd was another new division, the 90th from Texas and Oklahoma, under Major-General Henry T. Allen. It did participate in the attack, and accomplished in good style the small

mission it was given by four in the afternoon of the first day. The 5th, a new regular division, did its somewhat larger task in similar manner.

These three new divisions were all together on the right of the line. Nearly in the middle of the attack was the Missouri and Kansas draft divisions, trained by General Wood at Camp Funston. It kept abreast of the fast company on either side of it—the 42nd (the Rainbow) under Major-General Menoher, and the 2nd, the regular and Marine divisions of Château-Thierry and Soissons fame. It was the regular infantry brigade of the 2nd that did the attacking at St. Mihiel. Its task was to cover almost six miles to the hills beyond Thiaucourt on the first day—a much longer advance than that of the 5th Division on its right. It was not so far as the 89th advance on the other side, but it was the only long advance required of any division over hilly and difficult country. The other long advances had the advantage of the Rupt de Mad valley. The brigade of the 2nd went its six miles in eight and one half hours, collected more than 3,000 prisoners and much material, including five railroad trains. The commander of the brigade reported that had the advance been two hours slower, half these results would not have been achieved. This was evidently true all along the line. The speed of the American attack caught material and men which the German command had every reason to expect would escape, considering the promptness with which their retreat commenced.

The 1st Division did its part as usual. It performed in such manner that for the second time its commanding general left it to become a corps commander. It had given General Bullard to the III Corps after Cantigny, and General Charles P. Summerall to the V Corps during the Meuse-Argonne battle.

From the morning of the second day the salient was blotted out. From then on the French 26th Division bagged the prisoners who were trapped and our lines were pushed forward after the retreating Germans until we were ordered to halt in front of the solidly held, previously fortified line which the Germans had made behind the salient.

This was the first battle under American command—certainly a most auspicious beginning. Our total casualties (including the French troops involved) were about 7,000. The German prisoners numbered 14,439, with 443 guns. The extraordinary success of both new and old divisions and the fulfillment of the staff plans did not mean that we had made a perfectly working army. In the first place, to stage the artillery fire on the scale planned we had to borrow a lot of French guns.

Likewise the rather unusual concentration of aircraft made under the command of Brigadier-General William Mitchell was possible only by the use of French planes by Americans as well as by the loan of French squadrons complete.

At St. Mihiel there was a total of 46 squadrons and 20 balloon companies divided as follows:

	FRENCH	AMERICAN
Observation	11	10
Pursuit	4	12
Bombing	5	3
Night Reconnaissance		1
Balloons	20 6	26 14

Moreover, there were many indications that we had still much to learn of the refinements of modern war. In the line of supply back of the 26th Division, for instance, on the morning of the attack a road in plain view of German observation and within easy artillery range was filled with every known military vehicle all blissfully rolling along toward the front. For a seemingly incredible while the Germans let this go on. But finally they registered on a piece of the road and began shelling. The procession stopped behind the spot. But every once in a while a motorcyclist would get through the stalled transport to the edge of the shelled area, wave his hat at the waiting audience, turn on full speed, and run for it. Mounted men would do the same and go galloping through the shelled area. Even a Ford or two tried it. Running the gauntlet became a regular game. There is something fascinatingly American about this performance, but it cannot be classed as scientific war.


At St. Mihiel the infantry, especially in the main attack, were equipped with coloured panels with which to signal to the airplanes overhead who they were, so that the airplanes could report it back quickly. They failed to do it. The plans for the artillery and

transport to follow the advance were not particularly well handled by the military police, and traffic jams occurred. The power behind this young and fresh army was so great that, despite the rough edges of its performance, it succeeded in an extraordinary way. But the seeming brilliance of the performance did not blind the divisional and corps commanders to the lack of technique in the fine points of modern war. Their reports of the engagement are made up almost entirely of analyses of defects in their organizations, and suggested remedies.

In contrast to these inside judgments is a very interesting description of the American performance as seen from the outside. On September 25th the Intelligence Officer of the High Military Command of the German Army, reporting on St. Mihiel, wrote:

The artillery preparation prior to the attack was well carried out. Their objectives were bombarded with good effect and they were able to switch from one target to another in the minimum time and with remarkable accuracy. The coordination between the infantry and the artillery was faultless. If the infantry ran up against a machine gun nest they would immediately fall back, and very soon new artillery preparation would be directed on that point. A great many tanks were in readiness for the attack, but they were only used in very small numbers, as the masses of infantry accomplished the victory.

The word victory is interesting in comparison with some of the German High Command's descriptions of retiring from St. Mihiel "according to plan." The amusement which the Germans had at our ex-



THE ALLIED ADVANCE

The upper arrow shows the line of the attack begun on September 28th by the composite army under King Albert; the next arrow shows the British advance which broke the Hindenburg Line on September 27th; and the third, our attack begun on September 26th, the French in the meanwhile attacking between the British and ourselves.

pense about Seicheprey, one little spot in the salient, we could now enjoy at their expense concerning the whole salient. And it no doubt particularly pleased the 26th Division to have participated.

Just as the German offensive had called the 2nd and 3rd divisions to Château-Thierry and a strategical opportunity had called seven other divisions, most of them with training unfinished, into the Marne-Vesle campaign, so now grand strategy called loudly for the American Army to hit with all its strength. The active battle line from the sea to St. Mihiel was shaped very much like that famous salient. General Foch's strategy was much the same as General Pershing's plan at St. Mihiel. The British were to push a point in on one side and the Americans and French on the other. They were to get as near to meeting as possible, and the French, in the nose of the salient, were to keep the Germans opposite them busy and not let them get away while the pincers were closing in on them.

On the 8th of August, after a surprising recovery from their spring disasters, the British had begun their end of the pinching process. On the 21st of August they struck again. From August 8th on, as a matter of fact, they kept up one continual and terrible push against the German lines. On the 22nd of September they broke the Queant-Drocourt line, the outer line of defence of the Germans. By the 26th of September they were solid in front of the main Hindenburg Line at Le Catelet, ready to strike the main defence on which the Germans relied.

This being the case on the northern end of the salient, it was time also for us to see if we could go through the Hindenburg Line on the south side of the salient, and, between the two attacks, catch the German armies so that they could not escape. Whether we were ready for our part of the task or not we had to try it. The French had not sufficient reserves available for this and the war would not wait. Such an opportunity, once lost, was hardly likely to come again.

The problem facing the Commander-in-Chief and our General Staff was altogether different from St. Mihiel. That was a flank attack of limited duration—an isolated operation. The new problem was a frontal attack on a series of prepared positions that were vital to the Germans, and the operation had to be continuous. Its future could only be limited by exhaustion or the end of the war.

To prepare this General Pershing had a general staff that had the experience of one operation—St. Mihiel, an army staff with the same experience, corps staffs few of which had had more, and divisional staffs whose experience ranged from four months to nothing of active fighting. By their own previous schedule, the American Army should have been ready to undertake such a battle in the late spring of 1919. The new British armies had gone into their first major offensive, the Somme, twenty-three months after England entered the war, somewhat hurried by the pressure on the French at Verdun. Opportunity called loudly for us to make our first major

offensive eighteen months after we declared war—a great deal hurried by the course of events.

It was not to be reasonably expected that our newly created staff could function (to use a pet staff word) like the long-practised French ones. It was not unreasonable to fear some blunder that would precipitate a tragedy like Gallipoli or Loos, especially with such impetuous and reckless fighters as our men had shown themselves to be. With this situation ahead of them, "G. H. Q." did not waste much time celebrating St. Mihiel. The greatest strength of the American soldier, and of his regimental and platoon commanders, next to their own character, was the sound nature of their training. In most cases there was not enough of it, but what there was fitted them for the kind of warfare they had to meet.

The same was true of the staffs. They did not have time to be thoroughly trained nor to sift thoroughly their personnel. But the organization of the command of the A. E. F. was sound. For the first time in the history of the country, the American Army had a real general staff with the power and authority to "function." It was copied in large measure from the French. It worked in this fashion: The Commander-in-Chief is in complete and individual authority. If he decides upon an operation he gives his Chief-of-Staff—then Major-General James W. McAndrew—the general idea and object of the action. Under the Chief-of-Staff are five Assistant Chiefs-of-Staff, known as G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5. (G, meaning General Staff Section

1, etc.) G-1, General Andrews, was in charge of the administration of the army. G-2, General Dennis E. Nolan, was in charge of army intelligence. G-3, General Fox Conner, was in charge of operations. G-4, General Mosely, had supply, construction, transport, etc., and G-5, General Fiske, looked after the training of the troops. The French have no G-5, this work being done under operations, but as training in our army assumed such colossal proportions it was given a separate head.

Under the Chief-of-Staff's instructions these organizations get the necessary information about the enemy, including maps of his defences, G-2, prepare the plans for the attack, G-3, and get up the war material necessary, G-4. In the carrying out of the general policies of the army aside from combat operations, G-1 and G-5 are continuously active, so that men and material may be ready when battle is decided on. Compared to a business organization, the Government at Washington is the Board of Directors, the Commander-in-Chief is President of the company, the Chief-of-Staff is operating Vice-President, and the various "G's" are department heads.

It all sounds simple and obvious. Nevertheless, the creation of the General Staff of the A.E.F. on these lines is a landmark in American military history, for until the war we never had a general staff that could carry out any policy, because the Chief of Ordnance, the Quartermaster-General, and the various bureau heads, always dominated the army—each

working for his own bureau, and all against an army under unified control. If such a deplorable system had been followed in France, the Chief of Artillery would have told General Pershing how many guns he could have for an action; the Chief of the Medical Corps would have arranged as many hospitals as he saw fit; and the Chief of the Air Service would have decided what he would do. A battle under these conditions would have been murder with no extenuating circumstances.

The army, corps, and divisional staffs were exact copies of the organization of the General Staff, except that the army staffs and corps staffs have no G-5 and the division staffs have neither G-4 nor G-5. The staffs thus organized, on a firm foundation but with little practice in directing battle operations, were to meet their first major test in the biggest battle ever fought by American troops.

By the second day of the St. Mihiel battle, before the operation was really over, long before the papers began to ask why the American Army did not exploit its success and follow it up toward Metz, the reserves had started toward Verdun and the Argonne for the last great battle of the war.

CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARGONNE-MEUSE

THE Argonne-Meuse battle, fought by our First Army, was the largest battle in American history. General Pershing's forces engaged were 1,034,300 men—896,000 Americans and 138,300 French. It was a vital element in the conquest of the German forces, and our main contribution to the war's decision. The first great battle of the new British armies—the Somme—occurred twenty-three months after Great Britain entered the war. Our army went into its first great struggle eighteen months after our declaration. Half of the troops and divisional staffs were green, and our corps and army staffs had had but the very scanty battle experience acquired in the Marne-Vesle campaign under the French and our own operation at St. Mihiel. The place to be attacked was extremely difficult, and General von der Marwitz and his troops were seasoned and formidable opponents. Under the circumstances it was just as reasonable to look for a terrible catastrophe such as befell the British at Gallipoli, the French in the Champagne in 1917, or the Germans in the Champagne in July, 1918, as to look for a decisive victory—perhaps more so.

The state of our army would naturally have sug-

gested spending five or six months more in preparation for such a task. The state of the war incessantly demanded that we tackle the problem immediately in whatever shape we were to handle it.

On the morning of the 26th of September the Allied line from the sea to Switzerland was in contact with the main first lines of the Hindenburg system. The Germans held these lines intact everywhere except in the old St. Mihiel salient. The German troops had the greatest confidence in the strength of these lines and their ability to hold them, and it was entirely reasonable for them to feel that their defeats in preceding months in a war of movement were no criterion by which to judge what they could do behind their famous defensive system.

Marshal Foch's plan was for the British army to break through these lines in the neighbourhood of Cambrai, and push eastward, and for the French Fourth Army and the American First Army to drive northward on either side of the Argonne Forest. This would crowd the bulk of the German forces back on the Ardennes Forest where their transportation facilities were the poorest. If this plan could be carried out rapidly enough to throw the German retreat into confusion a large part of the German army would be forced to surrender in the same general locality as the French surrendered at Sedan in 1870. And this is exactly what occurred. Foch, Pershing, Haig, Ludendorff, and Hindenburg are all agreed that the German army was beaten and the armistice (which was a surrender) was signed to

avoid a complete débâcle. In General Pershing's words: "*Nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from complete disaster.*"

September 4th was the first day on which any of the plans for the Argonne-Meuse concentration could be begun to be put into effect. Between that time and the battle on September 26th, the French and Italian troops in this area had to be moved out and the Americans moved in. Of the French and Italians there were two corps headquarters, eleven divisions, and several other units—altogether about 220,000 men and all their impedimenta. The Americans who took their places consisted of three corps headquarters and troops, fifteen divisions, and several thousand army and corps troops—some 600,000 men and the vast supplies of a major attack. One item of these supplies will give an indication of their magnitude. There were 240 trainloads of ammunition put into the artillery dumps in this area between September 6th and September 26th. This was added to the ammunition in that area and to what the oncoming artillery brought with it. And these 240 trainloads were just one item of the supplies. No other staff on the Western Front carried out so large a concentration in so short a time. And this concentration was accomplished secretly. Everything was ready on the appointed hour and the enemy was surprised.

Not only does the staff deserve great credit for the planning of this concentration but the troops showed remarkable discipline in concealing themselves in the

daytime and going without fires at night. The wet weather made these precautions very uncomfortable. The troops went by rail, motor, and on foot. A division moving by motor bus will fill about fourteen miles of road. Fifteen divisions, the corps and army troops, and all the vast stores they need aggregate a terrible lot of humanity and material to put down in front of a watchful enemy in twenty-one nights without his knowing about it.

There is neither the heroism nor the drama about moving troops that there is about the actual fighting, but it is one of the most difficult and important parts of the conduct of war, and this troop movement brought our army more praise in Allied military circles than many a spectacular combat.

To move an army the staffs have to calculate the amount of traffic each road can carry and give each unit in the whole army an exact schedule of the time it can be on each road. Military police with full instructions must be at every cross-road, for many miles of the roads are literally as full of traffic as Fifth Avenue, New York, on a winter's afternoon. Road discipline becomes as important as battle discipline, and it seems about as hard to teach people. In an army the army, corps, and division staffs are like the various grades of managers and superintendents of an industrial establishment. A manufacturer can get some idea of what it is to move an army, either before or during a battle, if he will imagine himself conducting his business with his machinery and workmen and raw material moving

all over the country and he and his office staff and the records following along from town to town, all the while keeping in touch with his organization and directing operations. Now if the manufacturer will imagine most of his office staff and personnel to be fairly green when he started such a conduct of his business, he can picture for himself some of the difficulties which the management of a battle like the Argonne-Meuse entails, and this conception will help make clear why war isn't usually conducted economically, and also why all people who have even looked at such a problem are so deadly in earnest that we have a trained organization if ever we have to try this kind of thing again. When it is done without training, the price of ignorance is blood.

But to go back to the Argonne-Meuse battle.

Some of the divisions took over the line on the 20th of September. But a thin screen of French troops was left in front so that enemy raids would get no American prisoners from which to identify the forces against them.

A large operation such as the Argonne-Meuse battle is very seldom a complete surprise to the enemy, but the element of surprise may still remain in a very useful degree if the enemy cannot find out when the attack will begin, where its main effort will be, and what kind of troops will conduct it.

The Germans knew that the American Army was going to make an offensive in the Verdun district. It might, however, start from east of the Meuse River and go toward the iron district of Briey—toward

Longuyon and Thionville. Or it might go, as it did, north between the Meuse and the Argonne. From prisoners' statements and captured documents it is certain that the Germans thought that there would be an attack by the French in the Champagne, that there was to be a demonstration or an attack between the Argonne and the Meuse, and they were also fearful of an attack east of the Meuse, as shown by General von der Marwitz's order dated October 1st, which is later quoted in full. Their information on the time of the battle was good. They knew its main purpose. But just how that purpose was to be achieved, where our main effort was to be, and how many and what troops were to make it—on these things their information was not very good.

For instance, as late as September 22nd a German non-commissioned officer told a raiding party that they must get prisoners because an attack was feared and they did not know whether it was to be made by French, British, Italians, or Americans.

A German brigade order of the 1st Guard Division dated September 24th (later captured) stated that "we must count on a big attack to-morrow in Champagne (the French attacked there on September 26th) and against Metz (there was no attack there). The width of this attack on our front (they were between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River) is not yet known."

This report expected our main attack to be toward Metz on the other side of the Meuse from where it occurred, but they also expected some

activity on the front where our main attack was planned. The idea that we would attack toward Metz had been in the German mind for some time.

An order of General von der Marwitz, commanding the German Fifth Army, issued on *October 1st*, shows that as late as that date an attack east of the Meuse was expected. This very important order, captured during the course of our operations, is quoted in full:

Vth Army Staff

Army Hq., October 1, 1918.

Ia. No. 10619 SECRET

According to information in our possession, the enemy is about to attack the Vth Army east of the Meuse and try to push toward Longuyon. The object of this attack is to cut the Longuyon-Sedan line, the most important artery of the Army of the West. Moreover, the enemy's intention is to render it impossible for us to exploit the Briey basin, on which depends in a large part our steel production. Thus the heaviest part of the task will once more fall on the Vth Army in the course of the combats in the coming weeks, and *the safety of the Fatherland* will be in its hands. It is on the unconquerable resistance of the Verdun front that depends the fate of a great part of the west front, *perhaps even of our nation*. The Fatherland must rest assured that every commander and *every man realizes the greatness of his duty to the very end*. *If we do this, the enemy's attack will as heretofore break against our firm will to hold.*

The Commander-in-Chief

VON DER MARWITZ

General of Cavalry

and

Adjutant General

It is certain that even as late as October 1st, when this order was issued, the German High Command had not clearly realized that our main attack would

be toward Sedan instead of east of the Meuse. This failure on the part of the High Command to appreciate correctly the direction of the main attack is in itself a tribute to the way in which the concentration of the troops for the great attack was accomplished.

It seems clear, therefore, that the Germans did not expect our main attack where it came. This supposition is further confirmed by the fact that a line from the Argonne to the Meuse was held by only five (5) German divisions—only one of them being first class—the divisions in line being the 9th Landwehr, 2nd Landwehr, 1st Guard Division, 117th Division, 7th Reserve Division, the 9th Landwehr being partly in the Argonne in front of our army and partly in front of the French Fourth Army on the left. In the Argonne Forest itself was the 2nd Landwehr Division made up of men of more than thirty-five years of age. It had held this quiet sector for more than a year. Next on its right was the 1st Guard Division, one of the best in the German Army, but it had suffered severely in the Chemins des Dames and Marne battles, and was sent to this sector to rest and recuperate.

The 7th Reserve was similarly resting in this sector after having been heavily engaged in the battles of the spring and summer. The remaining division, the 117th Reserve, was composed largely of Poles and Alsations and on that account was not expected to be of high morale. These divisions were between the Argonne and the Meuse.

Between the Meuse and the Moselle, also on the front of our First Army, were fifteen German divisions

in line and available for the battle between the Meuse and the Argonne, and in reserve were a total of eight divisions.

On September 25th, it was estimated that the available reserves would permit the enemy to reënforce the Meuse-Argonne front as follows:

First day of the attack,	4 divisions
Second day of the attack,	2 divisions
Third day of the attack,	9 divisions

On the fourth and subsequent days of the attack it was estimated that ten divisions could come from the west and seven from the east. The availability of these divisions from the fourth day on depended on other attacks.

In other words, the comparatively weak forces in line could be reënforced on the first two days by six additional divisions and on the third day by an addition of nine divisions, and that from the third day on the battle would reach its greatest intensity and the gain of ground would necessarily be very slow. Had the German commander diagnosed our plan, however, and prepared for our attack on the first tremendously strong lines the result would have been very different.

Physically and artificially the 40-kilometer front which the American Army was to attack was about the most difficult point on the Western Front. The Argonne Forest had been considered impregnable for four years. We accepted this verdict, also, for the plan of battle was for the French to go up on the west of it while our army went up east of it, and by outflanking it render it untenable. The plan was


not to take it by direct assault. It is a thick growth very much resembling the Wilderness in Virginia, only the Wilderness is fairly level while the Argonne is full of steep hills and ravines. The growth is like the Wilderness, the lack of roads is the same, and the character of the few roads that exist is not very different. A fair picture of the Argonne does not include "the beautiful roads of France."

Across the valley of the Aire from the Argonne is another woods boasting half a dozen names but no roads running north in the direction we wanted to go. These woods were also a considerable immediate obstacle. From these woods to the Meuse the German lines were in the open but were strongly placed on the hills. Our positions on le Mort Homme, of Verdun fame, overlooked the German front near the Meuse River, but just behind the enemy's first positions was the Forges Wood which the Germans considered impregnable.

In addition to the lack of sufficient roads, the usual difficulty of building roads across "No Man's Land" connecting up the roads existing on your side with the roads existing on the enemy's side—the artillery having, in four years of warfare, destroyed all vestige of roads across "No Man's Land"—great difficulty was encountered, as was to be expected—five or six days being required to make the more important repairs to roads in "No Man's Land." However, lack of experience in traffic control and regulation by subordinates, coupled with a laudable desire of heavy artillery to push forward, caused several temporary

blocks and congestions. Rain and mud did not help matters on the only roads available for heavy traffic. Also, there was a serious lack of engineer tools and road construction material which the First Army in the limited time available for the purpose of the attack was unable to secure. Notwithstanding these difficulties, sufficient supplies and ammunition reached the troops and no serious shortage occurred.

On the whole 40-kilometer (25 mile) front there was only one main north and south road—the one up the Aire valley. The road from Esnes to Montfaucon was very poor, and the one along the Meuse was poor and under fire from the other bank of the river. Besides these three roads, one subject to shellfire, there was one from Bethincourt to Montfaucon, but as it went diagonally across the direction of our attack, it crossed the spheres of three different divisions which made its use somewhat complicated. On the map also there are such roads as the one from Avocourt to Very, but they were too poor to be of much help. According to theory each division in combat needs a good road to itself. We had nine divisions in line. Our communications, therefore, should have had nine good roads parallel to our advance. We had only one. The constant discussion of the difficulty of advancing without roads gives many people the same impatient feeling that the talk of low visibility in the North Sea gave them. It is true, of course, that the attacking troops go across country. It is likewise true that their ammunition, food, rolling kitchens, artillery, engineers, supplies, without



THE ROADS OF THE ARGONNE-MEUSE


The very heavy lines are the line of September 26th and the combined army objective. Between these are shown the divisional (broken) and the corps (dotted) lines of advance. The only good roads are shown in heavy black, the other roads being shown in lighter lines. With the exception of the 35th no division had even a mediocre road parallel to and within its zone of advance.

which things they can't fight, must go by road, and if there are no roads the infantry will soon get out of range of their artillery in its original positions. Attacks with an objective limited to the range of the artillery belong to the period of the old "fixed position" warfare. They do not belong to the war of movement, and they would have been fatal to the whole conception of the Argonne-Meuse battle. The lack of roads, the woods, and the hills were the chief physical difficulties to our advance.

The artificial difficulties—the defensive lines of the Germans—were even more formidable. The German defence systems between Verdun and the Argonne were close together. Immediately in our front were three, and in places four, well-prepared defensive lines. The Hagen Stellung and the Volker Stellung made up the principal parts of what is generally known as the Hindenburg Line, although this term was somewhat indefinite. Behind these was the very strong Kriemhilde Stellung, and back of that the surveyed but not finished Freya Stellung. The easiest way to picture the German defences is to think of three lines of one or more trenches in each line, the first two close together—the third some distance back. The third, the Kriemhilde line, was the basis of the thirty days of German defence in the Meuse-Argonne. These various lines consisted of trenches, permanent works, reënforced at places with concrete. At advantageous positions were concrete pill boxes. The German artillery was practically all fed by light railways. The dugouts were of per-

manent construction. Against the same skill that Gouraud held his less-advantageous lines in the Champagne in July our attack might have cost us 200,000 men in two days and ended in failure as the German attack there did. But even knowing that the German first defence was lightly manned by a somewhat mediocre force, one cannot help admiring the confidence and imagination that wrote into the plan of our first day's attack an advance of nearly eight and a half miles (army objective) and the piercing of the three main fortified German positions. If this had been done and the transport and artillery had kept up, it is almost certain that the war would have ended at least thirty days earlier than it did. If our army had been able to rush the Kriemhilde as well as the other two lines we should have appeared in the rear of the German forces in the Champagne about the first of October. But as the rush was checked we had to follow the original plan, but at slow time for a while. When we finally did get through it at the end of October, our troops started full speed ahead again.

The action of our First Army was to synchronize with the attack by the French Fourth Army under General Gouraud. The Argonne Forest ran north about six miles between the two armies. The plan was for the French to advance up the west side of it while the Americans advanced up the east side of it. When that was done the Germans would have to get out to keep from being surrounded. The French and Americans would join up then and repeat the process on the wooded hills north of the Argonne.



THE OFFICIAL PLAN OF THE ARGONNE-MEUSE ATTACK

Showing the lanes of advance of the different corps and divisions and their objectives. The lines xxx show German defence positions. Compare this with large map of Argonne-Meuse battle

The two armies side by side would thus press north toward Givet while the British pushed east toward Givet, and the main German forces would be crowded in between with their backs to the Ardennes Forest.

With these major purposes in view our General Staff plan was as follows:

The V Corps was to drive straight up the middle of the country lying between the Argonne and the Meuse. It was to be the point of the attack. The I Corps on its left was to keep the Germans busy in the Argonne and to advance up the Aire valley to keep in touch with the main attack. The III Corps, on the other side, was to cover the territory between the main attack and the Meuse. (See map page 98.)

The First Army, which had taken the St. Mihiel salient, was to make the Argonne-Meuse attack, but it will be noticed that its composition was not the same. This army now had in it the I, III, and V Corps instead of the I, IV, and V Corps as at St. Mihiel. In the French Army a division belongs normally to a certain corps, and the corps belongs to a certain army. With us this was not true. The corps and divisions were used as interchangeable parts and moved from army to army and corps to corps as occasion required. What remains permanent are the army and corps staff. But as it turned out during the Argonne-Meuse battle the army commander and every corps commander was changed—another evidence of the immaturity of our organization.

On September 26th General Pershing was still

commander of the First Army as well as being Commander-in-Chief. Major-General Hunter Liggett was in command of the I Corps. Major-General Robert L. Bullard commanded the III Corps, and Major-General George H. Cameron the V. During the battle the Commander-in-Chief, assuming the direction of both the First and Second armies, gave up the command of the First Army to General Liggett of the I Corps. The latter's place was taken by Major-General Joseph P. Dickman from the 3rd Division. General Cameron was succeeded in command of the V Corps by Major-General Charles P. Summerall from the 1st Division. When General Bullard gave up the III Corps to take command of the Second Army he was succeeded by Major-General John L. Hines of the 4th Division.

When the attack started, the I Corps opposite the Argonne Forest and the Aire valley had in line two divisions with experience, the 77th and 28th, and one green division, the 35th. The V Corps in the centre had three green divisions in line, the 91st, the 37th, and the 79th. The III Corps on the right had one untried division, the 80th, which had never been engaged, the 33rd Division part of which had had experience with the British, and the 4th which had fought on the Vesle.

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 26th, 32nd, 42nd, the most tried divisions, were, with the exception of the 32nd, involved in the St. Mihiel attack, and could not be brought up in time for the attack, on September 26th, of the First Army. The 32nd, while not in St. Mihiel,

had been fighting for about a month, and needed rest and replacements.

Six out of the nine initial attacking divisions had never been in a real battle before. The experience of the corps staffs was very limited. The army was somewhat lacking in training and experience. It was also lacking in the appliances of war. Happily this did not apply to guns. Our army had plenty of guns for the initial bombardment and after that more than could be got through the country. With a very few exceptions all our guns came from the French. Up to the time the war ended practically no guns of American make had reached the front.

Quite a large proportion of the artillery, principally heavy artillery, came from the French army. There were 35 French artillery regiments besides the railroad artillery units. There were not always plenty of guns at every point of the line during the battle on account of the difficulties of transportation, but we did not lack in total numbers. Between those bought from the French and served by our artillerymen, and those borrowed from the French, guns, transport, and gunners by regiments, there were enough.

On transport our army was short. The lack of horses came about because we stopped horse shipments in the spring in order to send men, and the French were unable to find as many horses, or as good ones, to supply us with as they had expected. Added to this, our army had not had time to learn how to care for animals, and the wearing-out proc-

ess went on at a terrible rate. We had, of American make, about 40 per cent. of the motor transport needed. The rest came from the French or British. With the exception of one or two divisions which had the light Browning, our men were using the Chauchat automatic rifle which they did not like and quite often threw away. Of minor but useful appliances, such as smoke bombs for beclouding the vision, we had only small supplies.

We had acquired from the French a sufficient number of tanks. One hundred and forty-two of these were operated by our own tank corps. The remainder, 73, belonged to the French and were manned by them. The French could not again lend us the help in the air to the extent they did at St. Mihiel because they had an attack going on at the same time.

We consequently had to fight a much larger battle without the corresponding increase in the air forces. On the first day of the battle the records showed 193 pursuit planes, 58 bombardment planes, and 333 observation planes available. On the day of the armistice the corresponding figures were 188 pursuit, 80 bombardment, and 242 observation planes available. In other words, the replacements about kept up to the losses. We could have used more planes if we had had them, but they were not to be had.

It is hardly worth saying whether we or the enemy had supremacy of the air, for that word supremacy is not very definite in its meaning in this connection. The ground soldier on either side would probably say that the other side had it. It is certain that

neither we nor the Germans had sufficient superiority to prevent the other side from taking practically all the observations he wanted to. The probability is that the Germans got more use out of their air force than we did out of ours because they were more accustomed to using it, and their infantry and artillery had longer practice in coördination with their air service than ours had.

We were, then, in many ways somewhat lacking in experience and equipment. On the other hand, we had numbers and a tremendous offensive spirit—"the will to victory" which the German military writers used to be so fond of writing about. This was as characteristic of the imagination and confidence of the command as it was the fighting spirit of the troops. This Argonne-Meuse battle had a time limit to it. Its object must be gained before the main German armies had retreated from the big salient in France. It was a question of breaking every German line on that front quickly and ending the war in 1918, or fighting another year, and it is fortunate we had a general and an army that were willing to push the fighting, pay the price, and finish the war.

At 2:30 on the morning of the 26th of September the bombardment began. It is easier to get a picture of what occurred by taking the action of one of the nine attacking divisions rather than trying to envisage the whole battlefield. Let us take the 4th. The high-water mark of the terrible German attacks on Verdun in the spring of 1916 were the two hills,

Le Mort Homme and Hill 304 west of the Meuse. The battle-scarred French trenches on Hill 304 was the "jumping-off" place of the 4th Division. For the three hours from 2:30 to 5:30 in the morning the division's artillery, aided by the larger guns of the corps and army artillery, filled the German defences with exploding shells, and a machine gun battalion of the division sprayed the ground from the first to the second German lines at 75 shots a minute.

When the zero hour arrived the men of the 4th Division "went over the top with a yell." The actual attacking force, as is usual, consisted of two battalions (1,000 men each) of infantry, two machine gun companies, and a few wire-cutting teams of engineers. The two battalions of infantry represent one third of one of the two brigades of the division. Immediately behind them went two more battalions as support. The last two battalions of the attacking brigade made up the brigade reserve. The other brigade in the capacity of division reserve followed within reach in case of emergency but keeping as safe and fresh as possible for the time when their turn would come.


At the jumping-off place, the 4th Division's swath was quite narrow, being less than two thousand yards across. Their first task was to cross the Forges Brook (for which the engineers were carrying foot bridges) and the swamp on both sides of it. There was a lane of wire along the brook, and a maze of wire lanes beyond before the men reached even the

first German trench. The German defence did not contemplate holding at this point. Our men cut the wire, or scrambled through, and crossed the trenches with as little opposition as at St. Mihiel. The field gun emplacements at this first line were empty. Even at the second line the German defence was not serious. A few machine guns fired for a while but they were quickly silenced.

According to schedule the artillery was concentrating on each defence line before the infantry were to reach it. By half-past two the troops had gone six miles to the corps' objective, as far as their original orders covered. The Germans were withdrawing their first line. The interesting thing then was what was to happen next. When the 4th Division stopped on orders, the German infantry and artillery in its front was still retreating. After the Americans stopped the Germans came back, straightened themselves out, and got ready for a better defence than they had been able to organize while on the retreat.

The American plan had been that the whole line would go forward as the 4th had actually done but that after reaching its first objective that it would keep right on and break the next German line—the Kriemhilde Stellung which was where the Germans had intended to do their hardest fighting. As the French said, this plan required a little more than human accomplishment. It was spoiled by Montfaucon which stuck up in this battlefield like Mont Sec at St. Mihiel. But the progress of the 4th Division east of Montfaucon was enough to show that





RELIEF MAP OF MONTFAUCON AREA

The woods (shaded) south of Montfaucon (point of arrow) are the Cheppy and Montfaucon woods through which the 37th Division pushed, the zone of the 79th on their right being along the edge of the woods. The 37th and 91st were on the hills to the left of Montfaucon at the end of the first day.

the original plan had some chance of success, and of course if it had succeeded the German army would have been in a hopeless position. That the advance did not go at the speed hoped for did not change either the plan itself or its purpose. But it did mean that the breaking of the Kriemhilde line had to be a somewhat slow task.

Montfaucon was the stumbling block. It lay in the path of the 79th Division. The 79th, the draft men from Maryland and Virginia, who had trained at Camp Meade, were entering their first battle. They met a good deal of difficulty from the start. The wire in front of them was so thick that they did not get through it in the twenty-five minutes allotted. This meant that they were not ready to go forward when the barrage moved and they were accordingly left without its protection. This resulted in their having a harder time overcoming the machine gun nests, especially those firing at them from the Malancourt, Montfaucon, and Cuisy woods on their left and from the town of Malancourt on their right. The total result was that by dusk they were in front of Montfaucon, some four kilometers (2.4 miles) behind the line which the 4th Division on their right had reached at 2:30.

This was the critical moment at which fate was to decide whether the "more-than-human" advance was to continue on with a rush or whether the attack was to slow up to hard plodding. The orders came to make one more effort to keep the push going. The 4th, the 79th, and the next two divisions on its

left (37th, 91st), which were a little ahead of it, were all ordered to attack about dusk. The condition of the roads had made it impossible for their artillery to be up. The attacks had to be launched without much help from the guns. The crux of the situation was Montfaucon on its steep and abrupt hill. In the darkness the 79th attacked with the help of two tanks. The men had gone about 200 yards from the woods in which they had assembled for the attack when they were deluged with machine gun fire, artillery, and hand grenades. They could not see the machine gun positions, nor make any effective return fire. After suffering heavy casualties in the attempt, they had finally to withdraw again to the woods.

The next morning the 79th attacked again and from 7 to 11 o'clock struggled to blot out the machine guns ahead of them, and take the town. In the daytime, with the assistance of a machine gun barrage and the tanks again, the task was finally accomplished. At 3:30 the 79th started north again from Montfaucon and continued attacking until 6. But the advance was not very fast and by night the men were badly tired. They were still about two kilometers (1.2 miles) behind the first day's objective.

With the 4th Division outflanking Montfaucon on the right, before the first day was over there might be some grounds to hope that the town's defenders would make the task of the 79th easier. But whether or not they should have, they didn't.

Montfaucon had fulfilled the mission given it by the German general. It had held up the first rush of our attack where it was to go fastest. The mountain and its defences were admirably fitted to do this. The American command, perhaps a little unreasonably, hoped to pass it the first day. From the time we failed to pass this obstacle on schedule, the hope of running the Germans off their feet and turning their retreating defence into a clear break through had to be given up. By the night of the 27th it was certain that the "more-than-human" schedule was broken. The task then was to keep attacking, one attack after another, until the German army in front was slowly beaten and driven out of its defences. The advantage of the great artillery preparation which opened the battle was now gone. Our artillery had to get new positions and get what ammunition it could by road. The enemy artillery was in long prepared positions with heavy and light railroads to feed them and convenient, well-protected ammunition dumps.

This means more than it seems to on the surface. His light railways fed his guns and carried other supplies as well, leaving his roads comparatively free. We, having no light railways, had to bring not only the ammunition but everything else over the roads. Our average daily expenditure of ammunition was 72,500 shells. If these were all for 75's it would mean 725 tons. But as much of it was for heavier guns the average was probably more than 1,000 tons a day. That means a lot of trucking every twenty-four hours

to get it to the distributing points and a lot of work for the horse transport distributing it to the guns. The German local reserves had gone into line and Von der Marwitz, knowing just where the great thrust was, could safely send his other reserve troops to the point where the battle was fixed. From five divisions in line and nine in reserve on September 26th, the German forces against us had grown to twenty-five divisions in line and seventeen in reserve on September 30th. In these four days our army had captured 9,000 prisoners and 100 guns. But almost more important than the men and guns and ground captured was the pulling of the extra German divisions from other parts of the front where they were desperately needed. The Germans saw their main line of supply threatened.

On the 26th, the first day of the battle, the Germans had held their second position, especially at Montfaucon, with great tenacity. By this they gained time for the arrival of reinforcements, and the full value of our surprise was lost. This second position was passed, however, on the succeeding days and the third position reached, and here the Germans made a desperate effort to hold. The lack of training and inexperience of some of our troops account for their inability to drive the trained enemy from his second position on the 26th or to carry the attack through the third position on the 27th.

Our army had now left the prepared positions from which it started and was dependent for everything on poor roads and few of them—roads which

had had to be rebuilt entirely across No Man's Land and repaired in the many places where the Germans had mined them or blown up bridges. It was fighting in a country which had been in enemy hands four years. The Germans, on the other hand, not only knew the positions they were in perfectly, but they likewise knew the positions we were in. Their artillery could reach every road, town, and piece of cover perfectly. It was all absolutely familiar to them.

And they had great skill using the advantages the character of the battlefield gave them, with flank and cross fire on our advance from the Argonne Forest and from across the Meuse River. They also made particularly effective use of a combination of single light guns and machine guns supporting each other.

On the 28th of September the two wings of the army made progress, and on the first of October the centre made a small gain. These might be considered the exploitation of the gains of the first day's attack. In the meanwhile, everyone was working feverishly to get ready for another general attack on the morning of October 4th.

The severity of the first five days' fighting caused inevitable losses in the 79th, 37th, and 35th divisions and a certain amount of disorganization and mixing of units. It was necessary to relieve these troops before the attack could be pushed further. To relieve three divisions means the movement of more than 150,000 men in and out of the battle line. The very restricted road situation and constant rain made


the task more than normally difficult. However, it was accomplished in three days, the 3rd, 32nd, and 1st divisions taking over from the 79th, 37th, and 35th respectively.

On the 4th of October came the first general attack all along the line after the initial rush. It gained, though not largely, at every point, but particularly it pushed forward up the Aire valley along the eastern edge of the Argonne. The French had, in the meanwhile, been pushing up on their side, following the plan of forcing the Germans out of the forest without pushing them out by direct attack. By the night of the 4th of October the American line was as far north as Fléville on the flank of the Forest of Argonne. But the Germans, although threatened with being cut off, as at Montfaucon, stuck to their exposed position and kept their artillery working on our exposed flank. To remedy this situation two regiments of the 82nd Division and three regiments of the 28th Division attacked due west from the Aire valley into the forest. These troops performed one of the most extraordinary feats of the whole battle. They crossed the Aire river valley, climbed the hills 300 feet high on the other side, and by the night of the 8th had pushed the Germans off the dominating points. To pass a flat valley under artillery and machine gun fire, get across a river and up wooded heights on the other side in the face of machine guns and capture a strongly defended town, is a matter not to be undertaken lightly. The men of the 28th and 82nd can with con-

fidence go home and discuss war with the remnants of those who went up Lookout Mountain in 1863; and if, on the one hand, the heights above the Aire are not as high as Lookout Mountain, on the other hand machine guns are much harder to face than single-shot rifles.

Thus threatened from the flank the Germans began to retreat, and by the night of the 10th the 77th, the New York City draft division, had the satisfaction of emerging on the north end of the Argonne. While it was greatly helped in its task by the pressure from the sides which was to have caused the Germans to get out of the Argonne, the 77th deserves great credit for its part in the business, for it was consistently ahead of its stated objectives, keeping up an unexpected pressure on the Germans in the hitherto impossible country. It was during this period of the 77th's struggles that Major Whittlesey and the lost battalion earned its fame.

While these events were progressing the French were pushing rapidly forward while our line advanced slowly and painfully. The battle lines in the papers showed big French advances for several days until their line bulged out some ten kilometers (6 miles) ahead of ours. The comparison seemed very unfavourable to us, and the wise gossips who coin scandal and talk calamity began to ask what was the matter with Pershing and his army. After all, was the American Army too green to succeed? Wild stories of road congestion and terrible losses reached Paris. There were both losses and road congestion



THE GERMAN DEFENCE LINES

A sketch showing in general the short distance between the Hindenburg and Kriemhilde lines where we attacked (short arrow) and the long distance between the Hindenburg and Brünhilde lines where the French attacked (long arrow)

with us, but the real explanation of the rapid French advance and our slow advance at this juncture of the battle was perfectly simple and logical, and without the tragic accompaniments given it by gossip.

The explanation is the arrangement of the German defensive lines. Between September 26th and October 4th we had passed all the German defence lines except the Kriemhilde Stellung. So had the French. The Kriemhilde Stellung ran directly across our advance. In front of the French the Brünhilde line, the continuation of the Kriemhilde line, made a big bend north following the Aisne River. The map on page 115 explains the whole situation. When the French broke the other lines, the Germans withdrew (under pressure) to the Brünhilde line. On the 10th of October both our army and the French were immediately in front of this German stronghold. Measured by the German defences that had been passed the armies were even. Measured by kilometers of advance we were behind. But defences are harder to pass than kilometers.

Both armies spent the next twenty days knocking holes—one in the Brünhilde and the other in the Kriemhilde line—preparatory to farther advance.

It is very difficult to give a clear picture of our fighting at this period for it was neither like the fighting of previous wars nor of the earlier parts of this war. The American line, for example, was not a line at all, nor was the German, although as a last resort they had their trench and wire lines to hold. But the Germans had much more than this. In the first

place, they had their artillery maps worked out so that they knew exactly where our men could take shelter. These places they systematically shelled. Then they had their machine guns planted in groups and well protected. To hold a valley they did not have a line of machine guns across it. They had them planted in the woods or on hills or in any favouring position which could sweep the valley. Until an attack was made no one could be certain from which direction the bullets which defended the valley would come. To make any progress, then, it was necessary to silence and take one or two of these specially pestiferous areas which covered the surrounding country. But this was only the first round in the game. The Germans had foreseen this and prepared from other positions a fire which was to make it impossible for us to hold one of these positions if we got it. Their third trick, if the first two failed, was to counter attack and take our prize away from us. The fourth move was to accept this particular advance if the first three moves went against them, retire a little way to their next combination, and work all four moves over again. This was a pretty hard game to beat, especially when played by some of the best troops in the German army, and a good many of them.

The Bois des Ogons was one such centre of trouble. We got into it once but had to get out again. On the other end of the line our men got into Grand Pré several times before they could make their tenure permanent. Between our various attacks and the

less frequent counter attacks of the Germans the artillery on both sides kept searching for the other side's guns, machine guns, and troops. In this contest the Germans had the advantage of having dugouts and other protection. Our men used the captured dugouts where possible, but mostly they dug little fox holes and crawled into them. All over the south side of every hill in this section are the American burrows, most of them just big enough for a man to lie down in. And all around among them are the shell holes made by the German effort to make these hillsides untenable. These places were bad enough. The shelter in the ruined villages was worse, for villages have a particular fascination for all artillerymen.

Some professional opinion believes that the German artillery was a little short of ammunition, but it is doubtful if the men up front noticed it. If there was a shortage it showed in the Germans leaving our transportation alone at times when they might have reached it. But all agree that their guns were well served. They not only kept all places where our troops might be under fire, but from time to time they would pick particular spots of importance and deluge them. A German airplane would come over and drop a smoke bomb. Their artillery observers would observe the direction from two different points and where the lines from these two points crossed would be the spot. In a surprisingly short time after the smoke bomb fell the shells would follow, and with admirable accuracy. If it was an ammunition dump

that was the object of attention, the thing to do was to go away right after the smoke bomb fell.

The following extract of a diary by a machine gun captain will give a fair picture of how this struggle appeared to a line officer whose picture of the battle must be circumscribed by his own immediate locality:

October Third. This day has lasted for 96 hours more or less. On October 3rd we got orders just as we were preparing to go to bed to go into the attack. I was not pleased. When you've got your mind all set for the hay you hate like thunder to have to go into an attack of any kind. But we packed and moved up into position just behind the front line. We bivouacked on the ground and got some sleep, but as it drizzled a little and we were shelled a little and were scared a little, sleep was not too good. Our barrage came down early and shortly after that we started forward. This warfare is quite open and we moved along the roads with our transport. We parked it much farther forward than was safe. The adjutant came running up shortly shouting above the roar of the guns: "Spread that transport out! The place is being shelled." I ran over to the limbers and told them to scatter out, and the words were hardly out of my mouth before a big shell hit within twenty yards of me. It bowled one of my sergeants completely over twice, but he got up unhurt. The transport scattered all right and went in all directions like chickens in front of an automobile, and had hardly moved away before a shell dropped

in the exact place where they had been. I went and told the adjutant: "They are all scattered, sir," I said. He answered, "I'm hit," and he certainly looked it. It was the best wound I ever saw. A piece of the shell that bowled over my sergeant had got in the point of his shoulder and had inflicted the nicest blighty that ever a man hoped for. We tied him up and laid him in a trench and later he went off to the dressing station. After that the shelling got worse and we had to get down. I had a little bit of a trench and was snug as the proverbial bug. I went out some time later and went around to see how the men were getting on. They were scattered around in shell holes and were getting on all right although the shelling was hot. I saw one man lying down and thought for a second it was good old Larry. My heart stood still and I hardly dared look at him. He was quite dead—horribly mashed by a shell, but thank God, it was not Larry. At five minutes to five I got an order to send four guns forward with the infantry who would attack at five o'clock. I ran all the way to my most advanced guns and told them they must advance at once. I hurried them all I could to allow them to get through before the counter barrage came down. Our barrage was to have started at five but there was so much shelling going on that you couldn't tell what was barrage and what wasn't. I saw them go forward over the ridge, and as they went by I wished them good luck little knowing what was in store for them.

They topped the crest and disappeared, and

then I heard the German machine guns open. I didn't know what they were shooting at, but I felt it must be my men and I couldn't understand it, because if the infantry had gone forward at five there should not have been any machine guns there. I went back and told Larry.

"Good God, man," said he, "that order said 5:30, not 5."

I had given the order to Ned so I couldn't tell for sure, but the cold sweat broke out on me. I had sent them over before our own infantry! I had made a most terrible mistake! I had sent a whole platoon to certain death through misreading an order! Good God in Heaven, what am I to do! They have gone now. I can't possibly stop them. Larry is never wrong, he saw the order and said it read 5:30. I waited in anguish for 5:30 to see if the barrage came down then, and sure enough the artillery fire doubled at 5:30 and at six was a continuous roar. Just after six I saw the German S.O.S. lights go up and I knew that the mistake was made. A thousand thoughts flashed through my mind. I had sent a whole platoon to perdition. I would commit suicide. No, not that; I would resign my commission and enlist. No, that wouldn't do, either. Then I thought, well, maybe the order *said* 5 o'clock after all, and that would clear me, and then I thought that Ned who had the order would probably be killed and I'd never know whether I had made the mistake or not. All this time orders were coming in and things had to be attended to. I had to force my tormented mind

to think about the rest of the company. A lot of letters came in from Ned's fiancée, and that didn't make matters any better. It was terrible. Finally a wild-eyed runner came in to say that the platoon had advanced to within one hundred yards of the German lines and then had had a dozen machine guns open on them. He said he had crawled on his hands and knees and the rest of the platoon had been wiped out. He had seen Ned go down and believed he had been killed. It was the worst possible news.

"I am going mad," I thought. "What can I say to Ned's girl? How can I ever stay in the army? How can I ever look any one in the eye again?"

And all the time I have to think about to-morrow's advance. Finally in comes Ned himself risen from the dead. He was crying like a baby and confirmed what the previous runner had said: they had walked directly into a machine gun nest, and only three had managed to crawl out again on their hands and knees. Ned had been in charge of the platoon. The Major was there.

"Have you the order?" he asked.

"Yes," sobbed Ned, and held out a crumpled piece of paper. The Major took it and read it. He had signed it, and he handed it to me without a word. I swear my hand shook and I hardly dared look at it. It read as follows: "The infantry will attack at 5 P. M." My heart leaped into my throat—the mistake was not mine. I almost broke down. The strain had been horrible, but the miracle came later. The platoon had not been wiped out. Practically

all of them had managed to crawl back. Two were killed, five unaccounted for, seven wounded, and twenty untouched. I don't understand it. It was broad daylight, and the Germans let them get within a hundred yards and there was no cover at all. It was a miracle, and that's all there was to it.

Uncle Ned keeps writing me about praying. He is certainly a very devout man. And he probably would be glad to know that I actually did pray once or twice during the last attack. It was rather contemptible of me, too. It is supposing too much to think that you can turn your back on God the way I have done and expect him to listen to a prayer, an instinctive, involuntary, but nevertheless fervent, prayer made while a particular shell is coming whistling down the wind directly toward you. But I prayed instinctively, I couldn't help it, and so, I find, did everyone else. I'll wager that large-calibre, high-explosive shells have caused more fervent prayer in the last four years than all the sermons that ever have been preached. No, it's no good, if you are going to pray when you hear the big shells you ought also to pray at other times, you ought to pray for the good of your soul, and for the welfare of others, and all that sort of thing. It would be surely contrary to all fairness to be a pagan like I am all the time except when I am scared green. I think everybody will agree to that. Uncle Ned adds that if I don't pray myself there are others at home who pray for me daily, which is quite comforting, partly because I'm glad to have anybody who is interested

enough in me, and partly because the people who are doing the praying are all devout Christians, and the Bible says that "the effectual, fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much." (I've got the quotation mixed but that's about it.) I don't want to die over here, as I have too much to do yet at home, and if prayer will bring me back then I'm all for it. It's all very well to figure in the "Killed and Action" reports. It sounds heroic and all your family and friends are glad to have known you, and write each other about it, but I'd a darn sight rather figure among the "arrivals at Hoboken" next fall, and I've a very strong notion that I'm going to be in the latter list.

The Kriemhilde defence system is approximately two and a half miles in depth. On the 10th of October we had reached it all along the line from the Argonne to the Meuse. It took us the next twenty days to go that two and a half miles. The hills around Romagne, Bantheville, and Landres-St. George were the backbone of the German resistance. General von der Marwitz was fighting to save the main German communications not only for his army but for all the German armies of Champagne and Picardy. Over the 4-track line from Sedan to Carignan and on to Longuyon and Metz flowed the life blood of supplies, munitions, and men for a large part of the German armies in France.

General von der Marwitz's order of October had said:

According to information in our possession the enemy is about to attack the Vth Army east of the Meuse and try to push toward Longuyon. *The object of this attack is to cut the Longuyon-Sedan line, the most important artery of the Army of the West.* Moreover, the enemy's intention is to render it impossible for us to exploit the Briey basin, on which depends in a large part our steel production. Thus the heaviest part of the task will once more fall on the 5th army in the course of the combats in the coming weeks, and the safety of the Fatherland will be in its hands. *It is on the unconquerable resistance of the Verdun front that depends the fate of a great part of the west front, perhaps even of the nation.*

In this order the General showed an expectation of a little different direction in our attack but he judged accurately that one of its objects was to cut the Longuyon-Sedan railroad, only in cutting it between Sedan and Carignan we would more completely ruin "*the most important artery of the Army of the West*" on which "depends the fate of a large part of the West Front, perhaps even of our (German) nation" than by cutting the road at Longuyon, for by cutting it west of Carignan the lines that came in there would also be cut.

Von der Marwitz, then, was under the compelling necessity to hold the Kriemhilde line, for if that went there were no prepared defences between it and the railroad, and if his troops couldn't hold behind the Kriemhilde defences he couldn't expect them to hold in the open. Nor could he expect enough reinforcements to make this possible, for the pressure on the other parts of the German line was so intense that no German general could spare the men, and their

general reserve was about gone. On the 10th of October, in fact, information was issued to our corps staffs that the last of the German rested reserves had been brought into the battle area.

Although Von der Marwitz did not have as many men as he could have wished for, the composition of his force was rather better than the average of the German army at that time. On the front of our First Army from September 26th to November 11th there were forty-four German and two Austro-Hungarian divisions. Of these thirteen were used twice and two were used three times. The German force consisted of three guard divisions, twenty-nine line divisions, and twelve reserve and Landwehr divisions.

Fifteen divisions, a third of the force, were rated first-class shock troops.

Of the total force against us about half belonged in that area. Of the other half seventeen divisions came from the French front, four from the British, and two from the Russian front. Two divisions left our front, one going against the British and the other against the French.

On our side, in the middle of our line between the forest and the river, were the 1st, 32nd, 42nd, and 3rd, among the best divisions with which we had carried on the attack on the Kriemhilde defences. The fighting was stubborn and hard, the daily advances were small, the losses were heavy. There was much about this fighting like Grant's advance through the Wilderness. The enemy was suffering badly, his defence, though stubborn and skillful,

was limited. The thing to do was to give him no rest, but to force the fighting and pound him every day. Little by little, through the latter part of October, we wore through his line of defences. When the 30th of the month came our troops were through the Kriemhilde defences in places, in others the Germans still held the last fringes of them, but Von der Marwitz knew that he could not cling to them and that there was no other line behind him that would save the precious railroad. He probably knew also that the comparative lull of the last few days of October were preparatory to another general attack.

On the whole Western Front the Germans were in a desperate condition, a condition directly the result of defeats at the hands of all the Allied armies. The greatest German concentration had been against the British offensive, but it had failed as Von der Marwitz had failed against us.

General Haig thus reports the German situation opposite him at the end of October:

By this time the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt by the British forces had had a cumulative effect, both moral and material, upon the German armies. The difficulty of replacing the enemy's enormous losses in guns, machine guns, and ammunition had increased with every fresh attack, and his reserves of men were exhausted. In the Selle battle the twenty-four British and two American divisions engaged had captured a further 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns from the thirty-one German divisions opposed to them, and had advanced to a great depth with certainty and precision. Though troops could still be found to offer resistance to our initial assault, the German infantry and machine gunners were no longer reliable, and cases

were being reported of their retiring without fighting in front of our artillery barrage.

The capitulation of Turkey and Bulgaria and the imminent collapse of Austria—consequent upon Allied successes which the desperate position of her own armies on the Western Front had rendered her powerless to prevent—had made Germany's military situation ultimately impossible. If her armies were allowed to withdraw undisturbed to shorter lines the struggle might still be protracted over the winter. The British armies, however, were now in a position to prevent this by a direct attack upon a vital centre, which should anticipate the enemy's withdrawal and force an immediate conclusion.

But the enemy was worse off than that and he knew it. He was not only threatened by the British with a "direct attack upon a vital centre," which he could not withstand, but he was also threatened by us with an attack on his main communications, and he knew he could not withstand this either. Even if the British could not have forced his collapse from in front, the German withdrawal was impossible if Von der Marwitz couldn't hold the Sedan-Longuyon railroad.

By the last of October, then, the fate of the German armies was really sealed, and Ludendorff and Hindenburg knew it as they have since frankly said. However, while the German Government tried to arrange some terms on which to stop, the German commanders did the best they could to rescue as much as possible from the approaching wreck.

And Foch, having the enemy within his grasp, stimulated every effort to hasten and enlarge the great consummation of four years of war.

Although by October 31st we were through the Kriemhilde line from Mt. Landres at St. George to the Meuse, the lay of the land still was favourable to the German defence. The hard fighting had used up a number of his divisions but his line was shortened and its configuration allowed him to transfer several divisions from in front of the French Fourth Army to our front. At this time he had twenty-eight divisions and parts of two others in line and ten divisions in reserve.

On our side, between October 18th and 31st, while keeping the enemy busy, our army had reorganized, rested, and gotten ready for another big attack. The weather improved and the spirit of the army was raised to a high pitch. For the attack of November 1st our line was

I CORPS.

In line 77th, 78th, 80th divisions.

Reserve 82nd Division.

V CORPS.

In line 2nd, 89th divisions.

Reserve 42nd, 1st divisions.

III CORPS.

In line 90th, 5th divisions.

Reserve 32nd, 3rd divisions.

Ammunition, supplies, and equipment were up, and all hospitals had been evacuated. All was ready.

The task of our army in this last phase was two-fold, part of it drove on north to gather the fruits of the previous thirty-five days' effort, and cut the railroad

in the neighbourhood of Sedan. The other part turned east and north in a drive on the eastern side of the Meuse toward Longwy.

The race for the railroad began on November first. At 5:30, just at the break of dawn, the men of the 77th, 79th, 80th, 2nd, 89th, 90th, and 5th divisions scrambled out of their fox holes and moved forward to enjoy an experience that no American troops had had since the day the battle opened in September—a progress measuring five or six kilometers per day.

The right and centre corps pushed their attack with spirit and speed to Barricourt ridge, breaking the German defence system and artillery lines. The right of the left corps kept up but its left could not make much headway. However, the completeness of the success on the rest of the front demoralized the enemy's whole resistance. He had to cross the Meuse near Dun and Stenay and this meant a general withdrawal.

During the next two days our attack still maintained its vigour. The III and V Corps pushed the enemy across the Meuse while the I Corps, preceding the French Fourth Army, drove the German rear guards north along the east bank of the Barre River. By November 9th the enemy was in full retreat. His rear guards tried hard to delay our advance but he made no attempt to establish another defensive line, until by November 6th his troops were across the Meuse on our army front from Wadelincourt south of Sedan to south of Dun sur Meuse.

South of Stenay our troops had crossed the river

in the drive toward Longwy. The operations east of the Meuse had, as a matter of fact, begun before November 1st. These operations were under the control of the French XVII Corps which in turn was acting as a part of our First Army. This French Corps staff had under it the French Colonial II Corps and a number of American divisions.

As the American troops on the west bank of the river pushed northward, farther and farther away from the old trench lines, they became more and more exposed to artillery and machine gun fire from the heights on the east bank. From this fire they suffered considerably and it soon became apparent that an attack on the other side of the river could not be longer delayed. One American division, the 29th (Virginia and Maryland National Guard), was assigned to General Claudel, the French commander of the corps, to take part in the attack with a second division, the 33rd (Illinois National Guard), to cross the Meuse and join up with the 29th should the original assault succeed.

It was an extremely difficult operation due to the strength of the enemy's defences, the massing of his forces to protect the Briey basin, northeast of Verdun, and the problems of transport and supplies because of the river and the lack of sufficient roads. To overcome all these difficulties General Claudel counted principally on the element of surprise, and to insure surprise he launched the attack across the enemy's front instead of directly against it.

This attack, which began on the morning of Octo-

ber 8th, was completely successful, the enemy being driven from a series of important heights including Malbrouck Hill and Consenvoye Woods. The Illinois troops accomplished an extremely difficult task in getting across the Meuse, and as soon as they had joined up with the 29th these two units were subjected to a terrific fire from the enemy's massed artillery on the Etrayes Ridge and beyond. The veteran 26th Division then came into the line on the right of the 29th. For several days these troops suffered heavily but they not only held to their positions but managed, after several rebuffs, to work their way forward. By October 23rd the 29th, assisted by one regiment of the 26th, had stormed the Etrayes Ridge, and four days later the 26th succeeded in clearing the Bois de Belleu, a little patch of woods which because of its name and the stubborn defence which the Germans put up there recalled the wood of similar name near Château-Thierry where the Marines first won fame. The New Englanders also had to their credit the capture of the Bois d'Ormont, one of the most formidable heights in this region.

The Americans now had a firm hold on the high wooded ground from which their comrades across the river could be protected in the operation that was then being planned, and which proved to be the final phase of the Argonne-Meuse battle and of America's part in the war.

The line east of the river stayed pretty much as it was on October 10th until the 5th of November. By that time our line west of the river was much

farther north, and the 5th Division held a 13-kilometer flank along the Meuse from about Briulles to the neighbourhood of Montigny. The task of the 5th was to cross the river and take the hills on the other side. The river bottom was flat and unprotected. The opposite shore was studded with machine guns. It would be pretty difficult to convince any ordinary man standing on the east bank of the Meuse now that troops could cross the flats, get over the river, and effect a lodgment in the face of rifle fire, not to mention machine guns and artillery. It does not look possible but it must have been for it happened.

Two attempts were made to cross the river, one at Briulles on the night of November 3rd-4th and the other the following day at Clery le Petit. In the first attempt two companies only got across, but these men by clinging desperately to their positions were the direct cause of the entire division's getting across and clearing the heights beyond. One battalion of the 60th Infantry crossed the river on rafts, duckboards, with poles and ropes, and by swimming, and established itself in the Bois de Chatillon. The following morning, November 5th, this wood was in our hands, and the left of the division was able to cross the river at Clery le Petit where its first attempts had been extremely costly. By 8 o'clock that morning the division had a secure hold on the east bank of the river and by dark that night the entire line of heights from Milly to Vilosnes was in our hands. Two days later the 5th Division had stormed the famous Côte St. Germain, the northern



THE VERDUN HILLS AND THE WOËVRE PLAIN

The hills in the lower left-hand corner hold the famous Douaumont (point of arrow) and Vaux forts. By November 11th the Germans were not only clear of these, as they had been for some time, but practically the whole line of hills as shown in this map was in American hands. Compare with the large map of Argonne-Meuse battle.


bulwark of the heights of the Meuse. With the assistance of the division on its right the 5th had driven the enemy into the plain of the Woivre.

When the armistice was proclaimed the Germans had lost practically every commanding position northeast of Verdun and had been backed out into the Woivre plain with no natural defences to rely on, and no such artificial defence lines as those they had already lost.

There is still one more element to the picture. It is not really a part of the Argonne-Meuse battle but it is closely related to it. Although certain that the Germans must sign any terms presented to them, our army was determined to lose none of its advantages by delay until the armistice was actually in operation.

While the First Army was preparing to push out toward Longwy the Second Army, which had been formed on October 12th under Major-General Robert Bullard, was preparing to launch an attack from the new line across the base of the St. Mihiel salient toward Briey. The beginnings of this action were stopped by the armistice. The Second Army's operation would have driven a wedge into the German line north of Metz.

At the same time a little farther south, opposite Château-Salins, there was a French force, under General Mangin, ready to go through the Hindenburg system there, and drive a wedge into the German lines south of Metz, thus isolating that fortress. To withstand these attacks there were only the German troops in that area and there was



THE LAST BATTLE

Showing in solid black the German defence systems and the Allied lines of September 26th, November 1st (xxx), and the armistice line. The large arrows show the direction of the American First Army's actual attack in the Argonne-Meuse, and where it was expected by the Germans. The smaller arrows show the attacks ready at the time of the armistice, and the planned attack by General Mangin south of Metz—a combination which the Germans had no power to meet.



WHERE WE CUT THE GERMAN COMMUNICATIONS

His two main supply lines were to the south the lines from Sedan to Longuyon and to the north the lines through Belgium. According to the Germans themselves the southern line was vital. By November 6th we had it under fire. From that time surrender was necessary. Shaded portion shows Allied advance.

nowhere for them to get reserves. The cutting of the Sedan railroad had practically cut the German army in two, the greater part of it was north of Sedan, and if it had had any reserves they could reach Lorraine only by the roundabout route through Belgium. On the other hand, as our line and the British had approached nearer each other, the French line in between kept getting shorter and shorter, and the troops thus relieved could quickly and easily reach Lorraine where, joined with ours already there, they could present an overwhelming force against the Germans on that front. The armistice went into effect just in time to save the Germans from this threatened catastrophe to them which bid fair to be more rapid and complete than any disaster they had previously suffered.

But without this the results of the Argonne-Meuse battle were great enough. We had cut the main German supply line of the German western army, which was their main army. They depended practically altogether on the four-track line from Mezières to Carignan and on the railroad system in Belgium (see map on page 137). Having cut their main supply line at a time when they were in the confusion of retreat made it doubly impossible for them to escape the effects of this disaster to their transportation system.

At the time of the armistice the Germans had 184 combat divisions. We had had against us forty-five of them and defeated them. In doing this we had used up the local reserves normally belonging to that area

and taken care of twenty-five divisions from other fronts. There were in all about 600,000 Germans against our First Army. On information captured from German sources it is estimated that their killed and wounded amounted to about 100,000. We took 26,000 prisoners. The American losses—killed, wounded, and prisoners—were about 117,000, and the French serving with us about 7,000. This is an extraordinary result for a not fully trained army to achieve in attack. We captured besides men 874 German guns, more than 300 trench mortars, and more than 3,000 machine guns.

The decisiveness and the significance of our great battle in France will continue to grow as people continue to study the war. As that study progresses, a good many lessons of the struggle will grow plain also, and as the picture gets plainer public appreciation of the valour of our soldiers and the work of our line officers and staffs will continue to grow.

Many officers came out of the battle marked "unfit for combat service." When the public realizes how meagre these men's training was—regulars, guardsmen, and national army—the cause for wonder will not be that there were so many officers relieved but that there were enough fit for this kind of combat to make the thing a success. If some troops retreated three kilometers in the face of a Prussian guard counter attack, if other troops got so disorganized in a rapid advance that they had to be taken to the rear to re-form, the wonder is not that this happened but that it did not happen more. There will be learned

arguments to the effect that if we had used fewer troops we could have avoided some of the traffic jams that occurred, and that had our battle plans been less elemental we might have taken greater advantage of terrain, etc. Before these and similar criticisms be counted just, they must take into account that it may take more green troops to take a position than it does experienced ones, and that the simplest battle instructions are plenty complicated for officers half of whom had never been in a big battle before, and most of whom had had a uniform on less than eighteen months. A lot of men are buried in the Argonne because people cannot in a short time learn even the elements of warfare so as not to forget them in the stress of battle.

Theremoretheforty-sevendays of the Argonne-Meuse is studied the more grateful the American public must become to General Pershing, his staff, and the officers and men of the American Army, and the more fixed should become the public resolution never again to make an American general take the moral responsibility of facing such a task, with an army "hurriedly raised and hastily trained," and never again to send our citizens into battle in which all the advantages that come from proper training are with the enemy.

The great decisions of Pershing and his staff to train for open warfare, to push the fighting whether ready or not, the ability to make a million men into an army that could function without fatal blunders and fight to victory—these things are as great in the annals of the nation as the courage of our men.

And always it is well to remember in estimating our last great battle Von der Marwitz's statement that the fate of the German western army, perhaps even of the Fatherland, depended on holding the Sedan-Longuyon railroad which was the prize of our victory won by forty-seven days of bitter fighting in the last decisive struggle of the great war.

CHAPTER VI

WITH THE ALLIES

DURING the Argonne-Meuse battle there were ~~six~~ American divisions with the Allies, and all of them saw distinguished service. Toward the end of October the 37th and 91st divisions, which had been in the opening of the battle on September 26th, were taken from our army and sent to Belgium and assigned to the composite army under the King of the Belgians who had the French General Degoutte as Chief-of-Staff. From the 31st of October on these divisions were in action and they acquitted themselves well. They were among the troops at the point of the Belgian advance.

The same was true of the two American divisions, the 27th and 30th, that were with the British. These two divisions were the first troops through the Hindenburg Line on the British front in the attack near Cambrai which began on September 27th. These two divisions were again in action on the 17th of October in the opening stages of the battle of the Selle River. Their work, on both occasions, received the highest praise from the British. In these two battles these two divisions took more than 6,000 prisoners.

Still farther south the 2nd and 36th divisions were

loaned to the French, and the 2nd Division had here the honour of being the first to break the German line in its area. The 2nd took the strong hill Blanc Mont and the town of St. Étienne, breaking a line the Germans had held since 1914, and playing a conspicuous part in the wide attack which resulted in a general German retreat to behind the Aisne from Rheims to the Argonne. The 36th relieved the 2nd and was in the French advance following this German retreat. From this service the 2nd came back and appeared in the Argonne in the attack of November 1st.

There is every reason for pride in the record of these loaned divisions as there is in the record of the First Army.

CONCISE OFFICIAL HISTORIES OF THE COMBAT DIVISIONS

1st DIVISION

This division was organized from troops of the U. S. Regular Army. The first units left the United States June 14, 1917, and the last units arrived in France July 2, 1917. The division went into the Gondrecourt (first area) training area for training.

The division insignia is a crimson figure "1" on khaki background. Chosen because the numeral "1" represents the number of the division and many of its subsidiary organizations. Also, as proudly claimed, because it was the "First division in France; first in sector; first to fire a shot at the Germans;

first to attack; first to conduct a raid; first to be raided; first to capture prisoners; first to inflict casualties; first to suffer casualties; first to be cited singly in general orders; first in the number of division, corps, and army commanders and general staff officers produced from its personnel."

It entered the line in the Sommerville sector, ten kilometers southeast of Nancy, for instructional purposes under French command October 21st, and withdrew the night of November 20, 1917. This sector was quiet.

The division entered the Ansauville sector under the tactical command of the French. This sector was approximately twenty kilometers northwest of Toul. Sector quiet with occasional active days. Division withdrew April 3rd. The 1st Artillery Brigade was the only American artillery in action during this period.

The division entered the Cantigny sector, five kilometers west of Montdidier, April 25th.

The Cantigny operation was carried out the morning of May 28th, the division advancing the line 300 to 600 yards on a 2,200 yard front. Division was relieved July 7, 1918.

The division entered the line the night of July 17, 1918, for the Soissons operation, approximately fifteen kilometers southwest of Soissons. The fighting was severe throughout the attack, especially July 20th and 21st. The division was relieved after having reached Berzy le Sec.

Saizerais sector. The 1st Division entered the

sector on August 7th. The sector was quiet and the division was relieved August 24th.

St. Mihiel operation. Elements of the division commenced entering the sector on September 6th, completing the relief September 11th. The division began an attack on September 12th in the Beaumont sector, twenty kilometers northwest of Toul. On September 13th the division was regrouped and held in reserve of the IV Army Corps. The division had advanced its line fourteen kilometers in nineteen hours.

Operation east of the Argonne and west of the Meuse. The division moved into line October 1st and attacked in the Cheppy sector, one kilometer west of Varennes, continuing the attack until the night of October 11th, when it was relieved. The division had advanced approximately seven kilometers.

Operation against Mouzon. On November 5th, elements of the division entered the line and attacked the next morning in the area of Mouzon. At 2 P.M. orders were received to assemble the division and march to Sedan.

Operation south and southwest of Sedan. The division attacked the heights south and southwest of Sedan on the morning of November 7th. At 2 P.M. the division was ordered to withdraw.

The division commenced its march to the Coblenz Bridgehead from Abaucourt on November 17th. Marched through Lorraine and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Crossed the Rhine on December 13th. Occupied its area east of Rhine in the Coblenz Bridgehead, December 14th.

To include March 8, 1919, there had been 23,974 casualties, which included 106 prisoners, reported from the division. Three hundred individuals of this division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross up to March 1, 1919. The division captured 165 officers and 6,304 men, numerous machine guns, pieces of artillery of all calibres, and a great quantity of supplies.

The 1st Division made a total advance, against resistance, of fifty-one kilometers.

The commanding generals of the division were as follows: Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert, June 8, 1917, to December 12, 1917; Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, December 12, 1917, until he became a corps commander. On March 15, 1919, Maj. Gen. E. F. McGlachlin, Jr., was in command of the division.

The following units composed the division: the 16th, 18th, 26th, 28th Infantry regiments; 5th, 6th, 7th Artillery regiments; 1st Engineers Regiment and Train; 2nd Field Signal Battalion; 3rd, 4th, 5th, Ambulance companies and Field Hospital.

2nd DIVISION

The division was organized from elements of the Regular Army and Marines in France during the last three months of 1917.

The division insignia is an Indian head on star background and shield with colours varying according to unit.

After a period of training with the division head-

quarters at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, from October 26, 1917, to March 16, 1918, the division entered the Verdun and Toulon sectors with headquarters at Sommedieu. The division was in sector with the French, the sector being quiet, no advance being made. Constant patrolling and several enemy raids repulsed. Division was relieved March 24th.

The 2nd Division on this date moved into the Château-Thierry sector, passing from the VII A.C. French to the XXI A. C. French as reserve. The division went forward about June 1, 1918, to meet a strong enemy attack which had developed on the line west of Château-Thierry. The attack of June 3rd and 4th was halted June 4th on the line west of Château-Thierry and the division advanced two kilometers in the neighbourhood of Vaux and in Belleau Wood, between June 6th and July 1st. The relief of the division was completed on night of July 9th.

On July 16th the 2nd Division entered the sector south of Soissons and attacked on the morning of the 18th and again on the morning of the 19th, advancing a total distance of eleven kilometers after severe fighting. The relief was completed on July 19th-20th. On July 20th the division moved into reserve position and left the sector.

On August 9th the division entered the Marbach sector. This was a quiet sector and division was relieved on August 24th.

The division entered the line on the St. Mihiel salient September 9th, where there was very active

fighting, withdrawing on September 16th, after having advanced approximately nine kilometers.

Entered the front line of the Blanc Mont sector near Somme Pye under the French. After severe fighting the division was relieved October 27th.

The division entered the Meuse-Argonne sector on October 30th and attacked November 1st, advancing to the Meuse. Division was relieved after declaration of armistice. The division had made an advance of twenty-nine kilometers.

Some of the units of the division, as a part of the 1st Division, left the United States in June, 1917. The division captured 228 officers, 11,738 men, 343 pieces of artillery, 1,350 machine guns, and made a total advance of sixty kilometers against resistance.

Its training in France was obtained in the third training area which is known as the Bourmont area.

The units composing the division were the 9th and 23rd Infantry; 5th and 6th Marine Corps regiments; 12th, 15th, and 17th Artillery regiments; 4th, 5th, and 6th Machine Gun battalions; 2nd Trench Mortar Battery; 1st Field Signal Battalions; 2nd Engineer Regiment and Train; 1st, 15th, 16th, and 23rd Ambulance companies and Field hospitals; which composed the 2nd Sanitary Train.

Brig. Gen. Charles A. Doyon, U. S. Marine Corps, commanded the division to include November 7, 1917; Maj. Gen. Omar Bundy commanded the division from November 8, 1917, to July 14, 1918.

4th Division

The 4th Division (Regulars) was organized at Camp Greene, Charlotte, North Carolina, on December 10, 1917.

The division is known as the "Ivy Division," its shoulder insignia is a green four-leafed ivy, about a circle in cross shape, superimposed upon a square olive-drab diamond.

The division began leaving Camp Greene April 18, 1918, by way of Camp Merritt and Camp Mills. Overseas movement began May 1, 1918, and most of the division landed in England and proceeded to Calais. By June 3rd, all organizations, except artillery, were in the Samer area for training with the British. The artillery trained at Camp de Souge.

On June 9, 1918, the division moved to Meaux and vicinity and on June 15th moved to La Ferte, being at the disposal of the 164th French Infantry Division. During the operations beginning July 18th the division (less 7th Brigade) was under orders of the VII Army Corps (French) and the 7th Brigade under the II Army Corps (French). Units of the division participated in the fighting around Haute-Vesnes, Courchamps, Chevillon, St. Genoulph, and Sommelans until July 22nd, when the division was made reserve. Some of the infantry units were detached and put into the fighting with another American division.

The division went into the front line August 3rd, advancing to the Vesle, and was relieved on night of

August 11th, and on August 19th was withdrawn to the Reynel training area, and on September 1st all units were moved to Vavincourt for further training.

On September 7th troops of the 59th Infantry went into the line in the Toul sector southeast of Verdun. During this period the balance of the division was in reserve in this sector, except the artillery which was in action with other divisions.

The 59th Infantry was relieved September 15th and the entire division moved to woods near Lennes on the night of September 19th-20th.

The division, as part of III Corps, attacked on the first day in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, September 26th, advancing six and a half kilometers the first day, and continued in this offensive until October 19th, when it was relieved while holding Bois de la Cote Lemont and Bois de Brioules.

On October 20th the division was assigned to the Second Army; started to move to Vignot and Lucey areas on October 21st.

On November 4th the division was assigned again to the First Army and started moving to Blercourt November 6th, but was reassigned to the Second Army on November 8th. The division returned to Void on November 9th, attached to the IV Corps.

After the signing of the armistice the division concentrated around Bourcq on November 13th and the artillery brigade, which had been kept in action almost continuously along the Meuse, rejoined the division November 14th.

The division began its march into Germany November 20th, under the Third Army, and on December 16th the division was occupying the Kreises of Adenau and Cochem, Province of the Rhine, as its permanent area of occupation.

The total battle casualties reported to include March 8, 1919, were 12,948. The number of Distinguished Service Crosses awarded to individuals of this division to include March 1, 1919, were 66.

The commanding generals of the division from the time of its organization to include the date of the armistice were as follows:

Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Cameron, December 10, 1917, to August 24, 1918; Brig. Gen. Benj. W. Poore, August 24, 1918, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, August 31, 1918, to October 17, 1918; Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Cameron, October 17, 1918, to October 24, 1918; Brig. Gen. Benj. W. Poore, October 24, 1918, to November 7, 1918; Maj. Gen. Mark L. Hersey, November 7, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

5th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions, the 5th Division (Regular Army) was organized at Camp Logan, Texas, in the latter part of May, 1917. The division was made up from the 6th, 11th, 60th, and 61st Regular Army Infantry regiments. The 60th and 61st Infantry were organized from the old 7th Infantry; the 19th and 20th Field Artillery organized from the old 7th Field Artillery; the 21st Field

Artillery organized from the old 3rd Field Artillery; the 7th Engineers Regiment organized from Companies E and F of the 1st Engineers; and the 9th Field Signal Battalion organized from personnel of the signal corps of the Regular Army. The 13th, 14th, and 15th Machine Gun battalions; 5th Trench Mortar Battery; 5th Headquarters Trains and Military Police; 5th Ammunition Train; 5th Sanitary Train, were organized from Regular Army and National Army drafts. The first organization to leave for overseas entrained from Camp Merritt about the first of March. Division headquarters arrived at Havre, France, May 1, 1918. The division was sent to the Bar-sur-Aube area for training and remained there until June 1st, when it moved by rail to the Vosges. There it entered the Colmar sector in conjunction with the 21st Division (French) and remained there until July 16th. The division then moved by bus to the St. Die sector and remained there until the 23rd of August, when it moved by bus and foot to the St. Mihiel sector. In the St. Mihiel operation this division was a part of the I Army Corps and was placed in the line northeast of Regnieville-en-Haye with the 2nd Division on their left and the 90th Division on their right. The division continued in the St. Mihiel offensive until September 16th when it moved by road and bus to the Argonne front and went into the attack on October 12th east of Montfaucon. The division continued in the attack until October 22nd when it was relieved by the 90th Division, and was withdrawn to the vicinity of Malancourt. On October

27th the division was again brought into the attack southwest of Brioules, crossed the Meuse River and took Dun-sur-Meuse, and continued the attack until November 11th when it had reached a position just south of Marville. On November 13th the division was moved back to the vicinity of Murvaux and on November 20th to Lion-Devant-Dun. When the Third Army was formed this division constituted a part of the command and was marched to the vicinity of Longwy where it was placed in charge of the lines of communication, taking over the control of the territory in its area. On December 8th the division marched to vicinity of Remich, Luxembourg, and upon arrival there was placed under command of the Second Army.

Maj. Gen. James E. McMahon, U.S.A., commanded this division from December 13, 1917, until October 24, 1918; Maj. Gen. Hanson E. Ely from October 24th to November 11th.

The shoulder insignia of the 5th Division is a red diamond. The division captured from the enemy the following: 2,405 prisoners, 98 pieces of artillery, 802 machine guns, and made a total advance of twenty-nine kilometers against resistance.

During active operations, the division suffered the following losses (as reported to the War Dept. to include May 10, 1919): killed, 1,908; wounded, 7,975; prisoners of war, 98 men.

To include March 1, 1919, 163 Distinguished Service Crosses have been awarded to individuals of this division.

6th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions, the 6th Division was organized at Camp Forrest, Ga., and Camp McClellan, Ala., on November 26, 1917. This division was a Regular Army division and was popularly known as the "Star Division."

On March 13, 1918, the division headquarters moved to Camp Forrest, Ga., and later left on May 8th and was established at Camp Wadsworth, S. C.

Practically every state in the Union was represented in the volunteer personnel of the division; however, the majority of the men were from the South.

The shoulder insignia of the division is a six-pointed star of red with the numeral "6" in blue superimposed on the centre of the star.

The division, less artillery and engineers, began embarking from New York on May 8, 1918, and began debarking in England on July 17th, the last units arriving in France August 28, 1918. From England the troops were transported to France, beginning July 21st, debarking at Le Havre.

Preceding the division, the engineers arrived on May 18th at Brest, France, and were engaged in construction work at Gievres before joining the division in August near Chateauvillain.

The artillery landed at Le Havre on July 29th and began its training at Valdahon.

After training in the vicinity of Chateauvillain,

the division, less artillery, left on August 27, 1918, for Gerardmer where it occupied, under French command, a sector in the Vosges until October 11, 1918.

On October 27th the division moved from Gerardmer by rail to the vicinity of Les Islettes and established headquarters at Beauchamlc Farm.

On November 2, 1918, the division began to march forward in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. On November 6th the division headquarters was established at Stonne.

The army objective in this drive having been reached, the division then marched to a sector northeast of Verdun, where it entered the line on November 14th and maintained this position until November 21st, when the division was relieved and proceeded by marching to the fourteenth training area. November 30th the division headquarters was established at Aignay-le-Duc.

To include March 8, 1919, the 6th Division had reported 285 casualties during the war of which 3 were prisoners of war.

The commanding generals of the division were as follows: Brig. Gen. Jas. B. Erwin, November 26, 1917, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. Walter P. Gordon, August 31, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

To include March 1, 1919, ten individuals of this division had received the Distinguished Service Cross.

The 6th Division was composed of the following units:

11th and 12th Infantry brigades.
51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th Infantry regiments.
17th and 18th Machine Gun battalions.
6th Artillery Brigade.
3rd, 11th, and 78th Artillery regiments.
6th Trench Mortar Battery.
16th Division Machine Gun Battalion.
318th Engineer Regiment and Train.
6th Field Signal Battalion.
6th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
6th Supply Train.
6th Ammunition Train.
6th Sanitary Train.
20th, 37th, 38th, 40th Ambulance companies and
Field hospitals.

7th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions this division was organized January 1, 1918, at Chickamauga Park, Ga.

The division insignia consists of two triangles with apexes touching, in black, on red circular base.

Division headquarters arrived at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, February 5, 1918, at which time the division began assembling and training.

Began leaving Camp MacArthur for Camp Merritt, N. J., July 18, 1918. Sailed from Hoboken, N. J., on July 31st; 14th Brigade followed during the next two weeks. The last units arrived in France on September 3, 1918.

On August 19th division arrived in fifteenth training

area with headquarters at Ancy-le-Franc. Entire division (less artillery) arrived in training area by September 20, 1918.

On September 30, 1918, the division moved to Toul area, with headquarters at Gondreville. Engaged in training and equipping.

Relief of the 90th Division was completed October 10 and 11, 1918, in the Puvencelle sector. Division headquarters moved from Gondreville to Villers-en-Haye. Fifth Field Artillery Brigade assigned to the support of the 7th Division. Defensive occupation of this sector from October 10 to November 9, 1918. Offensive occupation of this sector to November 11th. Participated in the Second Army offensive.

On January 3, 1919, the 5th Field Artillery Brigade was relieved from the 7th Division.

On January 10, 1919, the division headquarters moved from Euvezin to Saizerais. Units of the division moved south from battle area and engaged in active training.

(The 7th Field Artillery Brigade trained at Camp Meucon; did not join division until February, 1919.)

During the operations of the division, 1 officer and 68 men, 28 machine guns and numerous supplies were captured from the enemy. This division made a total advance into enemy territory of $\frac{3}{4}$ kilometer.

To include March 8, 1919, there had been reported from this division 1,546 casualties of which 3 were prisoners of war.

The commanding generals of the division were as follows:

Brig. Gen. C. H. Barth, August 10, 1918, to October 24, 1918; Maj. Gen. Edmund Wittenmeyer, October 24, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

To include March 1, 1919, 30 individuals of the 7th Division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The units composing the division were as follows:

13th Infantry Brigade.

55th, 56th Infantry regiments.

20th Machine Gun Battalion.

14th Infantry Brigade.

34th, 64th Infantry regiments.

21st Machine Gun Battalion.

19th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion.

7th Artillery Brigade.

8th, 79th, and 80th Artillery regiments.

7th Trench Mortar Battery.

5th Engineer Regiment and Train.

10th Field Signal Battalion.

7th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

7th Supply Train.

7th Ammunition Train.

7th Sanitary Train, consisting of the 22nd, 34th, 35th, and 36th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

8th DIVISION

The Eighth, "Pathfinder," Division was organized by letter of the Adjutant General, December 17, 1917. At that time some of the organizations now comprising the division were as yet unborn, while

some of those that had been organized were widely scattered. The 12th Infantry, and its offshoot, the 62nd Infantry, were then at the Presidio, San Francisco, California. On the morning of January 3, 1918, the 62nd Infantry left the Presidio and proceeded to Camp Fremont, near Palo Alto, California, pursuant to telegraphic instructions from Headquarters, Western Department, arriving there January 5, 1918. The 62nd Infantry was brigaded with the 12th Infantry forming the 15th Infantry Brigade; and the 8th and 13th Infantry were brigaded, forming the 16th Infantry Brigade. These two brigades constituted the 8th Division, Regular Army, at the beginning of 1918, with station at Camp Fremont, California. Routine duties in connection with making the camp habitable were immediately taken up, and shortly afterward intensive schedules of training were begun with the object of preparing the organizations for early overseas duty.

In the early part of 1918 the 2nd, 81st, and 83rd Field Artillery regiments were added to the division. The 81st and 83rd Field Artillery regiments were originally cavalry organizations. The three machine gun battalions sprang from the four infantry regiments. The 24th Machine Gun Battalion was organized January 2, 1918, under Table 10, Table of Organization, as amended by telegram A.G.O., December 31, 1917, its personnel being taken from the 8th and 13th Infantry regiments or the 16th Infantry Brigade, then under the command of Colonel S. E. Smiley. The 23rd Machine Gun Battalion

was organized February 1, 1918, its personnel being taken from the 12th and 62nd Infantry regiments. The organization of this Machine Gun Battalion was effected under the supervision of Captain, now Lieutenant Colonel, A. C. Gillem, the present commanding officer thereof. The 22nd Machine Gun Battalion was organized during the latter part of March and early part of April, 1918, under the direction of Captain James I. Muir who was authorized to take one officer from each the 23rd and 24th Machine Gun battalions, and two officers from the other organizations of the division. On April 13, 1918, nine of the officers transferred from the 91st Division at Camp Lewis, Washington, to the 8th Division were assigned to this Machine Gun Battalion.

The organization of the 8th Train Headquarters and Military Police was initiated by the War Department December 17, 1917, the first enlisted personnel for skeleton companies being obtained by transfer from the infantry regiments of the division. Colonel William K. Jones, infantry, who was assigned as Commander of Trains, reported and assumed command January 15, 1918. In March, 1918, a full quota of officers was assigned and on April 4, 1918, the organization was effected. On this latter date the 8th Ammunition Train was organized at Camp Fremont and placed under temporary command of Captain Len Bond until the arrival of Lieut. Col. John B. Schoeffel who was in command until he was promoted Colonel and trans-

ferred. The present commanding officer, Lieut. Col. William E. Persons, assumed command of this train July 1, 1918. The first personnel of the Ammunition Train consisted of 32 officers and 115 enlisted men. It is estimated that 95 per cent. of the personnel of this train were new men in the service with only a few months' military training at the most.

The 8th Sanitary Train was formed at Camp Fremont the first part of January, 1918, and was composed of field hospitals and ambulance companies that had been formed at the Presidio, San Francisco, California, from May to December, 1917. The nucleus of the train was Field Hospital and Ambulance companies No. 2 which had seen service on the Mexican border. They were re-numbered Field Hospital and Ambulance companies No. 11, and from them were formed Provisional Field Hospital and Ambulance companies "A" which were given the number 31. From the excess personnel of the latter were formed Provisional Field Hospital and Ambulance companies "C," No. 32. Provisional Field Hospital and Ambulance companies "B," No. 43 were next organized. At the time of the organization of the division, Major H. H. Sharpe, M. C., was in command of the sanitary train. Field Hospital and Ambulance companies No. 32 were the first organizations of this train to reach Camp Fremont, having arrived there in October, 1917. Sanitary Squads Nos. 83 and 84 were organized by the War Department in February, 1918, and assigned to the 8th Division at Camp Fremont for duty.

The 8th Motor Supply Train was organized at Camp Joseph E. Johnston, Jacksonville, Florida, January 26, 1918, the officers all being in the Quartermaster Corps and the enlisted personnel being transferred from provisional companies, Quartermaster Corps, stationed at Jacksonville, Florida. The train left Camp Johnston for Detroit, Michigan, March 12, 1918, and on March 20th and 21st left Detroit for Camp Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland, where it maintained a headquarters until October 30, 1918. During this time the commanding officer and one half to two thirds of the enlisted personnel were frequently on detached service with companies on the road engaged in convoy work between Detroit, Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and other points. Major Charles D. Kenison, Q. M. C., who was assigned in command of the supply train August 20, 1918, was relieved October 24, 1918, and attached to the train as motor transport officer, 8th Division. The present commanding officer, First Lieutenant, now Captain, Alonzo W. Jones, Q. M. C., was assigned in command of the train October 26, 1918.

The 320th Field Signal Battalion, assigned to the 8th Division, was organized at Camp Dodge, Des Moines, Iowa, November 12, 1917. One hundred and twenty men of the Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps reported, and approximately 50 men from Des Moines and the vicinity were added to the organization. Capt. Walter L. Thomas assumed command of the battalion November 14, 1917, and was in command

thereof until December 12, 1917, when Major E. Mason took command and served as commanding officer until his discharge, January 15, 1919, and the assignment of the present commanding officer, Major William T. Crook. The battalion entrained for Camp Fremont January 2, 1918, arriving there January 6, 1918.

Bakery Company No. 338 was organized at Camp Fremont September 26, 1917, as Bakery Company No. 50; the number being changed to 338 in November, 1917. Second Lieut. John G. Schronk was placed in command. The personnel of this company consisted of Regular Army bakers then in the service and of men from various schools for bakers and cooks in the Western Department. It might be observed here that four other bakery companies, drawing largely upon Bakery Company No. 338 for their personnel, were organized at Camp Fremont, and that as many as six men from this company were commissioned officers and assigned to the other bakery companies.

Other organizations of the 8th Division were the 319th Engineers and Train; division and brigade headquarters; the Trench Mortar Battery and the 8th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop. The 319th Engineers and Train left Camp Fremont for the American Expeditionary Forces under the command of Col. C. W. Otwell in September, 1918. This office does not have at hand the necessary data to furnish the details of the organization of the 319th Engineers.

In January, 1918, Col. Elmore F. Taggart, infantry, assumed command of the division and camp and was in command thereof until March, 1918, when Colonel Van Denson, artillery, took command. In April, 1918, Brig. Gen. Joseph D. Leitch became the commanding officer and was in command until May when Maj. Gen. John F. Morrison assumed command. Major General Morrison was relieved from this command and placed in command of the Western Department in July, 1918, and Brigadier General Leitch again commanded the division until the assignment of Maj. Gen. William S. Graves the same month. Major General Graves retained command until September, 1918, when he was relieved and placed in command of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia. The last commanding general of the 8th Division, Maj. Gen. Eli A. Holmick, assumed command thereof in September, 1918.

The home of the 8th Division was Camp Fremont, about one mile from Palo Alto, California, and thirty miles from San Francisco, situated in one of the most beautiful parts of the state, Santa Clara Valley. The camp was named after that great pioneer and soldier Gen. John G. Fremont, the pathfinder of the West. The division was therefore called the "Pathfinder" Division. At one time all of the organizations comprising the division were at Camp Fremont with the exception of the Motor Supply Train and the Mobile Field Laboratory No. 64, which latter unit was organized at Yale University, New

Haven, Connecticut, and attached to the division at Camp Mills, New York, in October, 1918. The camp consisted of tents although division headquarters, the mess buildings, base hospital and infirmaries, warehouses, and a few other were frame structures. Owing to the populous neighbourhood adjacent to the camp it was more or less irregular in shape and slightly crowded, without sufficient ground near by for close-order drill. The rifle ranges were exceptionally good, but about three miles from camp, usually necessitating the transportation of troops by rail at least one way when engaged in rifle practice. The use of the artillery ranges blocked traffic on the adjoining highways, and it was necessary to maintain a close guard when these ranges were being used.

From the very start intensive training was carried on by the organizations of the division, and highly trained skeleton organizations were rapidly developed for the purpose of training prospective recruits and with the object of engaging in early overseas service. In the early part of May, 1918, several thousand draft men arrived at Camp Fremont and were assigned to the division. Major General Morrison was in command of the division at the time and under his able direction the training of the various organizations progressed by leaps and bounds, and the new recruits were rapidly whipped into shape.

About the first of July, 1918, the three field artillery regiments and the trench mortar battery, constituting the 8th Field Artillery Brigade under

command of Brig. Gen. Alfred A. Starbird, were sent to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to complete their training preparatory to overseas duty. During this period, the 8th Motor Supply Train received valuable training in the convoy work it was engaged in between Baltimore, Washington, and other cities. The 8th Train Headquarters and Military Police were trained as both infantry and cavalry troops, and in addition received special training to fit them for overseas duty. This organization furnished the provost guard for Camp Fremont and established detached posts in all towns and cities near camp for police duty separately and in conjunction with the civil authorities. The training of the ammunition train was somewhat handicapped by lack of sufficient combat wagons, and mules, trucks, and other motor transportation, but it made the best of the situation, substituting other forms of training when necessary. The training of the other units progressed in accordance with arranged schedules and was highly satisfactory.

Practically every organization in the division engaged in one or more practice marches, some of which were extended over a period of several days. There were also practice marches of whole brigades at a time. The infantry regiments were given combat practice and trained in the new methods of warfare, using War Department Pamphlet 802 as a basis for the training. Trenches were dug and wire entanglements constructed and the usual course of training pursued in accordance with latest schedules

and circulars of training from the War Department. The bayonet training of this division was exceptionally fine, drawing a great deal of comment from officers of other camps and divisions, as well as from foreign officers. A number of parades and reviews, including one brigade review and two reviews of the entire division, were held at Camp Fremont. The two division reviews took place when Major General Helmick was in command of the division and passed before him as reviewing officer.

One of the fourth officers' training schools was conducted at Camp Fremont, with Major, now Lieut. Col., George G. Bartlett, infantry, in command under the general jurisdiction of the 8th Division. When the training school at Camp Kearny was discontinued, prior to the movement of the 40th Division overseas, the infantry of that school were transferred to the school at Camp Fremont for the completion of the course of training. At the termination of this school about 150 new second lieutenants were either assigned or attached to the various organizations of the division.

At the time Major General Graves was in command of the division, Brigadier General Leitch commanded the 15th Infantry Brigade and Brig. Gen. John J. Bradley the 16th Infantry Brigade. Brigadier General Leitch was relieved as commanding officer of the 15th Infantry Brigade and transferred to Camp Lewis as commanding officer of the new division being formed there about the first of October, 1918, when Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson assumed com-

mand of the 15th Infantry Brigade. At this time the commanding officers of the four infantry regiments were as follows: Lieut. Col. Morris M. Keck, and later Col. Walter C. Short, 8th; Col. Charles B. Hagadorn, 12th; Col. L. S. Sorley, 13th; and Col. James R. Lindsay, 62nd.

On or about August 3, 1918, instructions were received from the Adjutant General's Office directing the transfer of Major General Graves and part of his staff and some 5,000 men and nearly 100 officers to American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia. This was the most serious loss the division ever sustained as it was evidently the cause of a new delay of several weeks in starting the eastward movement of the division and of the failure to reach France on the part of most of the organizations comprising the division. About 2,000 men sailed on the first transports which left Fort Mason, San Francisco, California, about the middle of August, 1918, and more than 3,000 men sailed from the same port on the second transports about September 1, 1918. Major General Graves took with him his Chief-of-Staff, the two assistant division adjutants, a few army field clerks, the division judge advocate, and a number of other officers. The line officers and enlisted personnel sent to Siberia were largely drawn from the four infantry regiments. A number of medical and dental officers and enlisted men, as well as one field veterinary unit, and a few ordnance and quartermaster corps officers and men were sent with these forces.

In September, 1918, after the transfer of the above men to replacement troops, unassigned, for duty with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, new recruits began pouring into Camp Fremont, and by the latter part of September most of the organizations were again practically full strength. Major General Helmick now took command of the division with Lieutenant Colonel, now Col., Asa L. Singleton as Chief-of-Staff. The training of all units was speeded up and the new recruits were rapidly trained in elementary military principles and drill. The rifle ranges were kept busy constantly on every day of the week including Sunday and regardless of weather. Numerous schools were conducted for officers and all were required to attend. Major General Helmick himself, with all the officers of division headquarters who had not already had the work, took the course in gas, while the entire staff was required to take certain prescribed horse exercises. It was evident that the division was receiving its finishing training and was expecting orders for overseas duty.

In September, 1918, orders were received from the Adjutant General's Office directing the movement of the 319th Engineers and Train to Camp Upton, New York. A few days later these organizations under command of Colonel Otwell entrained and departed for the East. They were never again united with the other organizations of the division and their present location is not known.

About the first of October, 1918, the epidemic of

influenza broke out in a number of cities near Camp Fremont, and in order to prevent the disease from spreading among the men, on October 5th the whole camp was placed in close quarantine, and no one except medical officers was permitted to leave or enter the camp without a special pass from division headquarters, which was granted only in case of most exceptional circumstances. This quarantine was strictly enforced and was not lifted until the organizations were about to entrain for Camp Mills, New York. While there were, of course, a number of cases of influenza and some deaths among the men and officers, it is believed that the precautionary methods adopted by the division did much to lessen the seriousness of the situation and resulted in saving many lives.

On or about October 10, 1918, telegraphic instructions were received from the Adjutant General's Office directing movement of the division to Camp Mills, Long Island, New York, beginning October 18th. Every effort was now made to have all organizations ready to entrain when the appointed time came. The aforesaid telegraphic instructions, in so far as pertinent, were repeated to the 8th Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and to the 8th Motor Supply Train at Camp Holabird, Maryland. These organizations were directed to leave their respective camps in time to join the division at Camp Mills.

The schedule of entraining provided for the departure of six trains each day beginning at 8 A.M. and at intervals of one and one half hours thereafter.

Major General Helmick delegated Captain, now Maj., G. D. Gorton, Q.M.C., to act as his personal representative with instructions to see that the trains were properly prepared and moved out on time. The first train containing one company of military police, the advance school, and advance representatives of the staff departed at the exact time designated, 8 A.M., October 18, 1918, and all the other trains moved out as scheduled. The trains were routed over several different roads and in a way to prevent congestion. The entire movement took only seven days and was conducted in a most orderly and methodical manner. Many of those who were left behind because of temporary sickness were later forwarded to Camp Mills on a special train for casuals.

Upon arrival of the first train at Camp Mills, a headquarters was established, and preparations made for receiving detachments arriving later. It is estimated that the trip from Camp Fremont to Camp Mills took on an average six days. Upon arrival at Camp Mills, each organization prepared the required passenger lists and equipped its troops with overseas caps and helmets. The division had been well furnished with the woolen clothes and underwear required for overseas service and there was little or no difficulty in completing its equipment as far as clothing was concerned.

At the time the movement of the division to Camp Mills began, the staff of Major General Helmick consisted in part of:

Col. Asa L. Singleton, infantry, Chief-of-Staff;

Lieut. Col Frank F. Jewett, infantry, Assistant Chief-of-Staff; Maj. L. S. Schmitt, A. G., Division Adjutant; Maj. R. M. Alton, A. G., Division Personnel Adjutant; Col. L. L. Smith, M. C., Division Surgeon; Lieut. Col. Ned M. Green, infantry, Division M. G. Officer; Lieut. Col. Alfred T. Clifton, S. C., Division Signal Officer; Lieut. Col. Clenard McLaughlin, infantry, Division Inspector; Maj. Rob C. Musser, V. C., Division Veterinarian; Maj. Charles M. Taylor, D. C., Division Dental Officer; Maj. G. M. Everetts, Q.M.C., Division Quartermaster; Maj. George D. Rice, Chaplain, Division Chaplain; Maj. Joseph J. Kerrigan, infantry, Division Intelligence Officer.

At this time the artillery and infantry brigades were commanded as aforesaid, viz., Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson in command of the 15th Infantry Brigade, and Brig. Gen. John J. Bradley in command of the 16th Infantry Brigade. Lieut. Col., now Col., Morris M. Keck commanded the 8th Infantry at the time it left Camp Fremont; Col. Alfred Aloe, the 12th Infantry; Col. Lewis S. Sorley, 13th Infantry; and Col. James F. McKinley, the 62nd Infantry. There had been no change in the commanding officer of the 320th Field Signal Battalion up to this time. The below organizations were commanded then, as they still are, as follows:

8th Sanitary Train, F. W. Townsend, Lieut. Col., M. C.

22nd Machine Gun Battalion, Frank B. Jordan, Major, Inf.

23rd Machine Gun Battalion, Alvin C. Gillman, Lieut. Col., Inf.

24th Machine Gun Battalion, William J. McCaughey, Major, Inf.

8th Motor Supply Train, Alonzo W. Jones, Captain, M. T. C.

8th Train Headquarters and Military Police, William K. Jones, Colonel, Inf.

8th Ammunition Train, William E. Persons, Lieut. Col., Inf.

Sanitary Squads No. 83 and No. 84, George W. Green, Captain, S. C.

The embarkation of the units of the 8th Division began on or about October 30, 1918, at Hoboken, New Jersey. The 8th Artillery Brigade Headquarters and the 2nd, 81st, and 83rd Field Artillery regiments; the 8th Trench Mortar Battery; division headquarters; the 16th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and the 8th Infantry; the advance school; the 319th Engineers and Train and Headquarters Troop were the only organizations of the 8th Division that crossed overseas. The 15th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and the 320th Field Signal Battalion embarked at Hoboken but never sailed owing to the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918. This battalion remained on shipboard for about a week awaiting orders to proceed, and was then returned to Camp Mills. The 12th, 13th, and 62nd Infantry regiments, the 15th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 320th Field Signal Battalion, 8th Train Headquarters and Military Police, 8th Ammunition

Train and Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop, 8th Motor Supply Train; the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Machine Gun battalions, 8th Sanitary Train, Sanitary Squads No. 83 and No. 84; Mobile Field Laboratory No. 64, and Bakery Company No. 338 remained at Camp Mills for about one month.

The organizations remaining at Camp Mills were under command of Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson of the 15th Infantry Brigade. During the period these organizations remained there they engaged in usual camp duties and drill, and in addition furnished large labour and fatigue details for camp work. After the signing of the armistice, it became necessary to keep the men constantly busy in order to prevent them from nursing their disappointment at not getting overseas. A review of the 8th Division Detachment which remained at Camp Mills was held before Brig. Gen. Johnson as reviewing officer November 22, 1918. On this occasion Brigadier General Johnson observed the troops from an aeroplane. The quarantine under which the camp had been ever since the arrival of the 8th Division was lifted November 14, 1918, and the men were then given liberal pass privileges enabling them to visit New York City and neighbouring points of interest.

On November 23, 1918, orders were received directing the movement of all organizations of this detachment except the 12th and 13th Infantry regiments to Camp Lee, Virginia. The 12th Infantry was sent to Camp Stuart, Virginia, and the 13th Infantry to Camp Merritt, New Jersey. The first

troops for Camp Lee left Camp Mills at about 9 A.M., November 25, 1918, and proceeded to Hoboken, New Jersey, leaving there about 4 P.M. the same day on the U. S. Transport *President Grant* for Norfolk, Virginia, and arriving about 6 P.M., November 26th. The troops boarded river boats at Norfolk, disembarking at City Point, Virginia, on the James River, from whence they were marched a distance of about eight miles to Camp Lee. The 15th Infantry Brigade Headquarters immediately established itself with Brigadier General Johnson still in command and began its duties as both brigade headquarters and Headquarters for the Detachment 8th Division which comprised the 62nd Infantry, 8th Train Headquarters and Military Police, 8th Ammunition Train and Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop, 8th Motor Supply Train, 320th Field Signal Battalion, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Machine Gun battalions, 8th Sanitary Train, Sanitary Squads No. 83 and No. 84, Mobile Field Laboratory No. 64, and Bakery Company No. 338.

Routine duties were resumed at Camp Lee and in addition to the drills and other training, large fatigue details of as many as 1,600 men a day at times were furnished daily by the detachment for camp work. Brigadier General Johnson left Camp Lee for Washington, D. C., December 19, 1918, and remained there on special duty per verbal orders the Adjutant General's Office about December 20, 1918. In his absence Col. William K. Jones, the commanding officer of the 8th Train Headquarters and Military

Police, acted as commanding officer of the Detachment with Maj. William R. Schmidt, infantry, as adjutant; on January 6, 1919, garrison and post-graduate schools were started pursuant to camp orders, and all line officers were required to attend.

The first organization of the detachment to be demobilized was Bakery Company No. 338 which was finally disbanded January 20, 1919. Telegraphic instructions from the Adjutant General's Office, January 8, 1919, authorized the discharge of enlisted personnel of the 8th Division eligible for discharge under Circular No. 77, War Department, 1918, up to 50 per cent. of the strength of the division as reported November 30, 1918. Under this authority applications for the discharge of about 42 per cent. of the detachment's strength November 30, 1918, had been approved at these headquarters when telegraphic instructions from the Adjutant General's Office, January 17, 1918, were received directing the demobilization of all organizations of the 8th Division at Camp Lee except those belonging to the Regular Army. At the time of writing demobilization is now progressing and it is expected that within the next few weeks all the organizations of this detachment except the 62nd Infantry will have been demobilized and finally disbanded.

This division is not mentioned in General Pershing's cabled communiques. None of the units of this division was in action.

The shoulder insignia of the division was a black Indian head within an orange circle.

The following units composed the division:

8th Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop
and Detachment.

15th and 16th Infantry brigades.

12th, 62nd, 8th, and 13th Infantry regiments.

22nd 23rd, and 24th Machine Gun battalions.

8th Field Artillery Brigade composed of the 8th
Trench Mortar Battery, the 8th Ammunition Train,
and the 2nd, 81st, and 83rd regiments of Field Artillery.

319th Engineer Regiment and Train.

320th Field Signal Battalion.

8th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

8th Supply Train.

8th Sanitary Train, consisting of the 11th, 31st,
32nd, and 43rd Ambulance and Field Hospital com-
panies.

26th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions, the 26th (National Guard) Division was organized August 22, 1917, in Boston, Mass. Units of the division were made up from the National Guard troops of the New England States (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Mass., Rhode Island, and Connecticut), together with a contingent of National Army troops from Camp Devens.

The division received the popular name of "Yankee Division." Its shoulder insignia is a blue monogram YD superimposed on a diamond of khaki.

The first units sailed for France September 7, 1917,

and during September and October, 1917, the division was transported to France through both English and French ports. Division headquarters was established at Neufchateau, France, October 31, 1917.

The division went into line in the Chemin des Dames sector February 6th; was relieved from that sector March 18th, and moved to the La Reine sector northwest of Toul, entering the sector March 31st. The division left this sector June 28th, and moved by rail to area east of Meaux.

From July 5th to 18th the division marched to support position behind line Torcy-Belleau-Bois-Vaux, northwest of Château-Thierry, and took over the Pas Fini sector.

From July 18th to 25th it attacked, as a unit of the I Corps in the Château-Thierry offensive (2nd Battle of the Marne), penetrating to a depth of seventeen kilometers. Was relieved July 25th and marched to an area in vicinity of La Ferte. It then moved by rail on August 1st-3rd to Chatillon training area.

On August 25th the division moved to area north of Bar-le-Duc and from there by marching to the Troyon sector where it entered the line. On September 12th the division attacked in the St. Mihiel salient, penetrating as far as Vigneulles. From September 13th to October 7th it consolidated and occupied the Troyon sector.

On October 8th the division moved to vicinity of Verdun as army reserve.

The division was engaged in operations north of Verdun from October 18th to November 11th.

The division was relieved and proceeded to the eighth training area where headquarters was established at Montigny-le-Roi, November 23rd.

The following National Guard units were absorbed in forming the division:

Maine: 2nd Infantry, 1st Regiment Heavy F. A.; 1-13 Company, C.D.C.

New Hampshire: 1st Infantry, M. G. Troop Cavalry; Battery A., F. A.; Company South Carolina; Field Hospital Company No. 1, 1 to 4th companies C.A.C.

Vermont: 1st Infantry.

Massachusetts: 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th Infantry; Headquarters 2nd Brigade; Squadron Cavalry; 1st and 2nd Regiments F. A.; 1st Regiment Engineers; Ambulance companies 1 and 2; 1st Field Signal Battalion; 1 to 12th Companies C.A.C.

Rhode Island: 1st Sep. Squadron Cavalry; 1st Battalion Field Artillery; Ambulance Company No. 1.

Connecticut: 1st and 2nd Infantry; 1st Squadron Cavalry; Batteries E and F. Field Artillery; Ambulance Company No. 1; Field Hospital No. 1.

Division commanders:

Brig. Gen. Peter E. Traub, October 31 to November 11, 1917; Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Edwards, November 11, 1917, to October 24, 1918; Brig. Gen. Frank E. Bamford, October 24, 1918, and in command November 11th.

The following units composed the division:

51st and 52nd Infantry brigades; 101st, 102nd, 103rd,

104th regiments Infantry; 102nd, 103rd Machine Gun battalions; 51st Artillery Brigade; 101st, 102nd, 103rd Artillery regiments; 101st Trench Mortar Battery; 101st Division Machine Gun Battalion; 101st Engineers Regiment and Train; 101st Field Signal Battalion; 101st Train Headquarters and Military Police; 101st Supply Train; 101st Ammunition Train; 101st Sanitary Train; 101st, 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

To include May 15, 1919, the following losses had been reported from this division:

Battle deaths, 2,168; wounded, 13,000; prisoners of war, 451.

To include March 1, 1919, two hundred and twenty-nine individuals of this division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

This division captured from the enemy the following: 61 officers, 3,087 men, 16 pieces of artillery, 132 machine guns, and numerous supplies.

The division made a total advance against resistance of thirty-seven kilometers.

14,411 replacements were furnished this division.

27th DIVISION

The division was organized in compliance with War Department instructions at Camp Wadsworth, South Carolina, in September, 1917. The New York National Guard as its nucleus, the following units being used:

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 12th, 14th, 23rd, 71st, and 74th New York Infantry.

Squadron A, 1st New York Cavalry.
1st, 3rd New York Field Artillery.
22nd New York Engineers
1st Battalion New York Signal Corps.
New York Ammunition Train.
New York Supply Train.
New York Sanitary Train.

New York Headquarters and Military Police,
6th New York Division Headquarters Troop.

The division embarked for overseas at Newport News, Virginia, the first units sailing on May 8th, and the last arriving in France July 7, 1918.

It was ordered to a training area and later entered the line with British units opposite Mt. Kemmel. On August 20th a move was made to the Dickebush sector, Belgium, which was occupied next day. On August 31st the division was a front-line division in the attack on Vierstaadt Ridge, the 30th U. S. Division on its left, the 34th British Division on its right.

As part of the II Corps (U. S.) British Fourth Army, the division was in action near Bony, September 24th to October 1st. On October 12th it again entered the line in the St. Soupiet sector crossing the Seille River in the attack on the Jonc de Mer Ridge.

Maj. Gen. John O'Ryan, New York National Guard, commanded the division from its organization until mustered out.

The division insignia is a black circle with a red border in which are the letters NYD in monogram surrounded by the seven stars of the constellation Orion.

The division captured from the enemy 2,358

prisoners, and advanced eleven kilometers against resistance. During active operations it suffered the following losses: killed, 1,791; wounded, 9,427; prisoners, 3 officers and 225 men.

One hundred and thirty-nine Distinguished Service Crosses have been awarded members of the division.

The following organizations composed the division:

105th, 106th, 107th, 108th regiments Infantry.

104th, 105th, 106th Machine Gun battalions.

104th, 105th, 106th Field Artillery regiments.

102nd Trench Mortar Battery.

102nd Engineers.

102nd Field Signal Battalion.

102nd Headquarters Train and Military Police.

102nd Ammunition Train.

102nd Supply Train.

102nd Sanitary Train, consisting of 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th Ambulance companies and 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th Field hospitals.

102nd Engineer Train.

28th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department Orders the 28th Division was organized from units of the Pennsylvania National Guard at Camp Hancock, Ga., August 5, 1917. The majority of the officers and enlisted men were from the State of Pennsylvania. On November 15th the division was reorganized to conform to the new Tables of Organization. The division is known as the "Keystone Division," and has for its shoulder insignia a red keystone.

• The division commenced leaving the States April 21, 1918, moving through Camp Upton. It landed at Calais May 18th, and trained with the British in the vicinity of Neilles les Blequin for about two weeks. It then moved to Connesse where it trained with the French for another two weeks' period, and then moved to a sector near the Marne.

On July 1, 1918, two platoons of the 111th Infantry took part in an attack on Hill 204. On July 16th part of the infantry entered the line on the Marne River and the entire division was in sector on the Ourcq River by July 27, 1918.

The division was relieved on the night of July 30th-31st, and from then to August 6th was in rest in the vicinity of Jaulgonne on the Marne. On the night of August 6th-7th it again entered the line on the Vesle River, the sector extending from about Courland on the east to Fismes on the west. Here it remained actively engaged until September 8th, when it was relieved by a French division.

Upon relief of the division, it moved to a position south of the Argonne Forest, and on September 20th took part of the sector extending from Boureuilles on the east to Cote 285 on the west. It was one of the attacking divisions in the offensive of September 26th, pushing as far as Chatel Chehery, where it was relieved on October 9th. It then moved by bus to an area northeast of Commercy.

On October 16th it took over a sector near Thiaucourt extending from northeast of Jaulny on the east to the southern end of Etang de Lachaussee on the

west. It held this sector until the signing of the armistice and then went to the divisional training area.

To include May 15, 1919, the division's casualties were 2,531 battle deaths and 13,746 wounded. Seven hundred and twenty-six individuals of this division were taken prisoners by the enemy.

Fifty-eight Distinguished Service Crosses had been awarded to individuals of this division to include March 1, 1919.

The commanding generals of the division were as follows: Maj. Gen. C. M. Clement to December 11, 1917; Maj. Gen. Chas. H. Nuir, December 15, 1917, to October 24, 1918; Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Hay, October 24 to November 11, 1918.

The units composing the division were as follows:

55th and 56th Infantry brigades.

109th, 110th, 111th, 112th Infantry regiments.

108th and 109th Machine Gun battalions.

53rd Artillery Brigade.

107th, 108th, and 109th Artillery regiments.

103rd Trench Mortar Battery.

107th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion.

103rd Engineer Regiment and Train.

103rd Field Signal Battalion.

103rd Train Headquarters and Military Police.

103rd Supply Train.

103rd Ammunition Train.

103rd Sanitary Train.

109th, 110th, 111th, 112th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

29th DIVISION

(This history, written on a different scale than the others, has been cut somewhat to the general size of the other histories.)

In compliance with paragraph 56, S. O., No. 189, Headquarters, Eastern Department, July 26, 1917, the 29th Division was organized at Camp McClellan, Alabama, and was originally constituted from National Guard units from the District of Columbia and the states of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. The representatives from Delaware were withdrawn from the division and organized as separate pioneer infantry units.

On account of the fact that states from both the North and South were thus represented in the division the name of Blue and Gray Division was adopted for it early in history, and by this name it has been known during its service in France.

In June, 1918, the division left the United States and arrived in France the latter part of that month at the ports of Brest and St. Nazaire.

After a few days at the port of debarkation the division was ordered to the tenth training area, with the division headquarters at Prauthoy.

The 54th Artillery Brigade, 104th Ammunition Train, 104th Supply Train, 104th Sanitary Train, and 104th Train Headquarters and Military Police landed in England and proceeded to France via Le Havre. The artillery brigade and ammunition train were sent to the artillery training centre at

Camp Meucon. The other units of the division that had landed in England joined the division later in Alsace.

The middle of July found the division en route to Belfort and from the 17th to 25th of July the division was stationed in billeting areas near Belfort and under command of the XL Corps of the French Tenth Army.

On July 25th infantry units began their movement into line with the French units occupying the centre sector, Haute Alsace. The French units were gradually withdrawn and on August 10th at noon the sector was occupied solely by units of the 29th Division, and at that time the command passed from the French division commander to the commanding general, 29th Division. From this date until September 23rd the division remained in this sector, being engaged in the usual stationary warfare common to all quiet sectors.

On September 23rd the division, having been withdrawn from sector to the vicinity of Belfort, was ordered to the Robert Espagne training area. However, the Meuse-Argonne offensive having been planned to begin on the 26th of September, the division after leaving Belfort was placed in First Army (American) Reserve. It remained in First Army Reserve with P. Cs. (Posts of Command) successively at Conde, St. Andre, and Blercourt from September 24th to October 1st when it was relieved from the First Army and placed in reserve of the French XVII Corps with P. C. at Citadel, Verdun.

58th Brigade (115th Infantry, 116th Infantry, 112th Machine Gun Battalion) went into action, attached to the French 18th Division, the remainder of the division less 104th Engineers remaining in French XVII Corps Reserve.

Preliminary movements of 29th Division

In trenches Haute Alsace, July 25th to September 23rd.

September 24th to October 1st, First Army Reserve.

P. C.'s Conde, St. Andre, Blercourt.

October 2nd to 7th reserve of the French XVII Corps P. C. Verdun.

58th Brigade (115th, 116th Infantry and 112th Machine Gun Battalion) went into action the night of October 7th-8th.

On the afternoon of October 7th the Division P. C. was moved from the Citadel of Verdun to Vacherauville.

On the morning of October 8th, at 5 o'clock, the 58th Brigade, consisting of the 115th, 116th, and 112th Machine Gun Battalion, after a night march of about fourteen kilometers, attacked without artillery preparation. This attack was supported by the 158th Artillery Brigade, which, on October 2nd, had been released from the V Corps and attached to the 29th Division.

The action was planned to be a surprise and that it was such is proven by the fact that the German artillery did not react for more than half an hour. The

brigade attacked under the orders of the French 18th Division, which had previously held the sector.

The assaulting battalions of the 58th Brigade were placed in a jump-off position along the canal between Samogneux and Brabant in what had formerly been "No Man's Land."

On the night of October 7th-8th a company of French infantry was placed in Brabant to cover the formation for the assault and to act as left flank guard. This company did not advance with the brigade on the following day.

The direction of the attack was due north; and as the Meuse from Brabant to Sivry runs northwest, the advance of the 58th Brigade opened an increasingly wide space between its left flank and the river.

During the attack of the 8th this space was filled, and the left flank of the 58th Brigade covered by a regiment of the 33rd Division. This regiment crossed from the west bank of the Meuse, as the bridges were made available by the advance of the 58th Brigade.

Until the Consenvoye Woods were reached, late on the 8th, the ground was open and the troops advanced without disorganization and in good liaison.

A large number of prisoners was taken on that day, many being in the dugouts where they had been driven for shelter by the unexpected heavy artillery fire of the rolling barrage, which was closely followed by the infantry.

The line attained on October 8th ran along the west of the Bois de Consenvoye, from 23.8-80.4 to 24.2-

81.0; thence southeast to the crest of Cote 338; thence along the high ground, through the Bois de Consenvoye and Brabant-sur-Meuse to 26.6-79.4

The frontage of the brigade was somewhat more than three kilometers, which gave a strength of less than two rifles per meter.

The net results of the day's work were: The capture of approximately 1,500 prisoners, several pieces of artillery, many heavy machine guns, and the control of the Malbrouck Hill position, which broke the organized German line of resistance.

On the right, the attack of the 18th Division (French) did not progress as planned.

The right flank of the 58th Brigade had to be refused to link up with the 18th Division, and in order that the latter might fulfill its mission, the corps commander directed that the continuation of the attack planned for the next morning be not made.

During this period of inaction the Boche brought up reinforcements and his resistance from that time on was very stiff.

At 6 o'clock on the morning of October 10th the attack of the 58th Brigade, still operating under the orders of the French 18th Division, was renewed

The 113th Infantry of the 57th Brigade, which had hitherto been in corps reserve, was turned over to the 18th Division, to attack on the right of the 58th Brigade, between it and the French troops.

The objectives of the 113th Infantry were the Bois de la Reine and the Bois de Chenes.

To the 66th and 77th regiments of the French 18th

Division were assigned as objectives the Bois d'Ormont and the Bois de Moirey.

The 113th Infantry completely obtained its objectives in less than six hours, capturing 72 prisoners and 3 guns.

The French attack gained only fifty meters on the west edge of the Bois d'Ormont, which lay on the flank and in part behind the 113th Infantry, so that it became necessary to put in two companies of the reserve battalion of the 113th Infantry facing south toward the Bois d'Ormont.

The position of this regiment changed only slightly until the attack on the Ridge d'Etrayes, to be mentioned later.

The 58th Brigade, in conjunction with the troops of the 33rd Division on its left, advanced on the Bois Plat Chene and the Bois de Consenvoye, encountering very stiff resistance.

The result of this attack was to secure Richene Hill with its observing station; the line at the end of the day being Ravin Plat Chene—a point 400 meters north of the Richene observatory—south edge of Molleville Farm clearing; east along the Ravin de Molleville to the eastern tip of the Bois de la Reine, thence bending back along the south edge of the same woods.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of October 11th the command of the 58th Brigade, with its front between parallels 24 and 26, passed from the 18th Division (French) to the 29th Division. The 113th Infantry still remained under the command of the French.

At 6 o'clock, October 11th, an attack was made by the 58th Brigade due north, encountering an intense machine gun and artillery fire.

The open ground of the Molleville Farm Ravine lay in front of the 116th Infantry on the right of the 58th Brigade, with smooth slopes fully exposed to view from the woods on the north edge of the clearing.

The eastern side of the ravine was also held by the enemy.

The 116th Infantry advanced across this open ground nearly to the farther side but received severe machine gun fire from the edge of the woods on both front and flank and could not gain the woods to the north.

A counter attack delivered at the junction of the 115th and 116th regiments, in the woods on the west side of the clearing, threatened for a time to cause some loss of ground, but was repulsed.

The line of the 116th Infantry was drawn back after dark to the edge of the woods on the south side of the clearing, the 115th Infantry advancing as much as possible, its right flank being held in place by the check of the 116th Infantry.

Careful preparation was made before the renewal of the attack on October 15th on the hostile position north of Molleville Farm.

In the meanwhile, the 18th Division (French) continued to be held up. Its original objective for October 8th had never been reached.

On the 12th of October it was reënforced by the 114th Infantry, heretofore in corps reserve.

This put all four regiments of the 29th Division in the line; one with two battalions; one with ten companies; a total of more than one half of the division in the front line; the two regiments of the 58th Brigade operating with one battalion each in the front line.

The front assigned the troops on October 12th was seven kilometers, which gave less than one rifle per meter.

On October 12th the 18th Division employed the fresh 114th Infantry from a jump-off position in the Ravin de Coassinvaux. The French 66th Infantry, holding the western edge of the Bois d'Ormont and thus lying between the 113th and 114th Infantry, was ordered to attack simultaneously with the 114th Infantry, the objective of both regiments being the Bois d'Ormont.

The French 66th Infantry made no headway. The French 77th Infantry, on the right of the 114th Infantry, also failed to advance.

The 114th Infantry gained and held the south edge of the woods, but were checked by the failure of the attack on their left and right.

The French 18th Division then threw in two companies of the 113th Infantry, heretofore in reserve, from a point north of and facing the Bois d'Ormont.

The two companies attacked at 15 o'clock on the afternoon of October 12th and passed entirely through the western half of the woods from north to south.

On October 15th the French 18th Division was relieved by the American 26th Division, having been in action about one week.

On that date the attack was renewed by the 58th Brigade, the 113th Infantry on its right pushing forward detachments to maintain liaison.

The front of the 58th Brigade was now between meridians 24 and 26, the objective being Hill 375 in the Bois de la Grande Montagne.

Artillery preparation was limited to one half hour on account of the lack of ammunition.

This was directed mainly on the German organized position at the north edge of the Molleville Farm Clearing, and on Bultruy Bois which covered the high ground to our right.

Machine guns, artillery trench mortars, and a battery of 75's were employed well to the front.

The attack resulted in active fighting in dense woods, the hostile defence being largely machine gun fire from numerous well-selected positions. On the following morning, October 16th, the attack was renewed and the objectives attained after another full day of fighting.

As this was considered by the corps commander to be the ultimate advance practicable to the north until the capture of Ormont Woods, the position was consolidated along suitable ground at about 24.0-82.7; 25.0-83.0; 25.6-82.6; 25.7-82.2; 25.8-82.1.

The line presented a peculiar aspect in that it formed the arc of a circle between meridians 24 and 26, bending back on the left to link up with the troops of the 33rd Division, which had orders to conform to our movement and had advanced to the ridge through the Bois de Chaume, with the 57th Brigade on the

right, facing Etrayes Ridge, along the south side of the Ravin de Molleville.

The Etrayes Ridge, extending due east from the Molleville Farm clearing, was densely wooded and held by the Germans within forty yards of our troops in the western ridge.

A counter attack launched from it would have been a serious threat, striking at the flank and rear of the 58th Brigade.

Defence against such an attack was difficult because the deep open ravine of Molleville Farm lay immediately behind the front line.

The brigades joined at this point.

Movement was so difficult in the thin strip of woods held that the liaison was more one of information than of actual strength for combat.

The ridge afforded excellent hostile observation.

Ormont Woods had not been taken and it had become apparent that it would not be so long as Belleau Wood, looking down on it, was held by the enemy.

The capture of Etrayes Ridge was a necessary preliminary to an attack on Belleau Wood.

Etrayes Ridge was captured on October 23rd.

One battalion of the 102nd Infantry, 26th Division, participated with our troops, attacking down the Molleville Farm Ravine across the face of the 113th Infantry, with Belleau Wood as its objective.

In conference with the 26th Division it was decided to draw the troops back in the Molleville Farm clearing to allow artillery preparation on the most advanced German machine gun positions.

Up to this time, every day since October 7th had been rainy or foggy.

The safety of the assaulting battalions in the jump-off position was dependent on secrecy, but for the first time in more than two weeks the sky was cloudless and a full moon made the night almost bright as day.

It happened, however, that fog filled the low ground around the farm, concealing the troops.

The attack was preceded by 45 minutes artillery preparation in which all auxiliaries took part.

The three machine gun battalions had been carefully located, two of them being so placed as to gain an oblique fire on the enemy, one of them almost a flanking fire.

Approximately 250,000 rounds were fired on the enemy by the machine gun during the day, and many prisoners stated that this fire was terrific.

The advance of the infantry continued until late in the afternoon, when the ridge of Etrayes was completely captured, the success of the 113th Infantry in this attack securing our line against the danger which had constantly menaced it from the enemy positions on the ridge.

The line held by the division now lay across the north slope of Hill 375 in the Bois de la Grande Montagne, was drawn in and around the head of the Ravine d'Etrayes, and continued east along the north and east slopes of Etrayes Ridge, joining the 26th Division near the south edge of Houppy Bois.

The front of the division was now four kilometers, or 1.1 rifles per meter.

The main part of our remaining stay in the front line was occupied by consolidation of lines gained and gradual relief by the 79th Division command passing on October 30th.

The net result of our operations was an advance of seven kilometers, breaking through all organized lines of resistance of the enemy, the capture of about 2,400 prisoners, about twelve guns ranging from 7 to 210 mm., 250 light and heavy machine guns, and a large amount of other military property.

We were in line about three weeks.

Our losses were necessarily considerable.

30th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions the 30th Division was organized at Camp Sevier, South Carolina, in October, 1917. This division was formerly the old 9th National Guard Division (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Tennessee Infantry; 1st Tennessee Field Artillery, Troop D, Tennessee Cavalry; 1st Tennessee Field Hospital; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd North Carolina Infantry; 1st North Carolina Field Artillery; 1st squadron North Carolina Cavalry; 1st North Carolina Engineers; Company A, North Carolina Signal Corps; North Carolina Supply Train; 1st North Carolina Field Hospital; 1st North Carolina Ambulance Company; 1st and 2nd South Carolina Infantry; Company A, South Carolina Signal Corps; 1st South Carolina Field Hospital; Troop A, South Carolina Cavalry). In addition to the above the division was augmented by draft men from North and South Carolina, Ten-

nessee, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and North Dakota.

The division remained in training at Camp Sevier until May, 1918. The first units sailed for overseas on May 7, 1918, and the last units landed at Calais, France, on June 24, 1918. The division was ordered to the Eperlecques training area (Pas-de-Calais) and remained there until July 4th, when it was ordered into Belgium under command of the British II Corps and placed in support of the 33rd and 49th British divisions. Division headquarters was located at Watou and it was here that this division received its first training in the line. On August 17th the division took over the Canal sector extending from the southern outskirts of Ypres to Voormezele and from August 31st to September 1st engaged in the battle before Mt. Kemmel. The division was then withdrawn and placed in reserve until September 17th, when it was again sent into the line with division headquarters at Herissart. On September 22nd the division was placed under command of the British Fourth Army and took over the Beaufort sector the following day. The division participated in the battle of Bellincourt September 29th-30th, which resulted in the breaking of the Hindenburg Line. On October 4th the division took over the line near Montbrechain where it attacked on four successive days, making an advance of more than seventeen thousand yards. On October 17th the division participated in the battle of La Selle River, and remained in the attack until October 20th. The division was with-

drawn to the Heilly training area immediately after the battle, where it was located at the signing of the armistice. On November 24th the division was ordered to the Le Mans area preparatory to returning to the United States.

The divisional artillery was not present for operations with the division, but was in active operations in the Toul sector, St. Mihiel offensive, Meuse-Argonne offensive, and the Woevre sector.

The commanding generals of the division were: Maj. Gen. John F. Morrison, from organization to November 20, 1917; Maj. Gen. C. P. Townsley, November 20, 1917, to December 17, 1917; Maj. Gen. George W. Read, April 27, 1918, to August 10, 1918; Maj. Gen. Edward M. Lewis, August 10, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

The division insignia is a monogram in blue of the letters "O" and "H" standing for "Old Hickory," the nickname of Andrew Jackson. The cross bar of the "H" contains the triple "XXX," the Roman numerals for thirty. The whole is on a maroon background.

This division captured from the enemy the following: 3,848 prisoners, 81 pieces of artillery, and 426 machine guns. It made a total advance of twenty-nine and a half kilometers against resistance.

During active operations the division suffered the following losses as reported to the War Department to include May 10, 1919: killed in action, 1,652; wounded, 9,429; number taken prisoner, 6 officers and 71 men.

One hundred and seventy-seven Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded to individuals of this division up to March 8, 1919.

The units composing the division were as follows:

59th, 60th Infantry brigades.

117th, 118th, 119th, 120th Infantry regiments.

114th, 115th Machine Gun battalions.

55th Artillery Brigade.

113th, 114th, 115th, Artillery regiments.

105th Trench Mortar Battery.

113th Division Machine Gun Battalion.

105th Engineer Regiment and Train.

105th Field Signal Battalion.

105th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

105th Supply Train.

105th Ammunition Train.

105th Sanitary Train.

117th, 118th, 119th, 120th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

31ST DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions the 31st Division (National Guard) was organized at Camp Wheeler, Georgia, on October 1, 1917. The nucleus of this division was composed of National Guard troops from Georgia, Alabama, and Florida (1st and 2nd regiments, Alabama Infantry; 1st Regiment Alabama Cavalry; Company A, Alabama Field Signal Battalion; Field Hospital Company No. 1; 1st, 2nd, and 5th Georgia Infantry; 1st Squadron Georgia Cavalry; 1st Battalion Georgia

Field Artillery: Company A, Georgia Engineers; Georgia Field Hospital No. 1). The division was brought up to full strength by National Army drafts from Illinois and Michigan. The 31st Division remained in training at Camp Wheeler until September, 1918.

The first units sailed for overseas on September 16, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on November 9, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was designated as a replacement division and ordered to the Le Mans area. The personnel of most of the units were withdrawn from the division and sent to other divisions as replacements, causing the 31st to exist only as a skeletonized division.

The commanding generals of the division were: Maj. Gen. Francis J. Kernan, August 25, 1917, to September 18, 1917; Brig. Gen. John L. Hayden, September 18, 1917, to March 15, 1918; Maj. Gen. Francis H. French, March 15, 1918, to May 15, 1918; Maj. Gen. LeRoy S. Lyon, May 15, 1918, to November 11, 1918. The division insignia is the letters "DD" back to back, embroidered in red, placed on a khaki circle.

The units composing the division were:

61st, 62nd Infantry brigades.

56th Field Artillery Brigade.

121st, 122nd, 123rd, 124th Infantry regiments.

116th, 117th, 118th Machine Gun battalions.

116th, 117th, 118th Field Artillery regiments.

106th Trench Mortar Battery.

106th Engineer Regiment and Train.

106th Field Signal Battalion.

106th Headquarters Train and Military Police.

106th Ammunition Train.

106th Supply Train.

106th Sanitary Train (121st, 122nd, 123rd, and
124th Field hospitals and Ambulance companies.)

32nd DIVISION

In compliance with General Orders, No. 95, War Department, 1917, the 32nd Division was organized at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, in September, 1917. This division was formerly the old 12th National Guard Division, composed of troops from Wisconsin and Michigan (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th regiments; Wisconsin Infantry, 31st, 32nd, and 33rd Michigan Infantry; 1st Wisconsin Field Artillery, and 1st Michigan Field Artillery; 1st Wisconsin Cavalry and 1st Michigan Cavalry; 1st Battalion Wisconsin Engineers and 1st Battalion Michigan Engineers; 1st Wisconsin Field Signal Battalion and 1st Michigan Field Signal Battalion, Wisconsin and Michigan Field Hospital and Ambulance Corps Nos. 1 and 2.

The division remained in training at Camp MacArthur until January, 1918. The first units of the division embarked for overseas at Hoboken on January 19, 1918, and the last units arrived in France March 12, 1918. The division was ordered to the tenth training area with headquarters at Prauthoy, Haute-Marne, and was designated as a replacement division. On May 15, 1918, the status of the divi-

sion was changed to a combat division and moved into Alsace where it took over a front-line sector near Belfort. The division held this sector until July 21st when it was relieved by the French and ordered to the Ourcq where it relieved the 3rd Division in the Aisne-Marne offensive on July 30th. In this offensive the 32nd Division broke the German line of resistance on the Ourcq and drove the enemy back to the heights north of the Vesle making a total advance of nineteen kilometers. On August 28th it entered the front line northeast of Soissons as a part of the French Tenth Army and contributed to an important extent to the success of the French in outflanking the German line on the Chemin des Dames. In this drive the 32nd Division captured the strong German position on the Juvigny plateau, advancing to a depth of five and one half kilometers. On September 2nd the division was relieved by the 2nd Moroccan Division and sent back to Joinville for a rest period. On September 20th the division left the Joinville rest area and moved by bus to the Meuse-Argonne front. On September 30th the division entered the front line before the Kriemhilde Stellung near Romagne-sous-Montfaucon. In a series of attacks during the next three weeks the division penetrated the enemy position to a depth of eight and one half kilometers. On October 20th the division was relieved and placed in the III Army Corps Reserve until November 6th when it again entered the line at the Dun-sur Meuse bridge-head and on November 10th attacked east of the Meuse, and was in line when the armistice was signed.

The division became part of the Third Army upon its organization and on November 17th began its march from Vilosnes-sur-Meuse to the Rhine, and on December 13th, after marching 300 kilometers, crossed the Rhine and occupied a sector in the Coblenz Bridgehead with the 1st Division on the right and the 2nd Division on the left.

The commanding generals of the division were: Maj. Gen. Jas. Parker, August 26, 1917, to September 19, 1917; Brig. Gen. W. G. Haan (afterward Major General) September 19, 1917, to November 20, 1918; Maj. Gen. William Lassister, November 20th.

The insignia of this division is a flying red arrow with a red cross bar in the middle.

This division captured from the enemy the following: 2,153 prisoners, 21 pieces of artillery, and 190 machine guns. It made a total advance of thirty-six kilometers against resistance.

During active operations this division suffered the following losses as reported to the War Department to include May 10, 1919: killed 2,898; wounded, 10,984; number taken prisoner, 1 officer and 155 men.

One hundred and thirty-four Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded to individuals of this division up to March 8, 1919.

The 32nd Division was composed of the following organizations:

63rd and 64th Infantry brigades.

125th, 126th, 127th, 128th Infantry regiments.

119th, 120th, 121st Machine Gun battalions.

57th Field Artillery Brigade.

119th, 120th, 121st Field Artillery regiments.

107th Trench Mortar batteries.

107th Engineer Regiment and Train.

107th Field Signal battalion.

107th Headquarters Train and Military Police.

107th Ammunition Train.

107th Supply Train.

107th Sanitary Train consisting of 125th, 126th, 127th, and 128th Ambulance companies and 125th, 126th, 127th, and 128th Field hospitals.

33rd DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instruction, the 33rd Division, popularly known as the Prairie Division, was organized at Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, about the middle of August, 1917. The nucleus of the division was the Illinois National Guard (1st and 2nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry regiments; 2nd and 3rd regiments Field Artillery; Company A, Signal Corps; 1st Engineers; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Field hospitals and Ambulance companies). The first organization left Camp Logan April 23, 1918, for Camp Merritt. The rest of the division followed shortly afterward and sailed from Hoboken for France, disembarking at Brest. The last units arrived in France June 11, 1918.

Upon arrival in France the division was first sent to the Huppy area, near Abbeville, and on June 9th proceeded to the Eu training area. On June 20th and 21st the division moved into the Amiens sector,

where it was trained under the British, occupying portions of the British trenches and participating in a number of small operations. On July 4th Companies C and E, 131st Infantry, and A and G, 132nd Infantry, took part in the attack on Hamel, which was the first time American troops had fought with the Australians. On August 8, 1918, began the great British offensive, in which the 33rd Division broke the German line at Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood. On August 23rd it was transferred by rail from the British front to the area of the American First Army in the Toul sector, being concentrated on August 26th in the region of Tronville-en-Barrois. On September 5th it started for Verdun, where it relieved on the nights of September 7th, 8th, and 9th the French 120th Division. In the Meuse-Argonne battle, commencing September 26th, the 33rd Division formed the right of the American III Army Corps. For the next eleven days it formed the pivot of this corps. On October 6th the division was transferred to the French XVII Army Corps and participated (October 8th) in the attack of the French XVII Corps east of the Meuse. Upon being relieved the 33rd Division marched to the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector on the St. Mihiel front, relieving the 79th Division on the nights of October 23rd, 24th, and 25th. From this date to include the date of the armistice the division participated in a number of minor operations in this sector.

Maj. Gen. George Bell, Jr., United States Army, commanded the division from August 16, 1917, to include November 11, 1918.

The shoulder insignia of this division is a yellow cross on a round black patch.

This division captured from the enemy the following: 65 officers, 3,922 men, 100 pieces of artillery, 414 machine guns, 20 trench mortars, and other material. It made a total advance against resistance of thirty-six kilometers.

During active operation the division suffered the following losses: killed, 153 officers and 701 men; wounded, 153 officers and 6,844 men; missing, 148 men; prisoners of war, 1 officer and 17 men.

The following is a list of the decorations conferred on individuals of this division:

Congressional Medals of Honour, 8.

Distinguished Service Crosses, 110.

British Distinguished Service Orders, 1.

British Military Crosses, 5.

British Distinguished Conduct Medal, 5.

British Military Medal, 41.

French Croix de Guerre, 47.

Belgian Order of Leopold, 1.

The following organizations composed this division:

65th and 66th Infantry brigades.

129th, 130th, 131st, and 132nd Infantry regiments.

123rd and 124th Machine Gun battalions.

58th Artillery Brigade.

122nd, 123rd, and 124th Artillery regiments.

108th Trench Mortar Battery.

122nd Divisional Machine Gun Battalion.

108th Engineer Regiment and Train.

108th Field Signal Battalion.

108th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

108th Supply Train.

108th Ammunition Train.

108th Sanitary Train.

129th, 130th, 131st, and 132nd Ambulance companies, and Field hospitals.

34th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions, the 34th Division (National Guard) was organized at Camp Cody, New Mexico, on October 2, 1917, under General Orders, No. 18, Headquarters, 34th Division. The division was made up of National Guard troops from Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. (Headquarters 1st Minnesota Brigade; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Minnesota Infantry; Minnesota Field Hospital and Ambulance companies No. 1; Headquarters 1st Iowa Brigade; 1st and 2nd Iowa Infantry; 1st Squadron Iowa Cavalry; 1st Iowa Field Artillery; 1st Battalion Iowa Engineers; Company C, Iowa Signal Corps; Iowa Ammunition Train; Iowa Field hospitals and Ambulance companies Nos. 1 and 2; 4th, 5th, and 6th Nebraska Infantry; Company B, Nebraska Signal Corps; 1st Regiment North Dakota Infantry, and North Dakota Field Hospital Company No. 1; 1st Regiment South Dakota Cavalry.) The 34th Division remained in training at Camp Cody, New Mexico, until September, 1918. The first units sailed for overseas on September 16, 1918, via England, and the last units arrived in France on October 24, 1918. Upon ar-

rival in France the division was ordered to the Le Mans area where it was broken up and ceased to function as a division. In the early part of December the division began its return to the United States by individual units.

The commanding generals of this division were: Maj. Gen. A. P. Blocksom, September 18, 1917, to May 7, 1918; Maj. Gen. William R. Smith, September 28, 1918, to October 10, 1918; Maj. Gen. Beaumont B. Buck, October 17, 1918, to November 7, 1918; Brig. Gen. John A. Johnson, November 7, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

The division insignia is a black oval encircling a red bovine skull. This division was composed of the following organizations:

- 67th, 68th Infantry brigades.
- 69th Field Artillery Brigade.
- 133rd, 134th, 135th, and 136th Infantry regiments.
- 125th, 126th, 127th Field Artillery regiments.
- 109th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 109th Field Signal Battalion.
- 109th Headquarters Train and Military Police.
- 109th Ammunition Train.
- 109th Supply Train.
- 109th Sanitary Train (133rd, 134th, 135th, and 136th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals).
- 109th Field Train.
- 109th Engineer Regiment and Train.

35th DIVISION

The division was organized under War Department orders at Camp Doniphan, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma,

September 13, 1917, from the National Guard units of Missouri and Kansas.

On April 11th it began leaving camp for Camp Mills, New York, and sailed for France, April 25, 1918, via Liverpool and Winchester, England, arriving in France May 11th. It trained with the British first in the area of Eu until June 11th, then to June 30th in the Arches area.

From the training sector it went into the trenches in the Vosges in the De Galbert and Gerardner sectors.

On September 11th it was sent to the St. Mihiel sector where it acted as Army Reserve during the operations.

On September 21st the division relieved a French division in the Grange le Compte sector. It next went into the Meuse-Argonne offensive September 26th in the Vanquoise sector until October 1st, when it was withdrawn and sent to the vicinity of Conde-en-Barrois where it arrived October 12th, and taking over the Sommediene sector. From there it was sent on November 9th to the training area near Commercy.

Maj. Gen W. M. Wright commanded the division from August 25, 1917, to June 15, 1918. Brig. Gen. N. F. McClure commanded for a period after June 15, 1918. Maj. Gen. Peter M. Traub was next given the command which he held until the armistice. The shoulder insignia is the Santa Fé Cross.

The division captured from the enemy the following: 781 prisoners, 24 pieces of artillery, 85 machine guns, and other material. It advanced twelve and a

half kilometers in the face of resistance. During active operations the following casualties were suffered: killed, 960; wounded, 6,894; captured, 169, total 8,023.

Seventeen Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded to members of the division up to March 1, 1919.

The following organizations composed this division:

69th, 70th Infantry Brigade.

137th, 138th, 139th, 140th Infantry regiments.

129th, 130th Machine Gun battalions.

60th Artillery Brigade.

128th, 129th, 130th Artillery regiments.

110th Trench Mortar Battery.

128th Division Machine Gun Battalion.

110th Engineer Regiment and Train.

110th Field Signal Battalion.

110th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

110th Supply Train.

110th Ammunition Train.

110th Sanitary Train.

137th, 138th, 139th, 140th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

36th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions the 36th (National Guard) Division was organized at Camp Bowie, Texas, during the period extending from August 25 to October 15, 1917. The officers and men were drawn largely from the states of Texas and Oklahoma.

The division insignia is a light blue Indian arrow-head on a round khaki patch with a khaki T superimposed. The division is sometimes popularly known as the Lone Star or Panther Division.

The period of training at this station continued until July 4th, when the division left for Camp Mills, L. I. The division sailed from Hoboken, N. J., on July 18, 1918, units arriving at Brest, St. Nazaire, Le Havre, and Bordeaux, France, beginning July 30th, thence proceeding to the thirteenth training area in vicinity of Bar-sur-Aube. On September 27th the division left for the Champagne sector, detraining at Epernay and vicinity.

Commencing October 6th the division took an active part in the operations of the French Fourth Army, advancing a distance of twenty-one kilometers to the Aisne River where it was relieved on the night of October 27th-28th and withdrawn to the Triaucourt rest area.

On November 18th the troops departed, by marching for the sixteenth training area surrounding Tonnerre, arriving in billets in the Tonnerre area November 28th.

To include March 1, 1919, 24 individuals of the 36th Division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The losses of this division were as follows: battle deaths, 591; wounded, 2,119; prisoners of war, 25.

Maj. Gen. E. St. John Greble, United States Army, organized and commanded the division for some time. Maj. Gen. W. R. Smith, United States Army, was in

command of the division during the latter part of the war to include the date of the armistice, November 11, 1918.

The units composing the division were as follows:

71st and 72nd Infantry brigades.

141st, 142nd, 143rd, and 144th Infantry regiments.

132nd and 133rd Machine Gun battalions.

61st Artillery Brigade.

131st, 132nd, and 133rd Artillery regiments.

111th Trench Mortar Battery.

111th Ammunition Train.

131st (divisional) Machine Gun Battalion.

111th Field Signal Battalion.

111th Engineer Regiment and Train.

111th Supply Train.

141st, 142nd, 143rd, and 144th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals, composing the 111th Sanitary Train.

To form this division the following National Guard units were drawn from the states as indicated below;

Oklahoma: 1st Infantry, Squadron Cavalry; 1 Battalion Engineers; First Headquarters Company No. 1.

Texas: 1st and 2nd Infantry brigades, Divisional Headquarters Troop; 3rd, 4th, 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th Infantry; 1st Cavalry; 1st and 2nd Field Artillery Regiment; 1 Battalion Engineers; Battalion S. C.; Headquarters Trains and Military Police, and Companies and Field Hospital companies Nos. 1 and 2.

This division captured from the enemy 18 officers, 531 men, 9 pieces of artillery, 294 machine guns. It

made a total advance against resistance of about twenty-one kilometers.

37th DIVISION

In compliance with General Orders 101, War Department, 1917, the 37th Division—known as the Buckeye Division—was organized at Camp Sheridan, Montgomery, Alabama, beginning in August, 1917, when the first units of the Ohio National Guard arrived, and completed in October when the last had reached camp.

The division was built around the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th Ohio Infantry regiments, 1st Ohio Field Artillery, 1st Ohio Cavalry, 1st Ohio Engineers, and the Ohio Field Signal Battalion.

On May 20th the division, less its artillery, was sent to Camp Lee, Virginia, where it was filled to war strength and on June 11th Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 134th Machine Gun Battalion, and 73rd Infantry Brigade began the movement to Hoboken, sailing on June 15th and arriving in France June 22, 1918. The 74th Infantry Brigade and Engineers left Camp Lee June 21st and sailing via Newport News arrived in France July 5th.

The field artillery brigade, trench mortar battery, sanitary train, military police, and 114th Veterinary Section, left Camp Sheridan, Alabama, June 14th, for Camp Upton, sailing from there June 27th via England.

With the exception of the field artillery brigade

and ammunition train (less small arms section) the division was sent to the Bourmont area for training, and on August 4th went into the front lines in the Baccarat sector in the Vosges Mountains where it trained under the French VI Corps.

On September 16th it was relieved from this sector and proceeded by rail to the vicinity of Robert-Espagne. After four days it was moved by bus to Recicourt and as part of the V Corps entered the Argonne drive at Avocourt. Relieved on October 1st after having advanced to Cierges, the division was sent to Pagny-sur-Meuse from which point it was sent to hold a portion of the line in the St. Mihiel sector with headquarters at Euvesin.

After nine days in this sector the division was withdrawn to Pagny-sur-Meuse and on October 18th began its move by rail to Belgium where with division headquarters at Hoogdele in the Lys sector it was attached to the French XXX Army Corps on October 22nd. Advancing to and crossing the Escaut River the division was relieved from the front lines on November 4th and 5th and returned to Thiel for rest. On November 8th the division was transferred to the French XXXIV Corps and again entered the lines along the Escaut River in a sector with Syngem as its headquarters. Forcing a crossing of the Scheldt (Escaut) River on the night of November 10th-11th the advance was begun early on the 11th and pushed forward some five kilometers to the towns of Dickele and Hindelgem where the armistice at 11 A.M. brought the fighting to an end.

The artillery was sent to Camp de Souge for training and assigned to the First Army in the Argonne offensive, never serving with its own division. It served successively with the American IV Corps, American Second Army, French Colonial Second Army, and French XVII Corps. At one time the three regiments of the brigade served with three different divisions, the 28th, 33rd, and 92nd, and only joined the division just prior to its return to the United States.

Maj. Gen. Charles G. Treat was the first commander of the division, being relieved April 24th. On May 8th Maj. Gen. Chas. S. Farnsworth was assigned to it and commanded until its return to the States.

The division made the following captures from the enemy: officers, 26; enlisted men, 1,474; artillery, 19, 77's; 4, 105's; 10, 155's, 7 trench mortars, machine guns, 261, besides many rifles and a great deal of ammunition of all calibres.

This division made a total advance against resistance of thirty and three fourths kilometers.

During active operations the division suffered the following losses (as reported to War Department May 10, 1919): battle deaths, 992; wounded, 4,931; prisoners of war, 23. One thousand two hundred and fifty replacements were furnished the 37th Division.

To include March 1, 1919, 25 Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded individuals of this division.

The following units composed this division:

73rd and 74th Infantry brigades.

145th, 146th, 147th, and 148th Infantry regiments.

135th and 136th Machine Gun battalions.

62nd Artillery brigade.

134th, 135th, and 136th Artillery regiments.

112th Trench Mortar Battery.

134th Division Machine Gun Battalion.

112th Engineers Regiment and Train.

112th Field Signal Battalion.

112th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

112th Supply Train.

112th Ammunition Train.

112th Sanitary Train.

145th, 146th, 147th, 148th Ambulance companies
and Field hospitals.

37th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions, the 38th Division (National Guard) was organized at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, August 25, 1917. This division was made up of National Guard units from Kentucky, West Virginia, and Indiana. (1st Indiana Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Indiana Infantry, 1st Squadron Indiana Cavalry, 1st Battalion Indiana Engineers, 1st Battalion Indiana Signal Corps, Indiana Ambulance companies Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and Indiana Field Hospital companies Nos. 1 and 2, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments. Kentucky Infantry Company B, Kentucky Signal Corps, Kentucky Ambulance Company No 1, and

Kentucky Field Hospital companies Nos. 1 and 2, 1st and 2nd regiments West Virginia Infantry.)

Upon arrival in France in the middle of October, 1918, the division was ordered to the Le Mans area, when it was broken up and ceased to function further as a combat division. The division was returned to the United States in December, 1918.

The general officers that commanded this division at different times were: Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Sage, Brig. Gen. Edward M. Lewis, Brig. Gen. Henry H. Whitney, Brig. Gen. Wm. V. Judson.

The division insignia is a shield the right half of which is blue and the left half red. The "C" and "Y" in white are superimposed on the shield standing for "Cyclone Division."

The following organizations composed the 38th Division:

75th and 76th Infantry brigades.

63rd Field Artillery Brigade.

149th, 150th, 151st, and 152nd Infantry regiments.

137th, 138th, and 139th Machine Gun battalions.

137th, 138th, 139th Field Artillery regiments.

113th Trench Mortar Battery.

113th Engineers Regiment and Train.

113th Field Signal Battalion.

113th Headquarters Train and Military Police.

113th Ammunition Train.

113th Supply Train.

113th Sanitary Train (149th, 150th, 151st, and 152nd Ambulance companies and Field hospitals).

42nd DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions, the 42nd Division was organized August 5, 1917. It was completely assembled at Camp Mills by September 13th. It is composed of National Guard units coming from every section of the United States. The following states were represented as shown:

New York (69th Infantry)

Iowa (3rd Infantry)

Wisconsin (Companies E., F., and G., 2nd Infantry)

Indiana (1st Field Artillery)

Maryland (3rd and 4th Companies C. A. C.)

Kansas (1st Ammunition Train)

Oklahoma (Ambulance Company No. 1)

District of Columbia (Field Hospital Company No. 1)

Ohio (4th Infantry)

Pennsylvania (3rd Battalion 4th Infantry)

Illinois (1st Field Artillery)

Minnesota (1st Field Artillery)

California (1st Battalion Engineers)

New Jersey (Ambulance Company No. 1)

Michigan (1st Ambulance Company)

Nebraska (Field Hospital Company No. 1)

Colorado (Field Hospital Company No. 1)

Oregon (Field Hospital Company No. 1)

Alabama (4th Infantry)

Georgia (Companies B, C, and F, 2nd Infantry)

Louisiana (1st Sep. Troop Cavalry)

South Carolina (1st Battalion Engineers)

North Carolina (Eng. Train)

Texas (Supply Train)

Virginia (1st and 2nd Companies C. A. C.)

Tennessee (Ambulance Company No. 1)

Missouri (1st Battalion Signal Corps)

The division is known as the "Rainbow Division," the shoulder insignia being a rainbow on a field of black.

On October 18, 1917, the division embarked for France. Division headquarters landed at St. Nazaire November 1st. Debarkation completed December 7th. Debarked at St. Nazaire, Brest, and Liverpool. Troops were assembled in the Vancouver training area. Division marched to La Fauche area beginning December 12th, thence to Rolampont area where it remained until February, 1918.

On February 16, 1918, the division moved to vicinity of Luneville where they trained, serving in the line with corresponding French units.

The division on March 23, 1918, was withdrawn preparatory to marching to another area, but orders were revoked and it relieved the French 128th Division in the Baccarat sector.

It was relieved on June 21st and moved by rail to Camp de Chalons, and while preparing to go into more extensive training, news of impending German attack caused the division to be thrown into the line in the sectors of Souain and Experance as re-

serve, taking up the second position, also portions of the intermediate and outposts, under the French XXI Army Corps.

On July 15, 1918, the German attack against this corps was broken and the division was withdrawn by July 18th, moved by train and camion, and on July 25th it took over the front of the U. S. Army I Corps in the vicinity of Epieds. During subsequent attacks it drove the enemy for a distance of fifteen kilometers.

Relieved August 3rd, and moved by rail and marching to Bourmont area where it went into intensive training, moving to the St. Mihiel salient August 30th, where it delivered the attack from the south, being the centre division of the IV Corps, and advancing nineteen kilometers during two days' attack, September 12th and 13th.

On October 1st the division was relieved, moving to the Bois de Montfaucon on October 6th as reserve of the V Army Corps. It relieved one of the line divisions north of Fleville-Exermont on October 13th in the Argonne, and attacking, advanced two kilometers. Division was relieved October 31st.

The division again advanced to support the attack of November 1st, relieving a line division, and advanced nineteen kilometers in two days to the Meuse River and the heights south of Sedan.

On November 10th the division withdrew and moved to the Brandeville region, becoming a part of the Army of Occupation.

On December 15th it moved to the Kreis of Ahr-

weiler, division headquarters being established at Ahrweiler, Germany.

To include May 15, 1919, there had been reported from this division 2,713 battle deaths, 13,292 wounded, and 102 prisoners captured by the enemy.

To include March 1, 1919, 205 individuals of this division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The commanding generals of the division were as follows:

Maj. Gen. Wm. A. Mann, September, 1917, to December 14, 1917; Maj. Gen Charles T. Menoher, December 14, 1917, to November 7, 1918; Maj. Gen. Chas. D. Rhodes, November 7, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

The units comprising the division were as follows:

83rd and 84th Infantry brigades.

165th, 166th, 167th, and 168th Infantry regiments.

150th, 151st Machine Gun battalions.

67th Artillery Brigade.

149th, 150th, 151st Artillery regiments.

117th Trench Mortar Battery.

149th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion.

117th Engineer Regiment and Train.

117th Field Signal Battalion.

117th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

117th Supply Train.

117th Ammunition Train.

117th Sanitary Train.

165th, 166th, 167th, 168th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

The battles engaged in by the 42nd Division entitling organizations to silver bands on their regimental colour staffs were:

(1) Luneville sector, Lorraine, France, February 21 to March 23, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands:

165th Regimental Infantry.

166th Regimental Infantry.

167th Regimental Infantry.

168th Regimental Infantry.

149th Machine Gun Battalion.

150th Machine Gun Battalion.

151st Machine Gun Battalion.

149th Regimental Field Artillery.

150th Regimental Field Artillery.

151st Regimental Field Artillery.

117th Regimental Engineers.

117th Field Signal Battalion.

(2) Baccarat sector, Lorraine, France, March 21 to June 21, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands—Same as in (1).

(3) Esperance-Souain sector, Champagne, France, July 4 to July 14, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands—Same as in (1).

(4) Champagne-Marne defensive, France, July 15 to July 17, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands—Same as in (1).

(5) Aisne-Marne offensive, France, July 25 to August 3, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands—Same as in (1) with exception of the Field Artillery regiments.

(6) Aisne-Marne offensive, France, July 25 to August 11, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands: 149th Field Artillery, 150th Field Artillery, and 151st Field Artillery.

(7) St. Mihiel offensive, France, September 12 to September 16, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands—Same as in (1).

(8) Essey and Pannas sector, Woevre, France, September 17 to September 30, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver band—Same as in (1).

(9) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, October 12 to October 31, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands—Same as in (5).

(10) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, October 7 to November 1, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands: 149th, 150th, and 151st regiments, Field Artillery.

(11) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, November 5 to November 10, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands—Same as in (5).

(12) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, November 5 to November 9, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands—Same as in (10).

77th DIVISION

In compliance with General Orders, No. 101, August 23, 1917, the 77th Division was organized August 30th at Camp Upton. The majority of the officers were from New York City and the enlisted men were sent from New York City and Long Island, New York.

On October 10, 1917, many of the men were transferred, the vacancies in the different units caused thereby being filled by men from Camp Devens, Massachusetts, and from northern New York State. The division was popularly named the "Metropolitan Division" and has for its insignia a gold statue of Liberty on a truncated triangle of flag blue.

The division began leaving Camp Upton on March 28, 1918, and sailed from Boston and Portland, Maine, via Halifax and New York City. With the exception of the artillery (units) all units proceeded through Liverpool, across England, and landed at Calais, France. The artillery sailed from New York in April and went direct to Brest, France.

The division moved immediately to a training area back of the British front near St. Omer and while being trained by the British 39th Division, was held in reserve to meet the anticipated German attack against the channel ports which never materialized. The artillery brigade on arrival moved to an American training area at Souges.

On June 16, 1918, the division moved by train to the Baccarat sector.

On July 12, 1918, the artillery brigade relieved the French artillery in the Baccarat sector. During the time spent in this sector the division held a broad frontage.

On August 4th the division moved to the Vesle sector in the neighbourhood of Fismes, on August 11th entering the line. With French troops on both flanks and forming a part of the French Sixth Army,

the division commenced the attack of the German positions north of the River Vesle on August 18th, crossing the Vesle on September 5th, and advancing its left flank to the River Aisne. The division was relieved September 15th, moving for two days' rest to the region of Arcy-le-Poin Sart.

Division began moving September 17th by bus and marching to St. Menchould. On September 21st elements of the division moved into position in the Argonne trenches. By September 25th the whole division was in position and on September 26th attacked on the left of the American First Army in the Argonne Forest.

On October 15th and 16th the division was relieved and concentrated in the vicinity east of Cornay (I Corps Reserve) where it was held in readiness for immediate use if required.

During this time the division troops were employed in reorganizing the line of defence.

On October 25th the division relieved a line division and continued in the attack until November 12th, advancing from St. Huvin to the Meuse.

Division was relieved November 12th, and moved to the vicinity of Les Vignettes on November 21st, and thence proceeded on November 30th to the ninth training area and established division headquarters at Château Villaine.

To include March 1, 1919, 146 individuals of this division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

To include May 15, 1919, the following losses had been reported for this division: battle deaths, 1,990; wounded, 9,966; prisoners of war, 404.

The commanding generals of the division were as follows:

Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, August 18, 1917, to May 18, 1918; Maj. Gen. Geo. B. Duncan, May 18, 1918, to August 24, 1918; Brig. Gen. Evan M. Johnson, August 24, 1918, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. Robert Alexander, August 31, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

The units comprising the 77th Division were as follows:

- 153rd, 154th Infantry brigades.
- 305th, 306th, 307th, 308th Infantry regiments.
- 305th Machine Gun Battalion.
- 152nd Artillery Brigade.
- 304th, 305th, 306th Artillery regiments.
- 302nd Trench Mortar Battery.
- 304th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion.
- 302nd Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 302nd Field Signal Battalion.
- 302nd Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 302nd Supply Train.
- 302nd Ammunition Train.
- 302nd Sanitary Train.
- 305th, 306th, 307th, 308th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

The division captured from the enemy the following: 13 officers, 737 men, 44 pieces of artillery, 323 machine guns, and numerous supplies.

The 77th Division made a total advance against resistance of 71.5 kilometers.

The well-known "lost battalion" was a part of the 308th Infantry of this division.

78th DIVISION

In compliance with General Order No. 101, War Department, August 23, 1917, the 78th Division was organized about August 25th at Camp Dix, New Jersey. The majority of the officers were from New York State and were trained at Madison Barracks. The enlisted personnel was drawn from northern New York State, New Jersey, and Delaware.

The shoulder insignia of the division consists of a red semi-circle with lightning flash in white.

About the middle of October, 1917, the division began the gradual transfer of more than 13,000 enlisted men, more or less trained, to other camps.

On May 8, 1918, the division began movement overseas. The artillery brigade landed in France and proceeded to Brittany for training. The infantry units landed in England on June 4th and 5th, and crossed to Calais by boat three or four days later. The last units of the division arrived in France June 11, 1918.

Infantry units began training June 17, 1918, behind the Hazebrouck front in the British area. On July 19th the division moved to an area east of St. Pol and trained there until August 19th, when the infantry units moved to the Bourbonne-les-Bains area.

On August 31, 1918, the division began moving to the St. Mihiel front, arriving September 10th. It remained in I Corps Reserve until September 15th and 16th, when it relieved the 2nd and 5th divisions. The artillery brigade had meanwhile come up to this front and was supporting the 90th Division.

The division occupied the Limey sector until October 4th when it was relieved and rejoined by the artillery brigade and moved to the Argonne Forest. The division relieved the 77th Division on October 16th and continued in the line until November 5th, advancing twenty-one kilometers.

On November 6th the division, less artillery brigade and ammunition train, moved back to the Argonne camps west of Varennes, then to Florent, Les Islettes, and to the south of Ste. Menehould. It entrained for the Semur training area on November 15th.

This division captured from the enemy 9 officers, 392 men, several pieces of artillery, numerous machine guns, and quantities of other military supplies. It made a total advance against resistance of twenty-one kilometers, or about thirteen miles.

To include March 8, 1919, 813 casualties had been reported from this division, of which 63 were prisoners of war. To include March 1, 1919, 95 individuals of the 78th Division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The commanding generals of the division were as follows: Maj. Gen. Chase W. Kennedy, August 23, 1917, to December 27, 1917; Maj. Gen. Hugh L.

Scott, December 28, 1917, to March 15, 1918; Brig. Gen. Jas. T. Dean, March 16, 1918, to April 20, 1918; Maj. Gen. Jas. H. McRae, April 20, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

The units composing the division were as follows:

155th, 156th Infantry brigades.

309th, 310th, 311th, 312th Infantry regiments.

308th, 309th Machine Gun battalions.

153rd Artillery Brigade.

307th, 308th, 309th Artillery regiments.

303rd Trench Mortar Battery.

307th Division Machine Gun Battalion.

303rd Engineer Regiment and Train.

303rd Field Signal Battalion.

303rd Train Headquarters and Military Police.

303rd Supply Train.

303rd Ammunition Train.

303rd Sanitary Train.

309th 310th, 311th, 312th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

79th DIVISION

In compliance with General Orders No. 109, War Department, 1917, the division was organized August 25, 1917, at Camp Meade, Maryland. The officers, for the most part, were from Pennsylvania and the selected men in the early increments were drawn from eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, and District of Columbia.

Beginning about this time large numbers of men were transferred to southern divisions and to special

units throughout the United States. This continued until June, 1918. Approximately 80,000 men were trained in this division and only about 25,000 retained. The later increments came from New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. While in training this division was popularly designated as the Liberty Division.

The division commenced its overseas movement July 9, 1918, the majority embarking at Hoboken, New Jersey, and debarking at Brest. The 154th Field Artillery Brigade embarked at Philadelphia and debarked in England, proceeding from there to a training area in France. The last units arrived in France August 3, 1918. This artillery brigade joined division after the armistice.

The division left Brest for the twelfth training area, but were diverted to the tenth training area around Prauthoy and Champlite.

Left the training area for the Robert-Espagne area by rail. Subsequently proceeding by bus on September 16th relieved a division in Sector 304 (Montfaucon).

The division under the V Corps made its first offensive in the Meuse-Argonne drive, advancing through Haucourt and Malancourt. On September 27th they passed through Montfaucon and on September 28th through Nantillois. They were relieved in this sector on September 30th and passed to the command of the French Colonial II Corps, moving October 8th to the Troyon sector (Fresnes-en-Woevre-Doncourt). Were relieved in this sector

October 26, 1918. Entered the Grand Montagne sector (right of Meuse) and participated in the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, under the French XVII Corps, advancing through Bronedu-Cornouiller (Hill 376) on November 6th, and through Damvillers and Wavrille on November 9th. Ville-devant-Chaumont was passed on November 11th.

The division remained in same location and also took over area from Meuse River to Eresnes-en-Woevre until November 26th. The division moved to Souilly area south of Verdun, December 27th.

To include March 8, 1919, the total battle casualties of this division as reported were 3,223. To include March 1, 1919, 80 Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded individuals of the 79th Division.

Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhm, U. S. A., commanded the division from August 25, 1917, to include the date of the armistice, November 11, 1918.

The division is known as the Liberty Division and has for its shoulder insignia a gray lorraine cross on a blue shield-shaped field, the whole outlined in gray.

80th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department orders, the 80th Division was organized August 27, 1917, at Camp Lee, Virginia. The majority of the officers were from New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, and the enlisted men from western Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.

The division is named the "Blue Ridge Division"

and has for its shoulder insignia a shield outlined in white on a khaki background with three blue mountains superimposed.

The division began leaving Camp Lee on May 17, 1918, and was embarked at Newport News for France. Its principal points of entry were St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, and Brest. The assembly point of the division was Calais, from which place it departed early in June for the Samur training area, with the British. The artillery was not trained in this area but rejoined the division September 13th. The last units of the division arrived in France June 19, 1918.

Division left Samur training area on July 4th for British Third Army sector, where it arrived July 5th. All units trained with the British in the Artois sector; while in this sector the troops were attached to the British and were on active duty.

On August 18th the units of the division left this area and proceeded by rail to the fourteenth training area, where it remained until August 31st. On September 1st it moved to the Stainville and later to Tronville area as reserve during the St. Mihiel operation. During this time one infantry regiment and one machine gun battalion were serving with the French, taking part in active operations.

Commencing September 14th, the division moved into the Argonne and began its preparation for the offensive in that region. On September 26th, in conjunction with other American divisions, it attacked at Bethincourt, advancing a distance of nine kilometers in two days. On September 29th it was re-

lieved and assembled in the vicinity of Ouisy, where on October 4th it again attacked, and over difficult ground attained a distance of four kilometers in nine days.

On October 12th the division was again relieved and proceeded by march and bus to the Thiaucourt area where it was re-equipped. On October 23rd-24th it again moved, this time to the Le Neufour area where it remained until October 29th, making preparations for the resumption of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The division, on October 29th, entered the line St. Georges-St. Juvin and on November 1st made an attack on that line, penetrating in the next five days to a distance of twenty-four kilometers, being relieved the morning of November 6th. Upon relief it proceeded by marching to the Buzancy and Champ Mahaut areas.

On the 18th of November the division proceeded by march to the fifteenth training area, completing the march December 1st.

The 155th Field Artillery Brigade, after its relief from duty with the 80th Division, remained in the Cunel sector, serving successively with American divisions in that sector. It was in action for forty-eight consecutive fighting days. It proceeded by rail from Dun-sur-Meuse to the fifteenth training area, arriving December 4th to 7th.

Maj. Gen. Adelbert Cronkhite, United States Army, commanded the division from September 9, 1917, to include November 11, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, there had been reported from this division the following casualties: 1,141 battle deaths, 5,622 wounded, and 101 prisoners of war taken by the enemy.

To include March 1, 1919, 42 individuals of this division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The following units composed the division:

159th and 160th Infantry brigades.

317th, 318th, 319th, 320th Infantry regiments.

314th, 315th Machine Gun battalions.

155th Artillery Brigade.

313th, 314th, 315th Artillery regiments.

305th Trench Mortar Battery.

313th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion.

305th Engineer Regiment and Train.

305th Field Signal Battalion.

305th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

305th Supply Train.

305th Ammunition Train.

305th Sanitary Train.

317th, 318th, 319th, 320th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

81st DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions the 81st Division was organized at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, in September, 1917. This division was made up of National Army drafts from North and South Carolina and Tennessee. The division remained in training at Camp Jackson until July,

1918. The first units embarked for overseas on July 30, 1918, and the last units arrived in France, via England, on August 26, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was ordered to the Tonnerre (Yonne) training area where it remained in training until the middle of August. The division then proceeded to the St. Die sector (Vosges) where it held the line as a part of the XXXIII French Corps. On October 19th, the division was relieved and ordered to join the First Army for the Meuse-Argonne offensive. The division arrived in the Sommedieue sector early in November and was attached to the Colonial II Corps (French) as corps reserve. On November 6th, it relieved the 35th Division in this sector, and on November 9th the division attacked the German positions on the Woivre plain, and was in the line when the armistice was signed.

On November 18th the division moved to the vicinity of Chatillon-Sur-Seine (cote D'or) and the artillery brigade which had heretofore formed a part of the VIII Corps rejoined the division. On May 2nd the division was placed under the control of the C. G., S.O.S. for return to the United States.

The commanding generals of this division were: Brig. Gen. Chas. H. Barth, August 25, 1917, to October 8, 1917; Maj. Gen. Chas. J. Bailey, October 8, 1917, to November 11, 1918.

The insignia of this division is a silhouette of a wildcat on a khaki circle. The colour of the wildcat varies according to the different arms of the service.

During active operations the division suffered the following losses: killed, 250; wounded, 801; 51 men taken prisoner.

This division captured the following from the enemy: 5 officers, 96 men, 44 machine guns. The division advanced $5\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers against resistance.

Nineteen Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded to individuals of this division up to March 8, 1919.

The following units composed the division:

161st, 162nd Infantry brigades.

321st, 322nd, 323rd, 324th Infantry regiments.

317th, 318th Machine Gun battalions.

156th Artillery Brigade.

316th, 317th, 318th Artillery regiments.

306th Trench Mortar Battery.

316th Division Machine Gun battalion.

306th Engineer Regiment and Train.

306th Field Signal Battalion.

306th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

306th Ammunition Train.

306th Sanitary Train.

306th Supply Train.

321st, 322nd, 323rd, 324th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

82nd DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions, the 82nd (National Army) Division was organized August 25, 1917, at Camp Gordon, Georgia. The majority of officers were from Georgia, Alabama, and

Florida. The enlisted men were from Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee.

On October 10th the majority of the enlisted men were transferred out of the division to other divisions and newly drafted men were sent from Camp Devens, Upton, Dix, Meade, and Lee, which resulted in there being in the division men from every state in the Union, but principally from the eastern states.

The division is known as the "All American Division." Its shoulder insignia consists of the letters "A.A." in gold on a circle of blue, the whole superimposed on a red square.

The division began leaving Camp Gordon on April 9th, the movement continuing until May, and was through Camp Upton and England, except the artillery which landed in France. The first units left the United States April 25, 1918, and the last units arrived in France June 1, 1918. The main port of entry was Le Havre. Units, except artillery, engineers, and signal corps, trained with the British in Escarbotin area, west of Abbeville. The artillery was trained at La Courtine.

The division left Escarbotin June 16th and entered the Toul sector with a French division on June 27th, occupied this quiet sector alone from July 18, 1918, to August 9th, moved to Blanod les Toul training area, taking over the sector Marbache, astride the Moselle, on August 19th and occupied it until September 21st. This was a quiet sector except during the battle of St. Mihiel from September 12th to 18th.

The division moved to the Triaucourt area, west

of Verdun by bus, and on October 6th entered actively the Meuse-Argonne offensive, north of Barennes, continued in this offensive on the line in the Aire valley up to St. Juvin and St. George until October 30th, when it was withdrawn to the vicinity of Chene Tondeu and Camp Bouzon. Thence on November 2nd to Florent-Les Islettes area, thence to Vaucouleurs training area, November 4th; Beaumont training area, November 10th, and to the tenth training area on November 15th. (Prauthoy.)

Sailed from Bordeaux in April, 1919.

To include March 8, 1919, 8,300 casualties had been reported from the 82nd Division of which 169 were prisoners of war.

Thirty-four individuals of the division had received the Distinguished Service Cross up to March 1, 1919.

The commanding generals of the division from the time of its organization were as follows: Maj. Gen. Eben Swift, August 25, 1917, to some time in May, 1918; Brig. Gen. Wm. P. Burnham, some time in May, 1918, to October 10, 1918; Maj. Gen. Geo. B. Duncan, October 10, 1918, to October 17, 1918; Maj. Gen. W. P. Burnham, October 24, 1918, to November 7, 1918; Maj. Gen. Geo. B. Duncan, November 7, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

The following units composed the division:

163rd, 164th Infantry brigade.

325th, 326th, 327th, 328th Infantry regiments.

320th, 321st Machine Gun battalions.

157th Artillery Brigade.

319th, 320th, 321st Artillery regiments.

307th Trench Mortar Battery.

319th Machine Gun Battalion.

307th Engineer Regiment and Train.

307th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

307th Field Signal Battalion.

307th Supply Train.

307th Ammunition Train.

307th Sanitary Train.

325th, 326th, 327th, 328th Ambulance companies
and Field hospitals.

Battle Engagements of 82nd Division.

(1) Toul Sector, France, June 25-August 9, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands on their
regimental colour staffs.

325th Regiment Infantry.

326th Regiment Infantry.

327th Regiment Infantry.

328th Regiment Infantry.

307th Field Signal Battalion.

(2) Toul Sector, France, July 18-August 9, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands:

319th Machine Gun Battalion.

(3) Toul Sector, France, July 14-August 9, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands:

320th Machine Gun Battalion.

321st Machine Gun Battalion.

(4) Marbache Sector, Toul, France, August 17-
September 11, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands:

325th Regiment Infantry.

326th Regiment Infantry.
327th Regiment Infantry.
328th Regiment Infantry.
307th Regiment Engineers.
319th Machine Gun Battalion.
320th Machine Gun Battalion.
321st Machine Gun Battalion.
307th Field Signal Battalion.

(5) Marbache Sector, Toul, France, August 19-September 11, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands:

319th Regiment Field Artillery.
320th Regiment Field Artillery.
321st Regiment Field Artillery.

(6) St. Mihiel Offensive, France, September 12-September 16, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands:

325th Regiment Infantry.
326th Regiment Infantry.
327th Regiment Infantry.
328th Regiment Infantry.
307th Regiment Engineers.
319th Machine Gun Battalion.
320th Machine Gun Battalion.
321st Machine Gun Battalion.
307th Field Signal Battalion.
319th Regiment Field Artillery.
320th Regiment Field Artillery.
321st Regiment Field Artillery.

(7) Meuse-Argonne Offensive, France, October 6-October 31, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands:

325th Regiment Infantry.

326th Regiment Infantry.

327th Regiment Infantry.

328th Regiment Infantry.

307th Regiment Engineers.

319th Machine Gun Battalion.

320th Machine Gun Battalion.

321st Machine Gun Battalion.

307th Field Signal Battalion.

(8) Meuse-Argonne Offensive, France, October 6-November 7, 1918.

Organizations entitled to silver bands:

319th Regiment Field Artillery.

320th Regiment Field Artillery.

321st Regiment Field Artillery.

90th DIVISION

1. *Organization.* In compliance with General Orders No. 101, War Department, 1917, the 90th Division was organized August 25, 1917, at Camp Travis, Texas, under the command of Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen. All of the first men in the division were from Texas and Oklahoma, those from Oklahoma being in the 179th Brigade and those from Texas in the 180th Brigade. From that time these brigades have been known as the Oklahoma and Texas brigades. The division insignia, adopted in France, symbolizes the native states of the first members of the division.

Like all other National Army divisions in the States,

the 90th sent away great numbers of men to fill up Regular and National Guard divisions and to form special organizations of army, corps, and S.O.S. troops. In the early spring of 1918 the division was filled up with men from other camps, a large number coming from Camp Dodge, Iowa.

2. *Move to France.* The division commenced leaving Camp Travis early in June for Camp Mills, near New York. By June 30th all units had sailed from Hoboken. A few organizations went direct to France but the majority of the division landed in England. The 358th Infantry paraded before the Lord Mayor of Liverpool on July 4th, and was given a banquet by the city.

Immediately upon arrival in France the artillery brigade was sent to a training area near Bordeaux. The rest of the division was moved by train to the Aignay-le-Duc training area, northeast of Dijon. Headquarters of the division, 179th Brigade and 357th Infantry, were at Aignay-le-Duc. Headquarters of the 180th Brigade and the 359th Infantry were at Recey-sur-Ource. The 358th Infantry was at Minot, and the 360th Infantry was at Rouvres. The division stayed six weeks in this area, training eight hours a day for the time when it should take its place in line.

3. *Relief of First Division.* In the middle of August the division was ordered to relieve the 1st Division, which held the Saizerais sector along the Moselle River, near Toul. The division was moved by train on the 18th and 19th of August from its

training area to towns in the vicinity of Toul. The relief of the 1st Division commenced on the 19th of August and was completed on the 24th, General Allen taking command of the sector at 8 o'clock on the morning of August 24th.

The sector was about nine kilometers in width, from Remenauville to a point about a kilometer west of the Moselle River. The sector had been the scene of heavy fighting in 1915 when the French, with very heavy losses, had attempted to take the Bois le Pretre, but since 1915 had been what was known as a quiet sector. The front line on the left ran across broken open country just behind Fey-en-Haye, and on the right ran through the woods of the Bois le Pretre. No Man's Land was wide and full of old trenches, wire entanglements, and obstacles of every sort. The rear areas were heavily wooded and filled with all sorts of camps, dugouts, old gun emplacements, and every kind of construction which had accumulated during three years of trench warfare. The regiments went into line in order from left to right—357th Infantry (Colonel Hartmann), 358th Infantry (Colonel Leary), 359th Infantry (Colonel Cavanaugh), 360th Infantry (Colonel Price). General O'Neil, commanding the 179th Brigade, had his headquarters at Martincourt, and General Johnston, commanding the 180th Brigade, was at Griscourt. Division headquarters was established at Villers-en-Haye.

The 82nd Division was on the right and the 89th Division on the left.

On August 27th General Johnston became a Major General and was given the 91st Division. Brig. Gen. U. G. McAlexander, who had served with the 3rd Division on the Marne, took command of the 180th Brigade.

4. *St. Mihiel Offensive.* When the division went into line, preparation had already begun for the St. Mihiel offensive. Artillery of all calibres was being moved into the sector every night and it was obvious to everyone that an operation of some sort was being planned. Early in September orders were received from the I Army Corps which outlined the operation and gave the 90th Division its part in the attack. The American First Army, which had just been organized under the personal command of General Pershing, was to cut off the St. Mihiel salient. The general plan was that the V Corps would attack on the west base of the salient and drive east, and that the I and IV Corps on the east base of the salient would attack north. When the V and IV Corps met, they would close the neck of the bottle, and the salient and the German troops left in it would be cut off. The advance of the I and IV Corps was to swing forward like a door with the hinge of the door on the Moselle River. The divisions on the left of the advance would push forward the farthest, and by meeting the V Corps, cut off the salient.

The 82nd Division on the extreme right was not to advance at all, and the 90th Division on its left was given the mission of protecting the right flank of

the advance and seeing that the hinge on which the whole attack pivoted was not broken off. This was an extremely important and delicate mission, as with the 82nd Division standing fast it was obvious that the 90th Division, when it advanced, would leave its whole right flank open to the enemy.

5. *The Attack—September 12-16.* The front of the division was narrowed for the attack by three kilometers which were taken over by the 5th Division. On the three nights before the 12th, patrols were busy all along the front cleaning out the old trenches and cutting wire so that everything would be ready for the jump-off on the morning of the 12th. For the attack, the division was lined up with the regiments side by side in the same order that they held the sector. The infantry was supported by the 153rd Artillery Brigade (78th Division). The plan for the first day was that the division, like the corps, would advance farthest on the left and pivot on the right.

A terrific artillery preparation opened at one o'clock on the morning of the 12th. At 5 o'clock the infantry went over the top under a rolling barrage and by 2 o'clock in the afternoon all objectives had been reached and the enemy completely disorganized in spite of the immensely difficult country through which the advance had been made. The 357th Infantry on the left had advanced a maximum distance of four kilometers through dense wood, wire, and trench defences of every description. All of the other regiments, while their advance was not as deep as that of the 357th Infantry, had accom-

plished their missions. During the night strong patrols were sent out all along the front to exploit the success of the day.

On the 13th the 180th Brigade captured the Bois le Pretre with its maze of barbed-wire entanglements and innumerable machine gun emplacements. The French are said to have had more than 120,000 casualties in 1915 in attempting to take this piece of ground. On the same day the 179th Brigade cleaned out the Vencheres woods and advanced their line to the vicinity of St. Marie Farm. One of the battalions of the 357th Infantry encountered two enemy regiments moving across our front to counter attack the 5th Division and completely broke up their advance.

On the 14th the 179th Brigade pushed forward on the left into the Bois des Rappes to the vicinity of La Souleuvre Farm, while the 180th Brigade captured Villers-sours-Preny and established a foothold on the heights beyond.

On the 15th the advance was continued, Vandieres taken, the Bois de Villers and the Bois des Rappes cleaned up, and the line established along the Huit Chemins ("White Chimmy") road.

On the 16th the front line was pushed forward to the edge of the woods in front of Preny where it remained until the division was relieved in October.

While the 90th Division was carrying all objectives, the rest of the First Army was equally successful. Within twenty-four hours after the attack started, divisions from the IV and V Corps had met at Vignuelles in rear of the salient and the whole Ger-

man position, which had been held since 1914, was cut off. During this first operation of the American Army more than 14,000 prisoners, a great amount of artillery, and vast stores of all sorts were captured.

The 90th Division's contribution was, in prisoners, 14 officers and 650 men, 8 pieces of artillery, 24 heavy trench mortars, and a large number of rifles, machine guns, and miscellaneous weapons. The division's casualties were 39 officers and 886 men.

6. *From close of St. Mihiel offensive to relief by 7th Division.* Shortly after the St. Mihiel offensive was ended, the 82nd Division on our right was relieved by the French 69th Division and the 90th's sector was extended to the Moselle River. The 5th Division on the left was relieved by the 78th Division, which was itself shortly withdrawn, its sector being turned over about equally to the 89th and 90th. This extended the 90th's sector approximately four kilometers to the west. During the last week that the division was in line it was holding a front of approximately twelve kilometers. During the period following the St. Mihiel operation the four regiments continued to hold the line in the same order as before. Colonel Sterling had relieved Colonel Cavanaugh in command of the 359th Infantry.

During all this period enemy artillery activity was intense. The front and support lines were almost continually bombarded with high explosive and gas shell. Much of the fire came from the flank, and from places even in rear of our own line. While there

was no considerable enemy infantry activity during this period casualties were heavy from artillery.

Patrolling was active and daring. Scarcely a day passed that one of the regiments did not bring in prisoners.

On the night of September 23rd the 357th Infantry raided the Hindenburg Line near Sebastapol Farm and brought in five prisoners with only slight casualties.

On the 26th of September the American First Army west of the Meuse commenced the last great battle of the war, and the divisions between the Meuse and the Moselle assisted that operation by carrying out local operations to give the impression that the great attack extended along the entire front. Both infantry brigades took part in the operation which was planned as a deep raid on the enemy positions. The raid was preceded by a six-hour artillery preparation, as was the big attack west of the Meuse, and the infantry jumped off at the same hour as the troops making the real attack. Statements of prisoners and evidence discovered since the armistice prove that the division successfully accomplished its mission and that the enemy on our front believed until well into the morning of September 26th that a great attack was being made on their front. The success was attained, however, only with very heavy casualties, as our raiding parties were caught in an intense artillery bombardment and heavy machine gun fire from concrete emplacements all along the Hindenburg Line.

7. *Relief by 7th Division and move to the Meuse.*

Early in October the division was relieved by the 7th Division, the relief being completed on the 10th of October. The division was concentrated for a few days in billets in the vicinity of Toul and was then moved by truck to the Blercourt area, about twenty kilometers from Verdun. Here the division was billeted for a few days in huts and barracks in the woods and was then moved forward from the billeting area into bivouac in the vicinity of Montfaucon, Cuisy, Nantillois, Septsarges, and as a part of the III Corps.

8. *The Meuse-Argonne Offensive.* Commencing with the counter offensive in July which cleared the Marne salient, the Allied armies, particularly the British Army, had steadily driven the enemy back until nearly all of the ground gained in his great offensive of March, April, and May, 1918, had been recovered. It became evident that the enemy was planning, if not already executing, a general retreat with the Meuse as his pivot, and that if the Allied armies could continue their offensive, and particularly if they could break the enemy's pivot on the Meuse, a decision might be reached. With this in view the great attack of September 26th, which developed into the battle of the Meuse-Argonne, was planned and the American First Army was given the honour position on the Meuse with the all-important task of breaking the pivot of the enemy's retreat. The part which the 90th Division played on September 26th has already been described. The first attack met with great success on the entire front of the army. The advance was rapid. Then, as divisions

became exhausted, communications and supply became extremely difficult and the enemy threw in great numbers of reserve divisions, the advance slowed down, and the first stage of the battle was concluded. During the second stage there was continual fighting along the line but no concerted attack was launched by the entire army. The effort was rather on the part of individual divisions and corps to straighten out the line and reach a position from which a second great attack could be launched.

9. *Relief of 5th Division—Capture of Bantheville:* The 90th Division went into line near the end of this second period. The 179th Brigade relieved the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division on the night of October 21st-22nd. The 180th Brigade was held in division reserve. The 3rd Division was on the right and the 89th Division on the left. At this time the front line ran from just north of Romaone and Cunel around the northwestern edge of the Bois des Rappes. The 89th Division had pushed forward and occupied the Bois de Bantheville on the left so that the line of the 90th Division formed a pocket a little more than two kilometers in depth in the front of the corps. In this pocket were the villages of Bantheville and Bourrut. The first mission of the division was to straighten out the line. The 357th Infantry attacked at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of October 23rd, captured Bantheville and the high ground north and northwest of that town, and established a line from the northeast corner of the Bois des Rappes over the high ground north of Bourrut to the northeastern corner

of the Bois de Bantheville where the line joined with the 89th Division. The 358th Infantry in the Bois des Rappes at the same time extended its left to connect with the 357th Infantry north of Bourrut, and the same night two companies of the 358th Infantry crossed the Andon Brook and established a line from a point about 500 meters southwest of Aincreville along the Aincreville-Bantheville road to the line held by the 357th Infantry. This extremely successful operation, upon which the division was highly complimented by the army and corps commanders, resulted in giving the division an excellent position from which it could jump off in case of a great attack. This advance position was held until November 1st, despite many counter attacks and continuous intense shelling.

10. *Attack of November 1st.* With the capture of Bantheville by the 179th Brigade, everything was in readiness for the great attack by the American First Army and the French armies on its left, by which it was hoped finally to break the enemy's last line of resistance and change his retreat into a rout. This attack was ordered for November 1st. On the night of October 30th the 180th Brigade relieved the 179th Brigade which had suffered heavy casualties during its eight days in line and was withdrawn into division reserve. The 180th Brigade went into line and attacked with the 360th Infantry on the left and the 359th Infantry on the right. The 345th Machine Gun Battalion and the 343rd Machine Gun Battalion were in position on the front line from which they

could cover the advance with overhead fire. On the morning of the 1st these companies fired more than 1,200,000 rounds and contributed largely to the very great success of the attack.

The plan of the attack was that the 360th Infantry on the left, on a narrow front and assisted by a concentration of all available artillery, should drive forward through the Carre Farm and the immensely strong wooded position on the left of the sector up to and beyond Andevanne. With this attack a success the 359th Infantry on the right would be able to advance across the open ground west of Aincreville without disastrous losses. An extremely heavy artillery preparation opened at 3.30 A. M., on the 1st of November, and at 5.30 A. M. the infantry went over the top. From the outset the fighting was desperate. The best veteran troops available in the German Army were thrown in to stop the advance of the division. Machine gun nests were everywhere, the gunners sticking to their guns until wiped out. The 360th and 359th Infantry, splendidly supported by the 155th Field Artillery Brigade (80th Division), advanced practically without halt. Grande Carre Farm was taken and mopped up. The woods to the north were cleaned out, Andevanne and Cote 243 captured, and the line pushed a kilometer beyond by the 360th. Chassogne Farm and St. Marguerite Farm were captured by the 359th Infantry, and by late afternoon our troops were on or beyond their objectives. The Freya Stellung, the last known enemy position, was definitely and completely broken.

On the 2nd of November the advance was continued against desperate resistance. Villers devt. Dun was taken and passed, Hill 321 was occupied, and the Bois de Raux was put within our lines before night. On the right the 359th Infantry advanced more than three kilometers, and one battalion, extending over into the sector of the 5th Division on the right, advanced through the "punch bowl" all the way to the Meuse.

On the 3rd of November the 179th Brigade passed through the 180th Brigade and at 8 o'clock attacked with the 358th Infantry on the left and the 357th Infantry on the right. It was evident after a few hours that the attacks of the preceding days had broken the enemy's resistance and that he was completely disorganized. By night the brigade had penetrated the dense woods of the Bois de Tailly and occupied the towns of Montigny, Saulmaury, Sassey, and Mont devt. Sassey.

On the 4th and 5th of November the exploitation was continued and the hold on the river towns was strengthened. Halles, Wiseppe, and Laneuville were occupied.

The divisions on the left of the 90th were meeting with equal success and were driving the enemy back to the Meuse River. With the breaking of the Freya Stellung by the 90th Division the vitally important railroad from Sedan to Montmedy was brought under our artillery fire and the enemy's hold on the river was broken. The 5th Division, on our right, succeeded in crossing the Meuse at Dun-sur-Meuse and

was forcing the enemy up the right bank of the river. It was evident that the enemy's retreat was becoming completely disorganized and if our pressure could be continued he would break.

On the 9th of November the 179th Brigade crossed the Meuse at Sassey, and by all-night marching occupied Mouzay on the right bank of the river. The next day the 358th Infantry captured Blanc Fontaine, and after desperate fighting secured a foothold in Stenay. At the same time the 357th Infantry on the right had advanced over rolling country, swept by machine gun and artillery fire, and reached the heights overlooking Baalon and later occupied the town. On this day the enemy threw into line against the 90th his last reserve division on the Western Front.

The 89th Division on our left had, in the meantime, forced a crossing of the river at Pouilly and was ordered to send troops to protect the left flank of the 90th Division north of Stenay. When these troops were in position, it was planned to pass the 180th Brigade again through the lines of the 179th Brigade and to continue the attack in the direction of Montmedy.

11. *The Armistice.* Early on the morning of November 11th word was received that the greatest battle in which American troops had ever been engaged was ended by Germany's acceptance of the Allied terms and that hostilities would cease at 11 o'clock. Before that hour patrols from the 358th Infantry forced their way into Stenay and completely occupied the town, the enemy having evacuated after the desperate fighting of the previous day.

From the armistice until the division started its march into Germany the only activity was patrolling along the old front line to collect returned prisoners of war and civilians and to locate and guard abandoned and surrendered material of war.

Shortly after the conclusion of the armistice Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen left the division to take command of the VIII Corps. Command passed to Brig. Gen. J. P. O'Neil, who continued in command during the march into Germany and until December 30th when Maj. Gen. C. H. Martin assumed command.

12. *March to Germany.* On the 23rd of November the 90th Division, having been designated as one of the nine divisions of the Army of Occupation (of which only one other, the 89th, was a National Army division), moved forward toward Montmedy. The division marched from Stenay across Luxembourg to Rhenish Prussia, where, as a part of the VII Corps, it shortly before Christmas settled into winter quarters along the Moselle River in the vicinity of Berncastel, Germany, occupying the Krieses of Daun, Wittlich, and Berncastel. Here it was joined by the 165th Field Artillery Brigade.

13. *Summary.* The average advance made by the division in the St. Mihiel operation was six kilometers, in the Meuse-Argonne twenty-two kilometers. The division was under fire from August 20th to November 11th with the exception of seven days occupied in changing sectors; seventy-five days without a relief. During this time it went over the top in two major offensives

and seven minor operations, and was still advancing when halted by the armistice.

The division captured 42 pieces of artillery, 36 trench mortars, 294 machine guns, 903 rifles, and immense quantities of ammunition and stores. It took as prisoners 32 officers and 1,844 men. Casualties amounted to 37 officers and 1,042 men killed; 62 officers and 1,257 men severely wounded; 123 officers and 4,671 men slightly wounded; 81 officers and 2,094 men gassed. Of the gassed there were 17 deaths and 1,204 men were evacuated. Exact figures cannot be given on the missing for search is being made for all in this class and the number is decreasing daily.

The twenty-second division to reach France, it stands tenth in amount of artillery captured, thirteenth in number of machine guns captured, and fourteenth in both prisoners captured and total advance.

The division received five official commendations for its individual work in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations. The 90th won its place in the Army of Occupation by never failing to accomplish a mission and by never giving up a foot of ground to the enemy.

To include March 1, 1919, 57 individuals of the 90th Division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The shoulder insignia of the division is a monogram composed of the letters T and O in red. The division is known as the Alamo Division.

91st DIVISION

In compliance with General Orders, Nos. 101 and 109, W. D., 1917, the 91st (National Army) Division was organized August 25, 1917, at Camp Lewis, Washington. The majority of the officers were from California, Washington, and Oregon. The enlisted men from California, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, and Alaska.

The division shoulder insignia is a green fir tree, emblematic of the Far West. The division is known as the "Wild West Division."

The division began leaving Camp Lewis June 19, 1918, for overseas, the move continuing until early in July and was through Camp Merritt, Camp Mills, England, and France. The first units of the division sailed from the United States on July 6, 1918, and the last units arrived in France July 26, 1918. All units of the division, artillery excepted, were trained in the eighth training area, France. The artillery was trained in the vicinity of Clermont-Ferrand, France.

The division left the eighth area September 6, 1918, and from September 11th to 14th constituted a part of the reserves in the St. Mihiel offensive moving thence to the northwest of Verdun, where it took an active part in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, September 26th, advancing from west of Avocourt to north of Gesnes. Continued in the offensive until October 6th, when it moved to the Nattancourt area. One brigade stayed in the line with the 1st Division until October 16th.

On October 19th the division passed to the command of the King of Belgium.

From October 31st to November 4th the division, under the direction of the French Army, in Belgium, took part in the Lys-Scheldt offensive west of the Escaut (Scheldt) River in the vicinity of Audenarde.

From November 10th to November 11th the division took part in the Lys-Scheldt offensive east of the Escaut (Scheldt) River in the vicinity of Audenarde.

On November 22, 1918, detachment of division participated in the ceremony in connection with the entrance into the city of Brussels of the King and Queen of Belgium.

In December, 1918, and January, 1919, the division moved to the Le Mans area.

In March and April it embarked for the United States.

To include March 8, 1919, 5,838 casualties, of which 23 were prisoners of war, had been reported from this division. To include March 1, 1919, 19 individuals of the division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The commanding generals of the division from its organization to include the date of the armistice were as follows: Maj. Gen. Harry A. Greene, August 25, 1917, to November 24, 1917; Brig. Gen. Jas. A. Irons, November 24, 1917, to December 23, 1917; Brig. Gen. Frederick S. Foltz, December 23, 1917, to March 2, 1918; Maj. Gen. Harry A. Greene, March 2, 1918, to June 19, 1918; Brig. Gen. Frederick S.

Foltz, June 19, 1918, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Johnston, August 31, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

The units composing the division were as follows:

181st and 182nd Infantry brigades.

361st, 362nd, 363rd, and 364th Infantry regiments.

347th, 348th Machine Gun battalions.

166th Artillery Brigade.

346th, 347th, 348th Artillery regiments.

316th Trench Mortar Battery.

346th Division Machine Gun Battalion.

316th Engineer Regiment and Train.

316th Field Signal Battalion.

316th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

316th Supply Train.

316th Ammunition Train.

316th Sanitary Train.

361st, 362nd, 363rd, 364th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

92nd DIVISION

In compliance with telegraphic instructions Adjutant General's Office, dated October 26, 1917, the 92nd (National Army) Division was organized October 29th at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Upton, Meade, and Dix, the officers and enlisted men coming from all parts of the United States. The division is popularly known as the "Buffaloes," the shoulder insignia being a buffalo in black circle on khaki patch.

On June 2, 1918, the division was assembled at Camp Upton for embarkation.

From June 10-27, 1918, the division embarked at Hoboken, New Jersey.

On June 19, 1918, the division headquarters arrived at Brest, France.

On August 29, 1918, after a period of training, the division entered the line at St. Die in the quiet Vosges sector. It was relieved on September 20th.

From September 25th to 30th the division was in the reserve of the I Army Corps in the Argonne-Meuse sector. From September 24th to 30th the 368th Infantry was brigaded with the 11th Cuirassiers under command of the XXXVIII Army Corps (French) forming the liaison detachment between the French and American armies.

October 9th it was in line in the Marbach sector, astride the Moselle River from October 9th to November 15th.

The artillery brigade joined the division October 23, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the reports showed that the 92nd Division suffered the following casualties: battle deaths, 185; wounded, 1,495; prisoners, 17.

To include March 1, 1919, twenty-one individuals of this division had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The division commanders were as follows: Brig. Gen. Chas. C. Ballou, October 30, 1917, to November 20, 1917; Brig. Gen. John E. McMahon, November 23 to December 3, 1917; Maj. Gen. Chas. C. Ballou, December 3, 1917, to January 12, 1918; Brig. Gen. Jas. B. Erwin, January 12, 1918, to March 12, 1918;

Maj. Gen. Chas. C. Ballou, March 12, 1918, to November 12, 1918.

The units composing the division were as follows:

183rd and 184th Infantry brigades.

365th, 366th, 367th, 368th Infantry regiments.

350th, 351st Machine Gun battalions.

167th Artillery Brigade.

349th, 350th, and 351st Artillery regiments.

317th Trench Mortar Battery.

349th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion.

317th Engineer Regiment and Train.

325th Field Signal Battalion.

317th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

317th Supply Train.

317th Ammunition Train.

317th Sanitary Train.

365th, 366th, 367th, and 368th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 3rd DIVISION

In compliance with letter, Adjutant General's Office, dated November 15, 1917, the division was organized on November 21, 1917, at Camp Greene, Charlotte, North Carolina. The first units sailed from the United States on April 4, 1918, and the last units arrived in France May 30, 1918. The division went into the Château Villaine training area. Part of the division entered the line at Château-Thierry and Hill 204 May 31st.

The entire division entered the Château-Thierry sector in June. On July 15th they met the Germans

who crossed the Marne. On July 21st the division attacked across the Marne east of Château-Thierry and advanced to the Ourcq, where it was relieved on July 29th.

On September 10th the 3rd Division entered the St. Mihiel sector and formed a part of the V Corps Reserve in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. Was relieved September 14th.

The division entered the line September 30th in the Argonne offensive, relieving a line division, and fought continuously until October 27th, when it was relieved north of Montfaucon.

On November 14th the division entered the line on the right of the American Third Army and marched to the Rhine via Conflans and Saaburg, where it occupied the Kreis of Mayon.

The division insignia consists of three white stripes which stand for the three operations in which the 3rd Division took part, the Marne, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. The blue stands for the loyalty of those who placed their lives on the altar of self-sacrifice in defence of American ideals of liberty and democracy. The division is known as the Marne division.

The total battle casualties of the division were 16,356 as reported up to March 8, 1918. 233 individuals of the 3rd Division had received the Distinguished Service Cross up to March 1, 1919.

The commanding generals of the division from the time of its organization were as follows: Maj. Gen. Jos. T. Dickman, November 28, 1917, to February

'26, 1918; Brig. Gen. Jas. A. Irons, February 27, 1918, to March 18, 1918; Maj. Gen. Jos. T. Dickman, April 12, 1918, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. Beaumont B. Buck, August 31, 1918, to October 17, 1918; Brig. Gen. Preston Brown, October 17, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

Attention is invited to an article in the May, 1919, number of the *Century Magazine* entitled "The American Expeditionary Forces at Château-Thierry" by Col. R. H. C. Kelton, General Staff, who was Chief-of-Staff of this division at that time.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 89th DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instructions the 89th Division was organized at Camp Funston, Kansas, in September, 1917. The division was composed of National Army drafts mainly from Kansas, Missouri, and Colorado.

The division remained in training at Camp Funston until May, 1918, when the division moved to Camp Mills, New York, in preparation for movement overseas. On June 4th division headquarters and the majority of the division embarked from New York and the last units arrived in France on July 10th. Upon arrival in France the division was ordered to the Reynel training area (Haute-Marne) except the divisional artillery which was ordered to Camp Souge, near Bordeaux, for training. The division remained in the Reynel area until August 5th when it was moved by bus to the Toul front where it occupied the line between northeast corner of Bois de Bau-

shot to the middle of the Etang de Vorgevaux, and was supported by the 55th Field Artillery and French 250th Regiment Field Artillery. On September 12th the division participated in the St. Mihiel offensive as the right division of the American IV Corps and advanced to a depth of twenty-one kilometers including the capture of the towns of Bency, Essey, Boullionville, Pannes, and Xammes.

On October 7th the division was relieved in the Pannes-Fliry-Limey sector by the 37th Division and was moved by bus to the Recicourt area and became part of the First Army Reserves. On October 12th the division moved forward in rear of the 32nd Division as part of the American V Corps in the Argonne offensive, and on October 20th the division went into the line along the Sommerance-Romagne road just north of the Kriemhilde defence positions. The division attacked on November 1st and continued in the assault until the armistice was signed when it had crossed the Meuse north of Stenay. The division was placed under the VII Corps of the Third Army and on November 24th began its march into Germany. The division was assigned the area bounded by Kreise of Prum, Bitburg, Trier, and Saarburg with division headquarters at Kyllburg where it was joined by the divisional artillery which had been serving with the 28th Division. On May 19, 1919, the division sailed for the United States and debarked at New York. It was then sent to Camp Funston, Kansas, where it was demobilized shortly afterward.

The commanding generals of this division were: Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, August 27, 1917, to November 26, 1917; Brig. Gen. Frank L. Winn, November 26, 1917, to April 12, 1918; Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, April 12, 1918, to May 24, 1918; Brig. Gen. Frank L. Winn, May 24, 1918, to September, 14, 1918; Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Wright, September 14, 1918, to October 24, 1918; Maj. Gen. Frank L. Winn, October 24, 1918, to November 11, 1918.

The division is popularly known as the middle west division and its shoulder insignia is a black "W" in a black circle. Different colours are placed in the lower part of the "W" according to the various branches of the service.

The division captured from the enemy the following: 5,061 prisoners, 127 pieces of artillery, 455 machine guns. The division advanced thirty-six kilometers against resistance.

During active operations the division suffered the following casualties as reported to the War Department, May 10, 1919: killed 1,419; wounded, 7,394; number taken prisoners, 1 officer and 24 men.

The following decorations have been awarded to individuals of this division:

Congressional Medal of Honour, 8; Distinguished Service Crosses, 119; Distinguished Service Medals, 2; Croix de Guerre, 55; Belgian Cross L'Ordere Leopold, 1; Belgian Croix de Guerre, 2.

The division was composed of the following organizations:

177th and 178th Infantry brigades.

164th Artillery Brigade.

353rd, 354th, 355th, and 356th Infantry regiments.

340th, 341st, 342nd Machine Gun battalions.

340th, 341st, 342nd Field Artillery regiments.

314th Trench Mortar battery.

314th Engineer Regiment and Train.

314th Field Signal battalion.

314th Headquarters Train and Military Police.

314th Ammunition Train.

314th Supply Train.

314th Sanitary Train consisting of Field Hospital and Ambulance companies Nos. 353, 354, 355, and 356.

FACTS AND FIGURES OF THE FIGHTING ARMY

STRENGTH FIRST ARMY.

MAXIMUM FIGURES

Americans	896,000	Oct. 6
French	138,300	Oct. 10
TOTAL.	1,034,300	

DAILY AUTOMATIC SUPPLIES ORDERED BY G-4 FOR THE TROOPS OF THE FIRST ARMY

SEPTEMBER	MEN	ANIMALS	GASOLINE
23rd	791,719	122,590	151,720
24th	790,000	123,000	152,000
25th	775,000	127,000	157,000
26th	777,800	129,900	159,300
27th	807,971	128,044	159,440
28th	835,026	129,571	158,835
29th	851,306	132,146	167,617
30th	864,000	134,000	170,300
OCTOBER			
1st	878,694	135,803	170,420
2nd	852,400	128,300	169,400
3rd	842,800	121,800	167,700
4th	855,000	131,900	169,800
5th	872,800	135,400	171,200
6th	896,000	143,500	178,800
7th	870,600	132,300	176,400
8th	890,100	133,100	166,100
9th	617,700	109,200	123,400
10th	623,100	108,000	132,900

OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING

OCTOBER	MEN	ANIMALS	GASOLINE
11th	609,100	105,100	126,200
12th	597,900	96,700	132,300
13th	596,800	97,400	133,300
14th	633,400	99,000	136,600
15th	605,700	94,000	120,600
16th	646,600	103,700	126,100
17th	618,800	113,300	124,600
18th	593,700	102,200	122,200
19th	592,800	102,100	122,300
20th	594,800	101,300	123,700
21st	592,600	102,100	123,600
22nd	593,500	102,200	123,500
23rd	592,300	98,000	121,900
24th	589,400	98,200	124,100
25th	552,500	91,400	117,300
26th	612,900	101,800	122,700
27th	641,500	103,000	136,700
28th	634,600	97,000	132,700
29th	651,300	103,300	133,900
30th	651,000	99,100	138,600
31st	599,900	86,300	128,400
NOVEMBER			
1st	645,900	102,100	135,200
2nd	681,400	103,600	143,500
3rd	679,200	102,500	144,100
4th	678,400	100,200	143,900
5th	688,800	100,200	196,100
6th	668,200	97,700	144,300
7th	683,700	102,200	147,200
8th	707,600	103,600	148,700
9th	712,200	100,400	147,100
10th	683,200	97,000	147,100
11th	694,100	99,100	140,900

Extract from report of Asst. Chief-of-Staff G-4, First Army,
showing strength of First Army on various dates.

OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING
THE AMERICAN COMMANDERS

269

FIRST ARMY

Commander-in-Chief, Gen. John J. Pershing
Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett

I CORPS

Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett
Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Dickman

V CORPS

Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron
Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall

III CORPS

Maj. Gen. Robt. L. Bullard
Maj. Gen. John L. Hines

FRENCH XVII CORPS

General Claudel

DIVISION COMMANDERS

- 1st. Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall**
Brig. Gen. F. E. Bamford
Brig. Gen. Frank Parker
- 2nd. Maj. Gen. John A. Le Jeune**
- 3rd. Maj. Gen. Beaumont B. Buck**
- 4th. Maj. Gen. John L. Hines**
Maj. Gen. Mark L. Hersey
- 5th. Maj. Gen. John E. McMahon**
Maj. Gen. Hanson E. Ely
- 26th. Maj. Gen. Clarence E. Edwards**
Brig. Gen. F. E. Bamford
- 28th. Maj. Gen. Charles H. Muir**
- 29th. Maj. Gen. Charles G. Morton**
- 32nd. Maj. Gen. W. G. Haan**
- 33rd. Maj. Gen. George Bell, Jr.**
- 35th. Maj. Gen. Peter E. Traub**
- 37th. Maj. Gen. C. S. Farnsworth**
- 42nd. Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher**
- 77th. Maj. Gen. Robert Alexander**
- 78th. Maj. Gen. James H. McRae**
- 79th. Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn**
- 80th. Maj. Gen. A. Cronkhite**

81st.	Maj. Gen. C. J. Bailey
82nd.	Maj. Gen. George B. Duncan
80th.	Maj. Gen. William M. Wright
90th.	Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen
91st.	Maj. Gen. William H. Johnston

AMERICAN DIVISIONS ENGAGED

The following American divisions were engaged in the Meuse-Argonne battle:

REGULAR ARMY

DIV.	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY
First	16, 18, 26, 28	5, 6, 7
Second	9, 23 Inf. 5 and 6 Marines	12, 15, 17
Third	4, 7, 30, 38	10, 18, 76
Fourth	39, 47, 58, 59	13, 16, 77
Fifth	10, 11, 60, 61	19, 20, 21

NATIONAL GUARD

26th, New England .	101, 102, 103, 104	101, 102, 103
28th, Pennsylvania .	109, 110, 111, 112	107, 108, 109
29th, Maryland and Va.	113, 114, 115, 116	110, 111, 112
32nd, Wis. and Mich.	125, 126, 127, 128	119, 120, 121, 113, 114, 115
33rd, Illinois . . .	129, 130, 131, 132	104, 105, 106
35th, Kansas, Mo. .	137, 138, 139, 140	128, 129, 130
37th, Ohio	145, 146, 147, 148	122, 123, 124
42nd, Rainbow . . .	165, 166, 167, 168	149, 150, 151, 146, 148

NATIONAL ARMY

77th, New York City	305, 306, 307, 308	304, 305, 306
78th, N. Y., N. J., Pa.	309, 310, 311, 312	307, 308, 309
79th, Va., Maryland.	313, 314, 315, 316	325, 326, 327

DIV.	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY
80th, Pa., W. Va., Va.	317, 318, 319, 320	313, 314, 315
81st, Tenn., Carolinas	321, 322, 323, 324	128, 129, 130
82nd, Georgia, Ala.	325, 326, 327, 328	319, 320, 321
89th, Kansas, Mo.	353, 354, 355, 356	340, 341, 342
90th, Texas, Okla.	357, 358, 359, 360	313, 314, 315
91st, Pacific Coast	361, 362, 363, 364	113, 114, 115

FIRST ARMY

I CORPS	V CORPS	III CORPS	FRENCH XVII CORPS
Divs.	Divs.	Divs.	Divs.
77, 28, 35	91, 37, 79	4, 80, 33	29, 18F, 26F
78, 82, I	42-32, 32, 80	3, 33	79, 26, 26
77, 80	3, 5	5, 15 F.C.	33
—, I	2-89, — —	90, 5, 32	

42

SPECIAL ARTILLERY USED

The special artillery employed in the Meuse-Argonne battle, exclusive of artillery employed as divisional artillery, was as follows:

AMERICAN ARTILLERY

134th Field Artillery	75
135th Field Artillery	75
136th Field Artillery	155 How.
147th Field Artillery	155
347th Field Artillery	4-7
348th Field Artillery	155 G. P. F.
44th Regt. C.A.C.	8-inch How.
43rd Regt. C.A.C.	190
51st Regt. C.A.C.	240-270
53rd Regt. C.A.C.	340-400-81 M.
55th Regt. C.A.C.	155

272 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING

56th Regt. C.A.C.	155
57th Regt. C.A.C.	155
59th Regt. C.A.C.	8-inch How.
60th Regt. C.A.C.	155
65th Regt. C.A.C.	9.2 How.
Naval Battalion	14-inch
52nd Regt. C.A.C.	81 M.

FRENCH ARTILLERY

219th Regiment	75
238th Regiment	75
247th Regiment	75
117th Regiment	105
183rd Regiment	105
451st Regiment	105
454th Regiment	105
456th Regiment	105
6th Foot Artillery	90 to 155
5th R.A.P.	95-120-155
1st R.A.P.	120-155
151st R.A.P.	120-L
86th R.A.D.	145-155
81st R.A.L.	145-155
87th R.A.D.	145-155
113th Regt.	155 Short
142nd Regt.	155 Short
301st Regt.	155 Short
317th Regt.	155 Short
330th Regt.	155 Short
407th Regt.	155
416th Regt.	155 Long
413th Regt.	155
420th Regt.	155 Long
182nd Foot Artillery	120-155-220
308th Regt.	155-220 T. R.
289th Regt.	155-200 M.

282nd Regt.	220 T. R.—270—280
71st Regt.	240
73rd Regt.	270—293
74th Regt.	190
75th Regt.	305
76th Regt.	305
77th Regt.	340
78th Regt.	370—84 M.
Naval Batteries—6th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 17th, 18th—16M.	

PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES BY DIVISIONS FOR ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE

Division	Total Casualties	Average Strength	Percentage	Percentage of Casualties by Various Classes as Reported				
				Killed	Known Prisoners	Missing	Wounded	Gassed
First . . .	527	27,632	.019	.00285		.00209	.01368	.00038
Second . . .	1,563	31,259	.05	.00625	.0004	.00935	.0333	.0007
Third . . .	11	27,348	.0004	.00007			.00033	
Fourth . . .	86	26,441	.0032	.00067		.00022	.00179	.00052
Fifth . . .	1,614	24,653	.065	.01148	.00008	.00294	.0497	.0008
Sixth . . .								
Seventh . . .	540	27,092	.0199	.000995			.018905	
*Twenty-sixth . . .								
Twenty-eighth . . .								
Twenty-ninth . . .								
Thirty-second . . .	5	23,173	.0002	.00012			.00008	
Thirty-third . . .								
Thirty-fifth . . .								
Thirty-seventh . . .								
Forty-second . . .	876	25,230	.0347	.0064		.0018	.0254	.0011
Seventy-seventh . . .								
Seventy-eighth . . .	40	19,569	.002	.00025			.0017	.00005
Seventy-ninth . . .								
Eightieth . . .								
Eighty-first . . .								
Eighty-second . . .	998	26,621	.037	.002257	.000222	.00185	.01961	.013061
Eighty-ninth . . .	1,077	23,998	.0449	.0062		.0002	.0297	.0088
Ninetieth . . .	2,411	24,456	.0986	.0104		.0017	.0697	.0186
Ninety-first . . .								
Ninety-second . . .								
*Twenty-sixth as shown by them at St. Mihiel sector.	1,792	27,092	.0661	.0073	.0004	.0009	.0387	.0189

PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES BY DIVISIONS FOR MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

Division	Total Casualties	Average Strength	Percentage	Percentage of Casualties by Various Classes as Reported				
				Killed	Known Prisoners	Missing	Wounded	Gassed
First	9,186	22,652	.4055	.0549	.0002	.0588	.2204	.0712
Second	3,314	26,800	.1236	.015	.0005	.0164	.0885	.0032
Third	8,374	21,687	.3861	.0583	.00309	.02124	.24633	.05714
Fourth	5,440	21,540	.2525	.0288	.00176	.0174	.1798	.0265
Fifth	5,818	19,826	.2934	.04665	.00176	.01115	.22054	.0132
Sixth	52	19,155	.0027	.00036	.0001	.0001	.000268	.00016
Seventh	133	18,747	.007	.00058	.00015	.00015	.00163	.00464
Twenty-sixth	4,072	23,608	.1725	.02225	.01087	.01837	.13545	.06986
Twenty-eighth	3,899	22,079	.1766	.02278	.002	.008	.1433	.0951
Twenty-ninth	4,765	17,262	.276	.0276	.0028	.0359	.1866	.0264
Thirty-first	6,344	22,505	.2819	.0302	.003	.0024	.0696	.0923
Thirty-second	4,355	23,807	.1828	.0155	.00311	.0204	.27029	.01739
Thirty-third	7,414	21,951	.3377	.02651	.00021	.00626	.10589	.01695
Thirty-fifth	3,493	23,650	.1477	.01839	.00046	.00232	.10394	.03083
Forty-second	3,673	23,715	.1549	.01735	.00046	.01	.1601	.024
Seventy-seventh	5,561	23,413	.2375	.0434	.00064	.01063	.17236	.09288
Seventy-eighth	5,987	18,806	.3183	.04179	.00187	.06231	.18027	.02143
Seventy-ninth	6,764	22,815	.2965	.03072	.00374	.00666	.14001	.06074
Eightieth	5,609	22,784	.2462	.03505	.00273	.0003	.00881	.00823
Eighty-first	1,032	20,792	.0496	.00853	.00027	.01854	.17922	.06489
Eighty-second	6,274	20,304	.309	.03703	.00027	.00863	.13236	.05253
Eighty-ninth	5,825	25,392	.2294	.03602	.00046	.01352	.13602	.03374
Ninetieth	4,577	21,572	.2122	.02907	.00085	.00511	.17186	.01899
Ninety-first	4,801	19,712	.2435	.04505	.00049	.0032	.00831	.00235
Ninety-second	279	22,123	.0126	.00172	.00049	.0032	.00831	.00235

OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING

AIRPLANES—FIRST ARMY AIR SERVICE

St. Mihiel Offensive:

1918	BOMBARDMENT		PURSUIT		OBSERVATION	
	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE
Sept. 12th	88	65	372	297	338	245
13th	85	47	372	230	324	245
14th	85	62	363	200	343	257
15th	88	53	372	221	336	264
Average	86	57	370	237	335	252

FRENCH AÉRIAL DIVISION

1918	TOTAL	AVAILABLE
Sept. 12th	513	336
13th	595	426
14th	678	440
15th	623	400
Average	602	400

Argonne-Meuse Offensive:

1918	PURSUIT		BOMBARDMENT		OBSERVATION	
	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE
Sept. 26th	312	193	86	58	423	333
27th	322	207	83	60	434	344
28th	325	185	68	48	407	322
29th	333	200	70	51	419	362
30th	339	228	71	52	419	361
Oct. 1st	334	223	79	51	421	356
2nd	331	198	81	59	423	343
3rd	331	198	81	59	423	343
4th	297	185	79	55	419	342
5th	296	202	78	55	400	330

OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING

277

	1918	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE
Oct.	6th	301	191	82	56	417	324
	7th	279	198	82	56	393	320
	8th	276	198	85	63	423	332
	9th	282	193	93	71	438	342
	10th	310	154	93	67	436	320
	11th	282	181	97	71	443	330
	12th	274	192	101	78	426	329
	13th	287	222	100	80	435	352
	14th	296	217	97	82	431	356
	15th	293	204	99	84	434	355
	16th	280	213	98	83	423	354
	17th	282	197	107	98	332	275
	18th	278	169	116	91	324	259
	19th	281	170	103	82	350	263
	20th	282	188	108	91	352	274
	21st	283	174	103	93	354	280
	22nd	277	132	95	81	346	275
	23rd	278	139	98	73	341	275
	24th	276	172	104	72	337	270
	25th	274	178	100	76	328	271
	26th	274	176	101	80	340	287
	27th	280	166	101	75	343	282
	28th	280	154	99	76	342	274
	29th	276	139	103	73	337	263
	30th	282	141	107	66	331	254
	31st	284	145	93	61	331	260
Nov.	1st	284	173	92	73	317	244
	2nd	289	174	93	79	338	262
	3rd	288	161	95	71	328	247
	4th	288	163	94	69	320	240
	5th	295	168	94	64	318	220
	6th	290	153	93	66	302	221
	7th	285	171	93	73	326	251
	8th	287	150	95	81	332	253

	1918	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE	TOTAL	AVAIL- ABLE
Nov.	9th	283	181	95	85	311	246
	10th	284	164	95	81	307	246
	11th	283	188	94	80	305	242
	—	—	80	—	—	—	—
			242				
			400				

Number of enemy planes destroyed and confirmed—417.

Number of enemy balloons destroyed and confirmed—53.

Number of our planes lost in action—199.

Number of our balloons destroyed—22.

Balloons in St. Mihiel Offensive—16 (1 for each Company on the front).

Balloons in Argonne-Meuse Offensive—22.

AMERICAN SQUADRONS IN FIRST ARMY OFFENSIVE

St. Mihiel:

- 12 Monoplane Pursuit Squadrons.
- 9 Corps Observation Squadrons.
- 2 Army Observation Squadrons.
- 1 Bombardment Squadron.
- 1 Night Reconnaissance Squadron.
-
- 25 TOTAL.

Argonne-Meuse:

- 13 Monoplane Pursuit Squadrons (1 night).
- 7 Corps Observation Squadrons.
- 3 Army Observation Squadrons (1 night).
- 4 Bombardment Squadrons.
- 1 Army Artillery Observation Squadron.
-
- 28 TOTAL.

The First Day Bombardment Group joined the Army Air Forces on this front on October 16th with an available strength of 85 planes. It took the place of the French Night Bombers.

The records of the Air Service during the battle are best set out as given in the official operations reports. These records follow:

DATE	OUR PLANES CRASHED OR MISSING	ENEMY PLANES DOWNED	ENEMY LOSS CONFIRMED	CONFIRMATION OF VICTORY REQUESTED
Sept. 26	13	19	5	
" 27	7	26	3	
" 28	7	33	6	
" 29	2	7	—	
" 30	8	8	3	
Oct. 1	3	—	—	
" 2	12	14	11	
" 3	5	8	—	
" 4	30	18	—	
" 5	11	7	1	
" 6	12	8	—	
" 7	5	1	—	
" 8	4	3	—	
" 9	6	9	—	
" 10	10	33	—	
" 11	2	—	—	—
" 12	2	—		1
" 13	—	—		—
" 14	—	—		—
" 15	4	—		—
" 16	3	—		1
" 17	2			—
" 18	8			17
" 19	5			2
" 20	1			—
" 21	5			2
Totals	<u>167</u>	<u>194</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>23</u>

OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING

DATE	OUR PLANES CRASHED OR MISSING	ENEMY PLANES DOWNED	ENEMY LOSS CONFIRMED	CONFIRMATION OF VICTORY REQUESTED
<i>Brought Forward</i>	167	194	29	23
Oct. 22	5			14
" 23	7			28
" 24	8			—
" 25	1			—
" 26	3			1
" 27	14			13
" 28	8			3
" 29	14			23
" 30	12			23
" 31	8			7
Nov. 1	4			1
" 2	3			—
" 3	18			7
" 4	11			30
" 5	16			19
" 6	12			7
" 7	2			—
" 8	4			3
" 9	4			1
" 10	1			2
" 11	2			—
<i>Totals</i>	<u>324</u>	<u>194</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>205</u>

Our Bombing Groups during the period from Sept. 26th to Nov. 11th dropped behind the enemy's lines a total of 94,448 kilograms of explosives.

AIR SERVICE CASUALTIES

The casualties in the American Air Service which took part in the Meuse-Argonne battle are reported in the period from August 20th to November 11th as follows:

UNIT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	PRISONERS
1st Pursuit Group	28	11	19	
2nd Pursuit	10	1	30	
3rd Pursuit	9	9	24	
1st Corps Observation.	21	25	17	
3rd Corps Observation.	9	9	5	
5th Corps Observation.	7	11	2	1
1st Army Observation.	7	12	16	
1st Day Bombardment.	14	26	41	15
<i>Totals</i>	105	104	154	16

The number of American planes shot down in this period is given in the Air Service reports as 199; number of our balloons shot down in the same period, 22.

Confirmation of the destruction of enemy aircraft was requested in the following cases; this report covering the period from August 10th to November 11th:

UNIT	ENEMY AIRPLANES	ENEMY BALLOONS
1st Pursuit Group	107	51
2nd Pursuit	146	3
3rd Pursuit	87	8
1st Corps Observation	16	
3rd Corps Observation	7	
5th Corps Observation	12	
1st Army Observation	33	
1st Day Bombardment.	48	
<i>Totals</i>	456	62

TANKS

The following tank organizations were employed in the Meuse-Argonne offensive:

AMERICAN TANKS

<i>1st American Brigade (now 304th)—Light</i>	
344th Battalion	69
345th Battalion	73
<i>Total</i>	<u>142</u>

FRENCH TANKS

<i>504th Regiment—Light</i>	
17th Group	13
<i>505th Regiment—Light</i>	
14th Group	15
St. Chamond Group—Heavy	25
Schneider Group—Medium	20
<i>Total</i>	<u>73</u>

Out of 142 fighting tanks the Americans lost 22 totally destroyed. The French lost about 25. The American tank casualties in men were as follows:

Officers—Killed	3;	wounded	18,	Total	21
Men—	Killed	16;	"	126,	" 142
<i>Grand Total</i>					<u>163</u>

The American tanks were used in the advance up the Aire valley while the French were employed in the Bois de Montfaucon, at Montfaucon, Cunel, Septsarges, Romagne, in the Bois de Cuisy, and in the valley of the Andon River. These tanks fought with the following divisions: 79th, 37th, 4th, 80th, 32nd, and 3rd. The French tanks were in action from September 26th to October 14th making their last attack on October

9th. The American tanks were used in several stages of the attack, making their last attack November 2nd. All the tanks had great difficulty in getting across No Man's Land and for the launching of the offensive September 26th and the two days following. The French tanks had to cross the famous Hill 304 which was regarded as the worst terrain on the Western Front as it was covered with shell craters from the battle of Verdun in 1916. The tanks which were destroyed were direct hits. Officers of the Tank Corps report that the anti-tank rifle did very little damage.


THE END



THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS
GARDEN CITY, N. Y.









JAN 29 1935



